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General introduction
“As a result of the crisis, a hundred
intellectual flowers are blooming”
– Olivier Blanchard (2015),
Overview
As the title suggests, this thesis explores the linkages between interbank markets and
financial stability primarily through the application of tools from network theory. Fol-
lowing the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, the use of networks in assessing financial
stability and systemic risk has grown in importance (Schweitzer et al., 2009) due to their
inherent ability in capturing the externalities that the risk associated to a single institu-
tion poses for the entire financial system (Allen and Babus, 2009). Moreover, networks
allow for a structural perspective comprising nodes and the links connecting them. In
the case of interbank markets, nodes represent banks and the links the various types
of interdependencies between them. To this end, I argue that interconnections between
banks play a front-and-centre role in driving both individual bank behaviour and dynam-
ics at the system level. With the primary focus being on the interbank market, each of
the three chapters comprising the thesis is situated firmly within this narrative: Chap-
ter 1 identifies the importance of banking sector dynamics in post-crisis macroeconomic
modelling and posits an additional role for interconnectedness, Chapter 2 highlights the
importance of network structure in driving financial contagion and Chapter 3 combines
two approaches from the emerging field of complexity economics namely, network theory
and Agent-Based Modelling to create a model in which interbank market tensions is an
emergent phenomenon arising due to the interplay between counterparty and liquidity
risk.
2 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Interbank markets and the financial crisis
The global interbank market is defined as an Over-the-Counter (OTC) money market in
which banks extend loans to one another at short maturities (with the majority being
overnight). In the secured segment of the market, the loan is guaranteed by highly liquid,
short term debt securities while unsecured transactions are settled without collateral. The
market performs a key function in ensuring the smooth functioning and stability of the
global financial system for two primary reasons: First, it provides a key source of liquidity
for banks thereby allowing for the efficient channelling of funds from savers to investment
in the face of unexpected liquidity imbalances. The second reason derives from the manner
in which modern central banks conduct monetary policy. Taking the European Central
Bank (ECB) and the US Federal Reserve as examples, both operate under the inflation
targeting paradigm whereby the central bank targets a specific short-term interest rate in
debt markets in order to achieve/maintain a desired inflation rate. Under this framework,
the central bank buys or sells eligible government securities on the open market in order to
steer short-term interest rates and indirectly expand or contract the total money supply in
the economy. Since these open market operations are conducted with banks as the main
counterparty, short-term money market rates (in the Eurozone, this rate is given by the
EONIA or Euro Overnight Index Average rate) are the first to be affected by the central
bank’s policy rate. This in turn affects bank deposit and lending rates, credit supply and
aggregate demand in a process known as the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Despite tensions in global financial markets going back to August 2007 when the French
bank, BNP Paribas informed clients that it was suspending three of its funds exposed to
US subprime mortgages, citing a “complete evaporation of liquidity” making it impos-
sible to adequately value its assets, the watershed moment occurred on September 15th,
2008 when the major US investment bank, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. This
sent shockwaves through international financial markets due to the highly globalised and
interconnected nature of the institution and resulted in a global widening of risk premia
in unsecured interbank markets.
3In the EU, one of the most common barometers of interbank market strains is the
EURIBOR-OIS1 spread which proxies banks’ perception of the default/credit risk of other
banks. The evolution of the 3m EURIBOR-OIS spread during the crisis is provided be-
low:2
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Figure 1: 3m EURIBOR-OIS Spread. Source: Bloomberg
Following a prolonged period of low spreads, the Lehman bankruptcy instigated a large
jump, indicating a rapid accumulation of risks over a span of one month, eventually
spiking at 200 bp after which the aggressive intervention by the ECB (as I will further
detail below) succeeded in alleviating interbank market tensions.
In normal times, the ECB uses the various instruments at its disposal to steer short
term interest rates in order to provide an anchor for the term structure of interest rates
and achieve its inflation target of close to 2% as per its mandate. In doing so, the
benchmark EU short-term interbank lending rate, the EONIA3 fluctuates around the
ECB’s interest rate on its Main Refinancing Operations (MRO). However, as the crisis
intensified following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 15th 2008, the ECB
1The EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offered Rate) is a daily reference rate based on the average at which
Eurozone banks lend unsecured funds to each other in the Euro wholesale money market. Comprising
various maturities ranging from 1 week to 1 year, it is constructed by a panel of 23 major EU banks
and is a key benchmark for pricing approximately EUR 150 trillion worth of financial products globally.
Overnight Index Swaps (OIS) are considered risk-free, measuring the market’s expectation of overnight
rates over the term of the contract.
2Data between June and December 2008. Black dashed line represents the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy
(15/09/2008). Red dashed line represents ECB move from variable to fixed rate tender allotments
(15/10/2008)
3Using a panel of 30 large EU banks, the rate is calculated on a daily basis by the ECB as a weighted
average based on actual overnight, unsecured interbank transactions.
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reacted by decreasing its main refinancing rate by 150 bp from 4.25 to 3.75% on October
15th followed by a further reduction to 2.5% by the end of the year in order to ease liquidity
conditions on interbank markets where unfolding risks and information asymmetries led
to a systemwide crisis of confidence characterised by a global retrenchment from money
market funding (Trichet, 2010). Figure 2 below reports total trading volumes by EONIA-
quoting banks as well as the associated rate and ECB policy rates. In order to highlight
the growing redundancy of the conventional monetary policy framework, the EONIA rate
is compared to the main refinancing and the deposit facility rate as well as the volume of
bank deposits held by the ECB.
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Figure 2: EONIA volumes (L) and various rates + recourse to deposit facility (R). Source:
ECB.
Following the Lehman trigger, there is an immediate contraction of the interbank market,
both in terms of volumes and rates. From a policy perspective, the MRO and EONIA
rates diverged as the latter started to track the DF rate. This coincided with a sharp
increase in the use of the ECBs deposit facility (heretofore unused due to the lower rate
of return relative to wholesale funding). Recourse to the deposit facility can also be
interpreted as an increase in excess reserves (above the minimum reserve requirement
which until January 2012 was set at 2% of customer deposits) further highlighting banks’
hoarding behaviour during the crisis.
Coinciding with the decrease in the policy rate, the ECB implemented further emergency
measures by switching their liquidity-allotment policy from a variable rate tender to a
5policy of fixed rate full allotment (FRFA) under which all liquidity requests by banks are
met (against eligible collateral and under the condition of financial soundness) in order
to meet their short-term funding needs and ensure the continued availability of credit to
households and firms across the euro area. Figure 3 provides the allotment volumes (left
panel) and the number of banks bidding for funding (right panel) under the ECBs weekly
MRO tenders.
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Figure 3: ECB Main Refinancing Operations. Weekly frequency and maturity. Allotted
amounts calculated by the ECB such that banks are able to fulfil their reserve require-
ments. Source: ECB.
In line with the argument developed so far, the impact of the Lehman bankruptcy is
immediately apparent. Faced with the onset of funding shortages, banks substantially
increased their bids for ECB liquidity. Moreover, there is a clear increase in the number
of bidding banks relative to the situation before the crisis. As shown in the Figure 2(a),
interbank activity continued to decline combined with a concomitant increase in excess
reserves.
Given that the aforementioned policy measures were focussed largely on mitigating the
spillover of banking sector strains to the real economy, I end this section with a discussion
on changes in bank credit provision activities. Using data from the consolidated balance
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sheet of euro area MFIs4 (Monetary Financial Institutions), Figure 4 reports bank loans
to NFCs5 (Non Financial Corporations) and households.
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Figure 4: Loans vis-a`-vis euro area NFC (L) and households (R) reported by MFI exclud-
ing ESCB in the euro area (stock). Source: ECB
In order to highlight the impact of the crisis on credit provision relative to normal times,
a longer time series is provided. The impact of the Lehman bankruptcy is apparent:
following eight years of continuous loan growth, the crisis resulted in a sharp drop for
NFCs and a slowdown in loans to households. As I have shown in this section, the
crisis had a marked impact on the EU interbank market and the wider economy via a
contraction in credit. In response to this, the ECB entered uncharted territory by pumping
large amounts of liquidity into the system and substantially altering its monetary policy
framework in order to prevent a more widespread collapse.
4ECB Definition: Financial institutions which together form the money-issuing sector of the euro area.
These include the Eurosystem, resident credit institutions (as defined in EU law) and all other resident
financial institutions whose business is to receive deposits and/or close substitutes for deposits from
entities other than MFIs and, for their own account (at least in economic terms), to grant credit and/or
invest in securities.
5ECB Definition: Corporation or quasi-corporation that is not engaged in financial intermediation but is
active primarily in the production of market goods and non-financial services.
7The role of interconnectedness
As these events were unfolding, policymakers took note of the fact that what began as
a localised shock to the US subprime mortgage and collateralised debt obligation (CDO)
market ended up having global ramifications. Against this background, the interconnect-
edness of the financial system was identified as having played a central role in precipitating
the crisis via a complex web of direct and indirect links between market participants. No-
tably, Giannone et al. (2012) highlight how in the years preceding the crisis, Euro area
banks gradually replaced traditional retail funding i.e. deposits from households and firms
with funding obtained from the financial sector via the wholesale money market. A similar
trend was observed by Adrian and Shin (2010) for the US wherein other banks provided
a significant source of funding, primarily through the use of repurchase agreements6 and
securitised assets. Moreover, both identify the buildup of procyclical intra-financial sector
leverage via longer credit intermediation chains of financial institutions between ultimate
creditors and savers as having played a key role in allowing systemic risks to develop and
eventually unwind as distressed banks called in debt claims to shore up their own as-
sets thereby adversely affecting the liability-side of connected institutions’ balance sheets.
Similarly, rapid globalisation over the past three decades resulted in growing cross-border
exposures between banks, sovereigns and other market participants, adding an additional
channel for the financial crisis to deepen and attain global proportions (International
Monetary Fund, 2010).
6Also referred to as repos, repurchase agreements are a type of short-term loan consisting of the sale of an
asset (typically fixed-income securities such as government bonds) combined with a forward agreement to
repurchase it at maturity. Increasing repo haircuts and the cessation of repo lending against many forms
of collateral was described by Gorton and Metrick (2012) as a “run on repo” and identified as having
played a key role in exacerbating the subprime mortgage crisis.
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As central banks responded to the seizing up of interbank credit by stepping in as the
main intermediary across the banking sector, a number of key officials weighed in on the
potential for systemic risk arising due to the excessive complexity and interconnectedness
of the financial system. Notably, then-president of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet in a
speech to the Eurofi financial forum on September 30th, 2009 stated that:
“
. . . One of the key lessons stemming from the financial crisis relates to the impor-
tance of understanding and assessing the degree of “interconnectedness” between
market participants. In particular, the crisis demonstrated that the nature and
magnitude of the systemic risk in the financial sector is related not only to the
potential illiquidity or insolvency of large banks or other major regulated finan-
cial institutions, but it also depends on the close intertwining between financial
institutions, markets and infrastructures ”A sentiment that was also echoed by his US counterpart, then-Federal Reserve Chairman
Ben Bernanke on September 24th, 2010 in a speech given at Princeton University entitled
“Implications of the financial crisis for economics”:
“
. . . economists failed to predict the nature, timing, or severity of the crisis; and
those few who issued early warnings generally identified only isolated weaknesses
in the system, not anything approaching the full set of complex linkages and
mechanisms that amplified the initial shocks and ultimately resulted in a devastat-
ing global crisis and recession ”More recently, Janet Yellen, his successor emphasised the link between studying inter-
connectedness and systemic risk and emerging research in financial network analysis in
a speech to the American Economic and American Finance Associations on January 4th,
2013:
“
. . . Academic research that explores the relationship between network structure and
systemic risk is relatively new. Not surprisingly, interest in this field has increased
considerably since the financial crisis. A search of economics research focusing on
”systemic risk” or ”interconnectedness” since 2007 yields 624 publications, twice
as many as were produced in the previous 25 years ”
9Viewing the world through a network lens
As interconnectedness wove itself into the policy discourse, researchers were turning to
the use of network theory to better understand systemic risk and financial stability. In
a comprehensive survey of the literature, Hu¨ser (2015) highlights how the versatility of
interbank network models allows them to capture the entirety of the ‘financial fragility
hypothesis ’ posited by De Bandt et al. (2009) which outlines three interrelated features of
the financial system that can undermine financial stability. These are: (i) The complex
web of exposures amongst banks, (ii) the importance of balance sheet composition due to
the maturity transformation role played by banks and (iii) the informational and control
intensity of financial contracts. Against this background, the field of financial network
analysis has gained traction amongst academics and central bankers due to the intuitive
manner in which the various interdependencies between financial institutions are modelled
and the flexibility of the modelling framework.
Before outlining the interbank network models comprising the thesis, I provide a brief
overview of the early literature aimed at introducing networks into economic and financial
modelling. These articles can be classified along two dimensions:
 Financial contagion and network connectivity: In the immediate aftermath
of the crisis, there was a concerted effort amongst academics and policymakers
to understand how interdependencies designed to share risks could simultaneously
undermine financial stability by providing a channel for localised shocks to propagate
through the system.
 Understanding the architecture of financial systems: Due to rapid ad-
vances in computing power and the increasing availability of data over the past
decade, a prominent research avenue has opened up aimed at using granular ex-
posure/transaction data to map the structure of various financial markets using
networks in order to identify systemic vulnerabilities (e.g. banks who, by virtue of
their centrality in the network are deemed too-interconnected-to-fail).
While these approaches helped cement the use of networks in financial stability analysis,
the literature has since evolved to (i) focus on agent-behaviour, either embedded within a
network or as a driver in network formation and (ii) incorporate increasingly sophisticated
network topologies. These are expounded upon in the state-of-the-art section.
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The robust-yet-fragile property of financial networks
Prior to the crisis, the increasingly intertwined nature of global financial markets was
seen as a boon for the industry as it allowed for diversification of risks while providing
greater investment and liquidity opportunities for savers. From an economic modelling
perspective, the seminal theoretical contributions of Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas
et al. (2000) reached the same conclusion: That a highly interconnected network enhances
the resilience of the system to the insolvency of an individual bank. By contrast Brusco
and Castiglionesi (2007) develop an alternative theoretical model in which a larger num-
ber of interbank deposits promotes financial contagion. It was only after the crisis that
the notion of phase transitions and tipping points entered the financial stability lexicon.
Against this background, the higher connectivity is conducive to financial stability when
the magnitude of the shock is below a certain threshold. For large shocks, the same links
that allowed banks to diversify and dilute risks across multiple counterparties now act as
a channel for the propagation (and potential amplification) of financial distress stemming
from a small set of nodes/banks.
Initially elaborated by Haldane (2009) as the “robust-yet-fragile” property of financial
networks, several early works (notably, the seminal papers of Nier et al. (2007) and Gai
and Kapadia (2010)) explored the relationship between network structure and contagion,
finding that while higher connectivity does indeed mitigate the likelihood of financial
contagion (the robust aspect), the same set of linkages allow localised shocks of sufficient
magnitude to propagate through the network (the fragile property). Acemoglu et al.
(2015) add further nuance to the debate by identifying a shock magnitude threshold
below which the assertion of Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) holds and
above which interbank linkages facilitate financial contagion.
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Mapping interbank networks
Parallel to the efforts aimed at exploring the impact of connectivity on financial conta-
gion, another strand of research focussed on using data to empirically map real interbank
networks. Given the high level of granularity required to reconstruct bilateral linkages
combined with data confidentiality issues due to banks’ reluctance in disclosing their po-
sitions vis-a`-vis their counterparties/competitors, most of the current literature in this
domain falls within two categories: (i) interbank exposures obtained from national credit
registers7 and (ii) payments transaction data from which the web of exposures is inferred
using variations of an algorithm developed by Furfine (1999). As regards the actual struc-
ture of real-world networks, the literature has converged on two key features: (i) that in-
terbank networks exhibit a scale-free topology8 and (ii) that they exhibit a core-periphery
structure.
Note that the concept of scale-free networks, stemming from the seminal article of Baraba´si
and Albert (1999) aimed at classifying the network structure of several large datasets,
needs to be taken with a grain of salt. Indeed, an article by Broido and Clauset (2018)
tests the statistical fit of the scale-free paradigm applied to a wide variety of large datasets
and compares it to several alternatives such as the exponential and log-normal distribu-
tions, finding that pure scale-free networks are poorly represented in the real world.9
Below, I classify the articles that confirm the two structural features outlined above,
recalling the caveats mentioned in the previous paragraph.
7However, such data often suffers from reporting/completeness issues. Typically, researchers apply the
maximum entropy (ME) method originating from physics and first applied to interbank network analysis
by Sheldon and Maurer (1998). This features its own set of caveats including over/underestimation
of exposures and an inability to account for key stylised facts associated to interbank markets such as
sparseness or tiering (Upper, 2011).
8In this setup the degree distribution follows a power law whereby the fraction of nodes with degree k is
proportional to k−α, where α is the so-called scaling parameter. The term scale-free indicates that there
is no typical scale of the degrees, i.e. the mean may not be representative
9However, one of the originators of the model, Albert-La´szlo´ Baraba´si recently posted a rebuttal, entitled
“Love is all you need” and available at https://www.barabasilab.com/post/love-is-all-you-need.
In the piece, he argues for the existence of power laws in real-world networks, albeit subject to various
corrective functions such as exponential cutoffs and logarithmic corrections.
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Degree distribution
Boss et al. (2004) provide one of the first attempts to use interbank exposure data to map
the national interbank network. Using the Austrian credit register and bank balance sheet
data combined with ME to infer missing values, the reconstructed network is provided in
Figure 5 below. 2
The Austrian banking system has a sectoral organi-
zation due to historic reasons. Banks belong to one of
seven sectors: savings banks (S), Raiffeisen (agricultural)
banks (R), Volksbanken (VB), joint stock banks (JS),
state mortgage banks (SM), housing construction savings
and loan associations (HCL), and special purpose banks
(SP). Banks have to break down their balance sheet re-
ports on claims and liabilities with other banks according
to the different banking sectors, Central Bank and foreign
banks. This practice of reporting on balance interbank
positions breaks the liability matrix L down to blocks
of sub-matrices for the individual sectors. The savings
banks and the Volksbanken sector are organized in a
two tier structure with a sectoral head institution. The
Raiffeisen sector is organized by a three tier structure,
with a head institution for every federal state of Austria.
The federal state head institutions have a central institu-
tion, Raiffeisenzentralbank (RZB) which is at the top of
the Raiffeisen structure. Banks with a head institution
have to disclose their positions with the head institution,
which gives additional information on L. Since many
banks in the system hold interbank liabilities only with
their head institutions, one can pin down many entries in
the L matrix exactly. This information is combined in a
next step with the data from the major loans register of
OeNB. This register contains all interbank loans above a
threshold of 360 000 Euro. This information provides us
with a set of constraints (inequalities) and zero restric-
tions for individual entries Lij . Up to this point one can
obtain about 90% of the L-matrix entries exactly.
For the rest we employ an estimation routine based
on local entropy maximization, which has already been
used to reconstruct unknown bilateral interbank expo-
sures from aggregate information [9, 10]. The procedure
finds a matrix that fulfills all the known constraints and
treats all other parts (unknown entries in L) as contribut-
ing equally to the known row and column sums. These
sums are known since the total claims to other banks
have to reported to the Central Bank. The estimation
problem can be set up as follows: Assume we have a to-
tal of K constraints. The column and row constraints
take the form
N∑
j=1
Lij = b
r
i ∀ i and
N∑
i=1
Lij = b
c
j ∀ j (1)
with r denoting row and c denoting column. Constraints
imposed by the knowledge about particular entries in Lij
are given by
bl ≤ Lij ≤ bu for some i, j. (2)
The aim is to find the matrix L (among all the matrices
fulfilling the constraints) that has the least discrepancy to
some a priori matrix U with respect to the (generalized)
cross entropy measure
C(L,U) =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Lij ln
(
Lij
Uij
)
. (3)
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FIG. 1: The banking network of Austria (a). Clusters are
grouped (colored) according to regional and sectorial orga-
nization: R-sector with its federal state sub-structure: RB
yellow, RSt orange, light orange RK, gray RV, dark green
RT, black RN, light green RO, light yellow RS. VB-sector:
dark gray, S-sector: orange-brown, other: pink. Data is from
the September 2002 L matrix, which is representative for all
the other matrices. In (b) we show the contract size distribu-
tion within this network (histogram of all entries in L) which
follows a power law with exponent −1.87. Data is aggregated
from all 10 matrices.
U is the matrix which contains all known exact liability
entries. For those entries (bank pairs) ij where we have
no knowledge from Central Bank data, we set Uij = 1.
We use the convention that Lij = 0 whenever Uij = 0
and define 0 ln(00 ) to be 0. This is a standard convex op-
timization problem, the necessary optimality conditions
can be solved efficiently by an algorithm described in
[11, 12]. As a result we obtain a rather precise (see be-
low) picture of the interbank relations at a particular
point in time. Given L we plot the distribution (pdf)
of its entries in Fig. 1(b). The distribution of liabilities
Figure 5: The Austrian interbank network in September 2002. Coloured nodes repre-
sent different sectors : agricultural banks, Volksbanken, joint stock banks, state mortgage
banks, housing construction savings and loan associations, and special purpose banks
I addition to providing the first empirical mapping of an interbank network, Boss et al.
(2004) were also the first to confirm the scale-free topology of interbank networks, a
feature that has since been corroborated across various national markets. Using country-
specific bilateral exposure data, a number of researchers followed suit in mapping their
national in erbank networks. Notable studies confirming the scale-free archetype include
Soram¨ki et al. (2007) for the US Fedwire system, Alves et al. (2013) for large European
banks, De Masi et al. (2006) for the Italian interbank market and Leo´n and Berndsen
(2014) for the Colombian payment and settlement system.
Echoing the findings of Broido and Clauset (2018), another strand of the literature finds
limited evidence for the scale-free representation. For example, Bech and Atalay (2010)
identify the negative binomial distribution as providing the best fit for the out-degree
distribution of the US Federal Funds Market. Studying the Italian e-MID market10,
neither Iori et al. (2008) or Fricke and Lux (2015) find direct evidence in favour of the
scale-free degree distribution
10The e-MID electronic tradi g system was one of the first granular financial datasets that could be mapped
and interpreted in a netw r s context. It is p imarily used by Italian banks for unsecured, overnight
interbank credit.
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Core-periphery structures
A more recent development in the empirical literature has involved the classification of
interbank networks as exhibiting a core-periphery wherein a small, densely-connected
set of core banks extend credit amongst themselves and intermediate between a more
populous set of peripheral banks that do not interact with each other. This representation
has the added-value of being easier to interpret visually than the scale-free specification.
Moreover, Craig and Von Peter (2014) confirmed the strong empirical fit of the core-
periphery structure over the random and scale-free alternatives for the German interbank
network. Similar analyses on the Dutch and U.K interbank networks by van Lelyveld
et al. (2014) and Langfield et al. (2014) respectively also found a strong justification for
the core-periphery structure.
Interbank networks are also known to exhibit strong disassortative mixing (Montagna and
Lux, 2016) whereby high-degree nodes have a high tendency of connecting with low-degree
nodes and vice versa. The link between disassortative mixing and the scale-free property
has been identified by Fricke et al. (2013) while Craig and Von Peter (2014) highlights
the link to the core-periphery property.
Complementary to the empirical literature on estimating core-periphery networks, a the-
oretical literature has emerged aimed at identifying the behavioural mechanisms by which
such structures can develop endogenously. For example, van der Leij et al. (2014) develop
a network formation game in which a stable core-periphery structure arises when agents
are heterogeneous in terms of size. Lux (2015) allow banks to choose trading partners
by forming preferential relationships via a reinforcement learning algorithm based on the
degree of “trust” between banks. This concept of relationship lending plays a key role
in interbank market dynamics, stating that banks form stable, long-term relationships
between a small and stable set of counterparties, offerring them preferential treatment
in terms of lower interest rates and higher loan availability. This was first observed by
Cocco et al. (2009) for the Portuguese interbank market and has since been found to
drive bilateral link formation in the German (Bra¨uning and Fecht, 2016) and US (Afonso
et al., 2013) markets, both of whom identify the importance of relationships in minimising
search frictions. Similarly, the stability of interbank relationships over time is confirmed
by Affinito (2012) for the Italian interbank market.
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Multilayer networks
The versatility of network analysis extends beyond the simple interbank credit exposures
used to construct the above mapping. Using bilateral data on global CDS11 (Credit
Default Swap) trades, Peltonen et al. (2014) construct the following network mapping:
Figure 6: The global CDS network (Peltonen et al., 2014). Central clearing parties
(CCPs) are in blue. Dealers are in orange. Customers in green (red) if they are net CDS
buyers (sellers). Node size for customers is proportional to the square root of net notional
exposure
The relative opacity of the OTC market for CDS has raised systemic risk concerns in recent
years (Brunnermeier et al., 2013). By viewing the CDS market as a network, Peltonen
et al. (2014) identify a number of important features for systemic risk measurement.
Notably, the evident tiered structure combined with the concentration around 14 dealers
who are the only members of the two CCPs.
In a recent report by the Office of Financial Research within the US Department of the
Treasury, Bookstaber and Kenett (2016) highlight the need to recognise the numerous
interdependencies (beyond simple credit exposures) that can exist between banks as well
as the mechanisms through which risks can spread through the financial system. These
concerns are at the heart of the recent drive in mapping and modelling multilayer networks
(i.e. networks of networks). Two examples, based on the Mexican and UK interbank
networks are provided below:
11These are financial derivatives designed as an insurance contract against the default of a particular
entity. Historically, CDS facilitate risk-sharing amongst investors through improved price discovery and
allocation of capital. At the same time, trading and speculation on CDS on MBS (Mortgage-Backed
Securities) were at the heart of the financial crisis (Stulz, 2010).
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by each type of derivative contract. There are detailed
international agreements on the netting procedure in the
case of failure of a counterparty. This means, for in-
stance, that options with the same underlying security
are added up on each side and the exposures is then
assigned to the counterparty with positive net position.
This process is replicated for each type of derivative with
the same underlying security. The resulting net expo-
sures are then added up to calculate the final exposure
Lα=1ij (t), arising from derivative contracts between bank
i and bank j. In contrast to other, more developed fi-
nancial systems, derivatives in Mexico do not generate
size-able exposures and no exotic derivatives are traded.
Sophisticated derivative strategies are only defined and
executed by the parent banks of the Mexican subsidiaries.
D. Foreign exchange
As far as foreign exchange (FX) transactions are con-
cerned, exposures reflect settlement risk (or Herstatt
risk) – the risk that a counterparty will not pay as obli-
gated at the time of settlement. Mexican banks that are
subsidiaries of internationally active banks are members
of CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement), and are in the
position to settle their FX transactions in a secured way.
However, not all active banks in Mexico are in this situ-
ation and large exposures related to FX transactions do
arise. If banks settle FX transactions between themselves
by using the clearance service provided by CLS – which
eliminates time differences in settlement – there is no ex-
posure. Otherwise the exposure Lα=3ij (t) includes both
foreign currency receivable and foreign currency payable
between bank i and bank j.
Finally, various balance sheet data on the 43 Mexican
banks is also available, such as the capitalization mea-
sured at a monthly scale.
V. RESULTS
A. The financial multi-layer network – the
Mexican banking system
Figure 1 shows the various exposure layers of the Mex-
ican banking network at Sept 30 2013. The derivative
exposure network is seen in the top layer (green), the
second layer shows the exposures from securities cross-
holdings (yellow), the third shows foreign exchange ex-
posures (red). The fourth layer represents the interbank
deposits and loans market (blue). Nodes are shown at
the same position in all layers. Node-size represents the
size of banks’ total assets. Nodes i are colored according
to their systemic impact, as measured by the DebtRank,
Rαi , in the respective layer (see section III B). Systemi-
cally important banks are red, unimportant ones green.
The width of links represents the size of the exposures
in the layer; link-color is the same as the counterparty’s
Ri < .
Ri < .
R i < .
R i < .
R i < .
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FIG. 1. Banking multi-layer network of Mexico on Sept 30
2013. (a) network of exposures from derivatives, (b) securities
cross-holdings, (c) foreign exchange exposures, (d) deposits
and loans and (e) combined banking network Lcombij (t). Nodes
(banks) are colored according to their systemic impact Rαi
in the respective layer (see section III B): from systemically
important banks (red) to systemically safe (green). Node-size
represents banks’ total assets. Link-width is the exposure size
between banks, link-color is taken from the counterparty.
node color (DebtRank). The total exposure in layers
α = 2, 3, 4,
∑
i,j L
α
ij(t) ≈ 5 × 1010 Mex$, is similar in
size. The total exposure of derivatives (α = 1) is smaller,∑
i,j L
1
ij(t) ≈ 1 × 1010 Mex$. However, the number of
links is larger in this layer. Note that the data for deriva-
tive exposures also contains exposures from so-called repo
transactions; the respective amounts are small (less than
2 %) because the repo involves collateral. In fig. 1(e) the
combined exposures Lcombij (t) =
∑4
α=1 L
α
ij(t) are shown.
Classical network statistics for the multi-layer network
are collected and discussed briefly in appendix A.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of expo-
sure sizes for the different layers Lαij(t) is presented in
fig. 2. Distributions are obtained by taking all exposures
for every trading day in the observation period. Expo-
(a) Mexican banking network on September 30th 2013 (Poledna
et al., 2015). Layers: (a) deriv tives exposur s, (b) securities
cross-holdings, (c) foreign exchange exposures, (d) deposits and
loans and (e) combined banking network. Nodes are coloured
according to their systemic impact in the r spectiv layer: from
systemically important banks (red) to systemically safe (green).
Node size proportional to total assets. Edge width proportional
to exposure size between banks. Edge colour determined by coun-
t rpar y.
(b) UK interbank exposure (top) and interbank funding (bottom)
network in 2011 (Langfield et al., 2014). Node size proportional to
log(totalexposures) and log(receivedfunding) respectively. Or-
ange circles represent selected large UK banks, green circles rep-
resent investment banks, blue circles represent overseas banks and
red circles represent building societies. Edge width proportional
to the value of the exposures and funding amounts.
Figure 7: Multilayer network mapping
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Evidently, this domain of interbank network analysis is still in its infancy due to the high
volume and granularity of the data required to reconstruct such maps. Other examples
include Bargigli et al. (2015) using supervisory reports for the Italian banking sector
organised by maturity and whether the contract is secured or unsecured and Aldasoro
and Alves (2016) using exposure data for large European banks broken down by maturity
and type of instrument.
Interconnectedness and macroprudential policy
The post-crisis regulatory landscape revolves around the Basel III reforms first released
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in December 2010. Recently
finalised in December 2017, the reforms introduced macroprudential policy into the previ-
ous micro-prudentially oriented framework. Though the central aim of the package was to
strengthen bank capital adequacy ratios and tighten liquidity and funding requirements,
a number of aspects were aimed specifically at addressing systemic risk and interconnect-
edness. These are outlined in a report to the G20 prepared by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2010):
 Capital incentives for banks to use central counterparties for OTC derivatives;
 Higher capital requirements for trading and derivative activities, as well as complex
securitisations and off-balance sheet exposures
 Higher capital requirements for inter-financial sector exposures; and
 Introduction of liquidity requirements that penalise excessive reliance on short term,
interbank funding to support longer-dated assets.
Interconnectedness also features strongly in the identification of Global Systemically Im-
portant Banks (G-SIBS). The methodology used to determine the systemic importance
of a particular bank combines an indicator-based measurement approach with a buck-
eting/cutoff specification. In the first step, the five (equally-weighted at 20%) indica-
tors are determined: cross-jurisdictional activity, size, interconnectedness, substitutabil-
ity/financial institution infrastructure and complexity (BCBS, 2011). In this setup, in-
terconnectedness comprises quantitative values associated to intra-financial system assets
and liabilities and securities outstanding. The scores from this step are then assigned
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to four equally-sized buckets to determine the capital surcharge i.e. the additional loss
absorbing capital they are required to hold.
However, Espinosa-Vega and Sole (2014) point out that current stress testing method-
ologies and regulatory efforts to incorporate interconnectedness fail to harness the full
complexity of financial sector interdependencies. As I have argued, networks provide the
ideal framework to represent the structural complexity of the financial system. This has
been recognised in the recent literature. For example, Halaj and Kok (2015) develop a
network-based stress-testing model aimed at assessing the impact of regulatory large expo-
sure limits and credit valuation adjustments. More recently, Poledna et al. (2017) develop
an Agent-Based Model (ABM) in which an alternative to G-SIB surcharges is proposed,
the so-called systemic risk tax. The authors argue that such an approach is inherently
more efficient as it allows the financial network to self-organise into a topology such that
cascading defaults do not occur. Within the context of multilayer networks and the bail-
in regulation (part of the new EU-level bank resolution framework, applicable in binding
form since 1 January 2016), Hu¨ser et al. (2017) find a post-intervention rewiring of links
across the different layers of the interbank network. Battiston and Martinez-Jaramillo
(2018) survey the literature on financial networks and their current (and future) applica-
bility to stress-testing and financial regulation.
State of the art
Langfield and Sorama¨ki (2016) classify the research on interbank networks into three
areas: Descriptions of interbank exposure networks, Simulation and modelling and the
development of new network metrics to describe network topology and individual banks’
relative importance. As mentioned, the first articles to study complex networks within the
context of systemic risk and financial stability emerged about 10 years ago (following the
crisis). The early literature focussed primarily on mapping the architecture of financial
systems and understanding how shocks propagate through a network. As the field enters
its adolescent phase, data quality and modelling specifications are continuing to increase
in sophistication. Against this background, I identify the two subfields comprising the
current state-of-the-art in financial network analysis below.
Complex, multilayer networks: Recognising that there exists a multiplicity of trans-
action types between banks, researchers have begun looking beyond simple exposure net-
works of national financial systems. In addition to providing a more realistic representa-
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tion of financial interdependencies, multilayer networks are flexible enough to incorporate
the finding by Glasserman and Young (2015) that credit exposures alone are insufficient
to generate the widespread losses observed during the crisis. Complementary to the re-
cent empirical exercises mentioned above (i.e. multilayer mappings of the Mexican, UK,
Italian and EU banking sectors), Montagna and Kok (2016) developed a modelling frame-
work for looking at contagion within and across the three different layers comprising the
interbank market.
Agent behaviour on networks: Prior to the crisis, the dominant behavioural paradigm
for answering policy questions at the macroeconomic level was the so-called New-Keynesian
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) class of models. Exemplified by the pro-
totypical model of Smets and Wouters (2003), this approach allowed for nominal rigidities,
methods for evaluating the effect of monetary and fiscal policies and most importantly,
estimation using real data while also showing strong forecasting performance. However,
such models came under heavy criticism following the crisis due to their inability to deal
with nonlinearity and lack of a banking/financial sector (Blanchard, 2014). As sum-
marised in the recent survey by Christiano et al. (2018), there has been a concerted effort
to amend pre-crisis DSGE models by introducing various financial frictions and nonlin-
earities, an active banking sector and information asymmetries and heterogeneity into the
canonical modelling framework. Blanchard et al. (2016) and Linde´ (2018) adopt a similar
viewpoint: That despite their flaws, DSGE models are still best suited for thinking about
aggregate phenomena and policy. As a result, the New-Keynesian DSGE framework with
financial frictions, such as the models of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Christiano et al.
(2014) have retained their place within the modelling toolkit of almost all central banks.
However, a number of prominent academics argue that such models are erroneous by
construction. Notably, then Chief Economist of the World Bank Paul Romer, in an es-
say entitled “The trouble with macroeconomics”, argues that the excessive reliance on
autocorrelated exogenous shocks to drive model dynamics precludes their usefulness as
policy tools. The stochastic element (i.e. the treatment of uncertainty) in DSGE mod-
elling is also highlighted as a key shortcoming by Stiglitz (2018) in addition to the “wrong
microfoundations which failed to incorporate key aspects of economic behaviour, e.g. in-
corporating insights from information economics and behavioural economics”.
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The ensuing drive to redefine the behavioural foundations of macroeconomics led a num-
ber of researchers to the field of Agent-Based Modelling12 which treats the economy as a
complex, adaptive system in which the interaction of autonomous, heterogenous agents
gives rise to macroeconomic regularities (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006). Due to rapid ad-
vances in computing power in recent years, Colander et al. (2008), Farmer and Foley
(2009) and Chan-Lau (2017) argue that ABMs provide an ideal framework for looking at
macroeconomic dynamics due to the interactions of individual behaviours at the microe-
conomic level. Moreover, given that such models are essentially computational in nature
and driven by simple behavioural rules of thumb (referred to as heuristics), they are
unencumbered by the assumptions of neo-classical models such as representative agents,
rational expectations and convergence to an equilibrium state that characterise the cur-
rent workhorse DSGE models of most major central banks. This affords researchers the
flexibility to incorporate a wide array of dynamics in order to understand the impact of
various policies on economic performance and the manner in which risks can develop and
spread in cases of widespread panic. Moreover, the modelling framework allows ABMs to
be easily integrated into state-of-the-art network models.13
To date, ABMs have been developed to study the 1997-2008 housing boom and ensuing
crash (Geanakoplos et al., 2012), the impact of network topology on systemic risk in
interbank markets and the stabilising role played by the central bank (Georg, 2013) and
the deleterious impact of high inflation on macroeconomic performance Ashraf et al.
(2016). As mentioned previously, the ABMs developed by Halaj and Kok (2015) and
Poledna et al. (2017) were also designed to answer key policy questions regarding the
impact of large exposure limits on counterparty credit risk and the recent Basel III drive
to classify banks as G-SIBS using an indicator/bucketing approach, respectively. Ha laj
(2018) builds an ABM focussing on the relationship between bank solvency and liquidity
combined with an analysis of the efficiency of two policy instruments aimed at mitigating
systemic risk: banks’ capital adequacy and the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR).
12This debate was acknowledged in a July 2010 article in The Economist entitled “Agents of change”
which highlighted the potential of ABMs to learn from the past crisis and develop an early-warning
system for the next one. Insofar as real applications are concerned, Gode and Sunder (1993) show that
non-rational behaviour of zero-intelligence traders yields allocation outcomes close to those predicted by
neo-classical economics. Similarly, LeBaron (2001) builds on the famed Santa Fe artificial stock market
ABM consisting of agent heterogeneity by trading rule and memory. Despite the parsimonious modelling
framework, the author is able to generate return, volume, and volatility values remarkably similar to
actual financial time series.
13Incorporating agent behaviour was recognised as the “next frontier” in network models by policymaker
Jaime Caruana (General Manager, Bank for International Settlements) at a BIS research network meeting
on global financial interconnectedness in October 2015
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The present thesis is firmly situated at the nexus of these two subfields. Each chapter
develops a novel methodology incorporating at least one of the two, with the third com-
bining a realistic (in the topological sense) simulated bilayer network with an original
Agent-Based Model of the interbank market.
Structure of the thesis
The thesis comprises three chapters revolving around a common narrative positing that
the structural simplicity, granularity and holistic nature of network analysis can shed
light on the most pressing policy issues of the day. Using the interbank market as a
backdrop, we develop three theoretical models in which interconnectedness between banks,
as represented by a network, plays a front-and-centre role in driving model dynamics. Each
of the chapters is grounded in the application of networks to financial stability analysis
in a different way, each time seeking to address a major policy-framed research question:
Chapter 1: To what extent did the structure of the interbank network impair the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy and what was the impact on wholesale
and retail markets?
Chapter 2: How does network topology affect systemic risk, defined as the ability of
a localised shock to spread through the interbank market and engender widespread
losses on bank balance sheets?
Chapter 3: Why did interbank markets freeze during the crisis despite an unprece-
dented level of policy intervention?
Definitions
Several interrelated concepts are repeated throughout the thesis and play an important
role in developing the analytical framework of each chapter. In order to provide a unified
framework for the thesis, key definitions, as well as their application in each chapter, are
provided below.
Financial stability: Recognising the ambiguity of the term and the wide range of def-
initions in the literature, Schinasi (2004) of the IMF provides the following definition:
“A financial system is in a range of stability whenever it is capable of facilitating (rather
than impeding) the performance of an economy, and of dissipating financial imbalances
that arise endogenously or as a result of significant adverse and unanticipated events”.
This is broadly in line with how the stability of the interbank networks in each chapter
is treated. In chapter 1, financial stability encompasses reductions in bank lending, firm
21
credit and increasing policy intervention due to localised banking shocks. In chapter 2,
similar local shocks threaten the stability of the network as they propagate via complex
linkages in the interbank network. Finally, chapter 3 studies the stability of the interbank
market in the face of endogenous shock propagation.
Systemic risk: A first comprehensive definition of the term was provided by The Group
of Ten (2001), stating that “Systemic financial risk is the risk that a [sudden or unexpected]
event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in
uncertainty about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough
to quite probably have significant adverse effects on the real economy...generally seen as
arising from disruptions to the payment system, to credit flows, and from the destruction
of asset values”. Note that while the two definitions are intrinsically related (in that
increasing systemic risk implies decreasing financial stability), systemic risk focusses on
the contribution of individual financial institutions to potential financial (in)stability and
gives rise to the concept of “too interconnected to fail” typically used in the financial
regulation literature to indicate institutions that, due to the high number of systemic
interlinkages, would cause widespread disruptions to the financial system if they failed.
Applied to financial network analysis, it can be reinterpreted as the “robust yet fragile“
property defined below.
Robust-yet-fragile property: As mentioned, this was a concept first articulated by
Haldane (2009) within the context of financial network analysis. Though the original
definition outlined a range of shock sizes within which “connections serve as shock ab-
sorbers and connectivity engenders robustness” and above which “the system [flips to] the
wrong side of the knife edge” and above which fragility prevails, the article also makes
the link between long-tailed degree distributions (i.e networks containing a small set of
highly-connected hubs) and the susceptibility of the network to random vs. targeted
shocks. Chapter 2 analyses all these aspects (network structure, shock size and random
vs. targeted shocks) in turn, thereby providing a comprehensive analysis of the topic. By
contrast, chapters 1 and 3 focus primarily on agent behaviour within the network.
Network structure: Throughout the thesis, the term is used along with ‘network topol-
ogy’, the key difference between the two being that the latter refers either to specific
quantifiable features of the network i.e. network measures such as the degree distribu-
tion, density etc or topological features such as the degree distribution or core-periphery
structure. By contrast, network structure is used in a more general sense to describe the
network as a whole.
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Chapter summary
Network simulation
As mentioned above, each of the chapters uses a different methodology to answer a policy-
relevant research question. However, they exhibit one common narrative namely, the
use of realistic and exogenous simulated interbank networks where realistic refers to the
following empirical findings outlined in the ‘mapping interbank networks’ section:
 Disassortative mixing: Both chapters 2 and 3 make use of a probabilistic simu-
lation algorithm developed by Montagna and Lux (2016) to generate disassortative
networks.
 Scale-free degree distribution: The algorithm mentioned above is capable of
obtaining a power-law degree distribution with parameters in line with real-world
findings.
 Core-periphery structure: Chapter 1 uses a highly-stylised representation of the
core-periphery structure in order to isolate the transmission effects within a DSGE
model. The more complex networks in Chapters 2 and 3 follow a core-periphery
structure by virtue of the disassortative property.
I justify the assumption of an exogenous i.e. imposed network structure by citing the
relationship lending literature documented above. That is, the core-periphery networks
in which the three theoretical models are embedded can be said to be the result of the
process of banks’ optimising their interbank linkages prior to the running of the models.
Chapter 1
In the first chapter, we analyse the impairment of the transmission mechanism of mon-
etary policy through the lens of an RBC-DSGE model featuring an active banking sector.
Our contribution comes through the development of a novel methodology for combining
the established field of DSGE modelling with the nascent field of financial network anal-
ysis. From a modelling perspective, this involves (i) incorporating the structure of the
network into the microfounded behaviour of banks and (ii) establishing the framework
through which aggregate fluctuations arise as the endogenous outcome of micro shocks
propagating across interbank market linkages. As regards the latter point, our approach
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is thus firmly embedded within the growing literature aimed at elucidating the “network
origins of aggregate fluctuations” (Acemoglu et al., 2012).
The DSGE model is based on De Walque et al. (2010) whose microfoundations we modify
to reflect banks’ role as intermediaries between depositors and firms on the retail market.
In addition, banks can request and provide wholesale funding on the interbank market,
which is where we introduce the network. Building on the seminal models of Allen and
Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000), the economy comprises four blocs (which can be
interpreted as countries or regions) each of which includes a local household, firm and
bank. Each local bank combines wholesale (from connected banks) and retail funding
(from depositors) to extend credit to firms for productive investment. The model in-
cludes a number of features that makes it relevant as a crisis-modelling tool and within
a regulatory policymaking context. Firstly, it allows for endogenous loan defaults from
banks as well as firms. In addition, macroprudential policy is considered via a capital
requirement featuring endogenous risk weights and a number of disincentives to deviating
from the regulatory requirement. Most importantly, the model incorporates a central
bank who injects liquidity into the banking sector in order to correct liquidity imbalances
on the interbank market, closely mirroring the refinancing operations used by all major
inflation-targeting central banks to steer short-term interest rates.
Turning now to the main contribution of the paper, we propose four different structures for
the underlying network of established lender/borrower interbank relationships: a complete
network (i.e. maximally connected such that all banks lend to and borrow from all other
banks), a cyclical network and two variations of the core-periphery topology. The core-
periphery structure is central to the paper for two reasons: (i) it introduces a degree of
realism into the model given that real-world interbank networks are known to exhibit
such a tiered structure and (ii) it allows for heterogeneity derived from a bank’s position
in the network (i.e. as the core bank intermediating between peripheral banks or as a
peripheral bank providing liquidity to or requesting liquidity from the core bank). System
dynamics are driven by two types of negative shock: A standard aggregate productivity
shock affecting firms in each bloc which we treat as the baseline and a localised banking
shock hitting one of the four banks. The location of the shock in the network, combined
with the network structure being used thus affects its propagation properties, the stability
of the banking sector in the face of such a shock and finally, the impact on credit to the
real economy.
Despite the novelty of the approach, the results assessing the impact of the different
structures on network topology are largely intuitive. We find that the complete network
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plays a stabilising role as banking sector shocks dissipate through the large number of
linkages, ultimately reducing their effect. The cyclical network provides insights into
shock propagation between indirectly connected nodes. However, the main focus is on
the core-periphery structure given its real-world relevance. In line with the literature,
we identify a robust-yet-fragile property associated to this structure: Shocks to the core
create large and persistent fluctuations in interbank default rates and lending/borrowing
volumes. Turning to the ability of the central bank to stabilise the system, core-periphery
networks require the largest intervention. By contrast, complete networks again, act as a
system stabiliser.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 abstracts from a detailed representation of bank behaviour, instead shifting
the focus to the implications of network structure on financial stability. Though numer-
ous works have highlighted the impact of the “robust-yet-fragile” property of financial
networks on systemic risk, they have typically relied on a simplistic representation of the
interbank network. Against this backdrop, the models of Nier et al. (2007), Gai and
Kapadia (2010) and May and Arinaminpathy (2010) were amongst the first to study fi-
nancial contagion and systemic risk as well as the impact of random vs. targeted shocks
within the context of complex networks. However their reliance on the random network
archetype precludes their usefulness as policy tools due to the inability of random networks
to replicate known topological features of interbank networks such as: the small-world
effect, scale-free degree distribution, disassortative mixing and a core-periphery structure
(Hu¨ser, 2015).
Models of cascading defaults, initially derived from disciplines such as ecology and epi-
demiology (Haldane, 2009), are based on the concept that interbank exposures act as
channels along which asset- or liability-side shocks are transmitted between banks. Their
ability to absorb the shock depends on their capital buffer. Failure to absorb the shock
implies further propagation through the pattern of interlinkages. This gives rise to the
notion of default cascades in which the local shock can engender widespread systemic
defaults as the shock propagates through then network. Central to this argument is the
structure of the network and the predominance of risk-sharing vs. risk-spreading in finan-
cial networks, as discussed previously. I argue that a deeper topological analysis is needed
in order to gauge the systemic potential of the network. Using the probabilistic network
generation model developed by Montagna and Lux (2016) as a starting point, I calibrate
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the range of parameters for the bank size distribution, balance sheet decomposition and
network structure, taking observed topological properties of real interbank networks as
a benchmark. These are then fed into a Latin Hypercube Design in order to produce a
large sample of “realistic” interbank networks.
The first part of the analysis is theoretical in nature and entails running two variants of the
cascading defaults model on each of the simulated networks. Specifically, I contribute to
the study of the robust-yet-fragile property of financial networks by comparing a random
(where the initial seed is any one of the nodes in the network) with a targeted shock.
In the latter setup, the shock is restricted to an upper quantile of banks in terms of
size (and by construction, interconnectedness). In order to keep the paper in line with
the state-of-the-art in financial network analysis, I incorporate the observation by Upper
(2011), Summer (2013) and Glasserman and Young (2015) that direct exposures alone
are not a significant contributor to systemic risk by allowing for liquidity effects in which
a bank’s failure (occurring when the incoming shock wipes out its capital, rendering it
insolvent) forces it to liquidate its assets, also referred to as a firesale. Acknowledging
that that market’s ability to absorb these assets is imperfect, firesales drive down asset
prices which forces all banks in the system to revalue their portfolios. Where contagion
via banks’ interbank linkages can be considered a direct transmission channel, contagion
through liquidity effects is indirect as its impact on other banks operates independently
of the web of exposures.
The results of the theoretical model can be classified into two sets of variables. The first
set describes the outcome of the cascading defaults model namely, the total capital wiped
out as the shock propagates through the banking sector, number of failed banks, total
losses on customer deposits and change in asset price (when liquidity effects are active).
The second applies tools from the social network analysis discipline to ascribe numerical
values to certain topological features of the network. This comprises global structural
properties: density, diameter, reciprocity, assortativity, average path length and average
clustering coefficient as well as local properties (applied to the set of initially shocked
banks) via various centrality measures aimed at measuring node importance within the
network. Similar to the global analysis, the centrality measures used (degree, closeness,
betweenness and pagerank) capture different structural features of the network.
The results of the theoretical model described above constitute a dataset on which we
develop an empirical model aimed at establishing a causal link between network topology
and financial stability. From a policy perspective, this allows for an ex ante measurement
of the systemic risk associated to a particular network structure. To my knowledge, this
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paper provides a first attempt at identifying specific topological features of the network
(in terms of the global and local measures proposed above) that pose a danger to financial
stability. This builds on the literature studying the link between connectivity and systemic
risk while also enhancing the real-world applicability of the cascading defaults model
through our use of a realistic interbank network structure.
Chapter 3
The third chapter is a culmination of the first two and hence, offers a completely novel
approach to studying the complex behavioural dynamics of the interbank market within
a state-of-the-art network representation. As regards the latter point, the most recent
interbank network models acknowledge that banks interact with one another in a variety
of ways which are not captured by the simple directed exposure network. As a result,
this paper contributes to the nascent literature on multilayer networks by considering
two types of interdependency: direct exposures via interbank lending and borrowing and
indirect exposures via banks’ common holdings of certain securities (which I refer to as
overlapping portfolios. However, unlike the previous chapter, the network structure is not
the primary focus. Rather, the bilayer network houses an Agent-Based Model of the inter-
bank market in which agents/banks interact according to a set of simple behavioural rules,
referred to as heuristics or rules-of-thumb. Unlike the cascading defaults methodology
described above these models are at an extremely early stage of development, given the
additional computational complexity and the lack of a an established, concrete method-
ology for presenting the results of the simulations. The most relevant papers to date are
Georg (2013), Iori et al. (2015) and Halaj and Kok (2015), all of whom also ground the
ABM in a simulated network. However, this paper is the first to provide an encompassing
model of interbank market dynamics. Against this background, this model develops inter
alia a detailed representation of balance sheet movements due to bank behaviour, a thor-
ough treatment of interbank market dynamics in terms of volumes as well as rates and
a new approach to indirect contagion based on the relationship between the interbank
market and external asset firesales.
Interbank market dynamics are driven primarily by two heuristics aimed at capturing the
funding liquidity and counterparty risk of banks. The former is driven by banks’ concern
regarding their own ability to attract interbank funding while the second is associated to
the creditworthiness of borrowers. All heuristics are constructed in the form of adaptive
expectations based on actual definitions. In addition, all heuristics are grounded where
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possible, on behavioural foundations from the established banking literature in order to
reduce the ad hoc nature of the model. This flexibility is one of the main advantages of
the ABM framework.
In line with the rest of the thesis, this chapter revolves around a concrete policy issue.
Focussing on the period around the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008 (which
triggered the global financial crisis), a puzzle has emerged asking why the interbank
market underwent such severe strains despite an aggressive and unprecedented level of
intervention by monetary authorities. Finding that the theoretical and empirical literature
has, at present failed to each a consensus regarding the predominance of liquidity or
counterparty risk in driving these tensions, I argue that ABMs offer the ideal modelling
environment given their ability to encompass a wide variety of complex dynamics within
a relatively simple behavioural specification.
To answer this question, I build a computational model in which banks go to the interbank
market as lenders or borrowers in each period depending on the realisation of an idiosyn-
cratic liquidity shock. Interbank volumes and weights are determined by the behavioural
heuristics which are constructed to reflect banks’ evolving funding and counterparty risk.
As such, I construct an economy from the “bottom-up” in which autonomous agents,
driven by these behavioural heuristics go about their daily business of making private
sector investments, remunerating depositors and receiving return from their securities
portfolios while using the interbank market to meet their daily liquidity needs. These
actions are disrupted through the introduction of a crisis period imposed on the banking
sector and characterised by falling asset prices and market liquidity. I present the results
along the lines of two counterfactual policy experiments. In the first, the crisis is allowed
to develop unchecked. The second introduces the extreme liquidity provision by the cen-
tral bank in order to restore interbank market functioning and ensure continued credit to
the private sector. This is constructed to mirror the fixed rate full allotment policy of the
ECB.
The crux of my argument is based on the fact that these policies were deployed after
a delay of about one month following the onset of the crisis (which I corroborate using
actual data). As a result, funding liquidity and counterparty risks were allowed to develop
and feedback on one another, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the policy. However,
the counterfactual approach also reveals a complete breakdown of the interbank market
followed by a credit crunch in the absence of any kind of intervention.
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Computational Economics
In addition to providing a novel modelling framework for understanding financial stabil-
ity and systemic risk, this thesis is also firmly situated in the computational economics
tradition, defined by the Society for Computational Economics as a “multidisciplinary
field that uses advanced computing capabilities to understand and solve complex problems
from all branches of economics”. Against this background, each chapter of the thesis uses
computational methods to run the model and output relevant results. Given the growing
importance of network analysis in the policy-sphere, I have developed an extensive and
documented code base (primarily in MATLAB) written in a modular fashion for ease-
of-use which I have placed in the public domain for end-users to calibrate and modify
according to their specifications. Below, I provide the most relevant functions for each
chapter.
Chapter 1 - https://github.com/nscholtes/NDSGE.: The code is written primarily on
the Dynare platform (http://dynare.org) with each network structure requiring its own
set of .mod files. Taking the complete network as an example, the top-level file, compnet
contains the parameter values, steady state equations and first order conditions of the
DSGE model and calls the following subfiles:
 liqinjvardefs comp, liqinjvareqs comp, liqinjvarinit comp,
liqinjvarexo: Liquidity injection variable definitions, equations and initialisation;
 shockpardefs, shockpareqs, shockvardefs, shockvareqs, shockvarinit: Pa-
rameter and variable specification under the two shock specifications.
Chapter 2 - https://github.com/nscholtes/Default-Cascades: Uses object-oriented
programming to define a set of ‘bank’ structured arrays storing information on their
balance sheet and location within the simulated network. The top-level file, topsim2,
contains all exogenous parameters and calls the following subfiles:
 createLH: Latin Hypercube Design to sample from the parameter space;
 netgen2: Simulates the directed network;
 networkmeasures: Makes use of the brain connectivity toolbox located at https:
//sites.google.com/site/bctnet/ for various network measures;
 cascadingdefaults, cascadealgorithm: Initiates the random/targeted shock and
provides the algorithm by which the shock propagates through the interbank net-
work.
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The results outputted by the networkmeasures and cascadingdefaults functions are
combined and saved as a cross-sectional table. This is then called by a set of R codes, lo-
cated at https://github.com/nscholtes/Cascading-defaults--regressions which
provide the results of the empirical model.
Chapter 3 - https://github.com/nscholtes/Confidence-Crises. Similar object-
oriented approach to Chapter 2. However, the behavioural heuristics and changing net-
work structure create more complex bank objects. The top-level file, topsim, contains all
exogenous parameters and calls the following subfiles:
 netgen: Simulates the undirected network;
 phase0, phase1, phase2, phase3: Contain the model dynamics developed in the
chapter. The phases are run sequentially , with the output from one phase being
passed as input to the next phase. The phases are looped over a fixed number of
simulation periods;
 Results balancesheet, Results IBM, Results failures,
Results securitiesmarket: Aggregates the bank-level results and outputs dif-
ferent sets of results over the simulation period.
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Summary
Though each chapter views the networks-financial stability nexus from a different angle,
there are a number of overlaps in the general modelling framework, which I summarise in
the schematic below:
CH.1
DSGE
CH.2
Cascading defaults
CH.3
ABM
Network topology
Bank behaviour
CB policy
Complex networks
Financial contagion
INTERBANK NETWORKS
FINANCIAL STABILITY
Starting with chapters 1 and 2, it is clear that both revolve around analysing the impact
of network structure on financial stability and systemic risk. However, where chapter 1
couches a highly stylised four-node network within a sophisticated DSGE model featur-
ing a microfounded banking sector, chapter 2 expounds upon the relationship between
network topology and systemic risk through the use of network measures derived from
statistical mechanics and social network analysis while abstracting from bank behaviour
through the use of a mechanical cascading defaults model.
Chapters 2 and 3 make use of the same probabilistic network generation model in which
the nodes are recast as heterogeneous bank balance sheets. Though the dynamic models of
bank behaviour subsequently imposed on the networks are different in terms of scope and
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complexity, a key difference is already built into the network generation stage. Specifically,
chapter 2 simulates a weighted, directed network where lending/borrowing relationships
and volumes are established ex ante. By contrast, the initial network in chapter 3 is
unweighted and undirected, the purpose being to impose these features as the outcome
of a complex model featuring idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and banks’ use of heuristics
to drive their behaviour on the interbank market. Thus the network in chapter 3 is
introduced simply to house the Agent-Based Model. Unlike chapter 2, we do not attempt
to derive the causal impact of network structure on model dynamics.
The comparison of chapters 1 and 3 is saved for the end given the competing philosophies
underpinning DSGE and ABM. First and foremost, both are aimed primarily to shed light
on banking sector dynamics in times of crisis and the role played by interconnectedness in
exacerbating/mitigating these dynamics. However, where chapter 3 uses a topologically-
realistic and complex multilayer to house the behavioural model, the network in chapter 1
is presented in a highly-stylised, four-node form due to limitations of the DSGE approach.
Nevertheless, the novelty of introducing interconnectedness and financial contagion into
a DSGE model provides an alternative canonical framework on which future work (for
example, introducing nominal frictions into the model) can build. By contrast, chapter 3
develops a highly-computational model in which all data related to bank balance sheets,
bilateral transactions, asset firesale volumes etc. are stored either as matrices (in the case
of interactive variable such as interbank lending and repayment volumes) or structured ar-
rays. Unlike DSGE modelling, where results are typically presented as Impulse Response
Functions (IRFs), no such framework exists for ABM. Thus, despite both chapters incor-
porating bank balance sheets, interbank market activity and central bank policies, they
differ substantially in the simulation methodology and the manner in which the results
are presented.
Overall, the thesis makes the case for the use of networks in systemic risk modelling by
highlighting the flexibility and versatility of these approaches. By attacking the problem
on two fronts (network structure and behaviour on networks), the work is situated firmly
within the state-of-the-art in financial stability analysis. Moreover, each chapter is framed
as a theoretical response to a relevant policy question in order to highlight the tractability
of the framework and place the thesis within the growing academic literature recognising
the key role played by interconnectedness in the current economic and financial landscape.

Chapter 1
Assessing the role of interbank
networks in business and financial
cycle analysis
1.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, there was a strong drive amongst academics
and policymakers alike to better understand the role of the financial sector as a source of
macroeconomic fluctuations as well as the various amplification mechanisms associated
to financial shocks (Adrian et al., 2013). Moreover, there has been a renewed interest in
modelling the supply-side of credit markets in order to highlight the important role played
by banks in driving the business cycle. From a macroeconomic modelling perspective, this
has led to a reappraisal of the demand-side credit market frictions developed by Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) while recognising the caveat related to
the reliance on Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrelevance in assuming away supply-side
conditions revolving around bank behaviour in credit markets. Finally, economic models
post-crisis are being tailored to reflect the current economic climate, characterised by
increasing financial system regulation and central bank interventions.
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Parallel to these developments in macro-financial modelling, the notion that financial sys-
tem interconnectedness can impair financial stability has opened up a research agenda
seeking to apply tools from the network theory literature to study the threats to sys-
temic risk posed by the various types of financial interdependence. Broadly speaking,
the majority of papers in this literature aim to quantify the role of the network structure
(commonly referred to as its topology) as a shock propagation and amplification mecha-
nism. The seminal contribution by Allen and Gale (2000) finds that increasing the density
of linkages between financial institutions has a mitigating effect on the propagation of liq-
uidity shocks to individual banks. More recently, Elliott et al. (2014) and Acemoglu
et al. (2015) develop models of cascading defaults wherein the network structure and the
location of the shock in the network determine the extent of financial contagion.
This paper provides, to the best of our knowledge, a first attempt at reconciling these two
seemingly unrelated developments by proposing a framework for combining the network
structure of the interbank market with a macroeconomic model that inter alia allows for
interactions between the banking sector and the wider economy as well as imperfections
in interbank and credit markets. To this end, we develop a microfounded framework that
incorporates an active banking sector and interbank market into a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model. This is combined with the network interpretation
of the interbank market by treating the pattern of interlinkages between banks as given.
Consequently, the manner in which banks are connected in the network is mapped into
the bank microfoundations by conditioning the set of variables associated to interbank
transactions viz. lending, borrowing and endogenous default choices on the set of coun-
terparties given by the network.
The macroeconomic framework is based on De Walque et al. (2010) (hereafter, WPR)
who develop a DSGE model of the real business cycle (RBC)-variety while allowing for
an endogenous banking sector, bank regulation (in the form of a capital requirement)
and monetary policy through liquidity injections into the interbank market. Before intro-
ducing the networks dimension, we modify their construction of a heterogeneous banking
sector, comprising deposit and merchant banks (interbank lenders and borrowers, re-
spectively) by combining them into one bank who intermediates between households and
firms. Following this, the key contribution of the paper is the application of the stylised
four-node network methodology of Allen and Gale (2000) and Lee (2013), which we use
to construct four representative interbank networks: 1) a complete network 2) a cycli-
cal network and 3) two variations of the core-periphery topology. The structure is thus
imposed exogenously and dictates the pattern of lending and borrowing counterparties.
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As stated by Goodhart et al. (2006), the interactive dimension of bank behaviour is cru-
cial from a financial stability perspective as well as for the design and implementation of
monetary policy and (macro)prudential requirements.1 The manner in which networks
are introduced into the DSGE methodology is flexible enough that it factors into the pol-
icy aspect as well. Specifically, our regulatory framework consists of a capital requirement
combined with a linear utility term for holding a capital buffer in excess of the regulator-
imposed minimum. The network is featured via the dynamic risk-weights associated to
interbank lending which are driven by banks’ expectations on their (network-determined)
counterparties loan repayment ability. In addition, the monetary authority injects liq-
uidity on a bilateral basis wherever there is a mismatch between supply and demand of
interbank funding. Consequently, each link in the network constitutes a market (in which
a price, the interbank rate, is formed). As a result, the number and structure of the links
in the network affects the impact of monetary policy.
Though the paper draws primarily from WPR, there is a growing literature incorporating
a banking sector into DSGE models2. Within this framework, they introduce various
endogenous financial frictions and an active interbank market. Notably, Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010) introduce credit market frictions in both the retail and wholesale financial
markets as well as a comprehensive analysis of Federal Reserve credit policies. Another
strand of research adds a layer of realism by introducing imperfect competition in the form
of ‘market power ’ into bank behaviour. Such an approach has been applied by Gerali et al.
(2010) and Dib (2010) and Parie`s et al. (2011), who also incorporate regulation in the
form of a capital-based measure. The role played by financial shocks in driving business
cycle fluctuations is studied in Christiano et al. (2010).
1From a regulatory standpoint, the Basel III reforms identify interconnectedness as one of the five cate-
gories for determining global systemically important banks (BCBS, 2010).
2The interested reader is referred to Vlcek and Roger (2012) for a comprehensive survey of their use at
various central banks.
36 Chapter 1: Assessing the role of interbank networks
Due to the growing availability of increasingly granular financial datasets, researchers
have begun exploring the structure of real interbank networks in order to gain a better
understanding of the shock propagation mechanisms at play along with the associated risks
to financial stability. As documented in the introduction of the thesis, a common thread
that has emerged across various studies is that interbank networks exhibit a tiered or
core-periphery architecture wherein a small set of large ‘core’ banks intermediate between
a larger set of smaller ‘peripheral’ banks who do not interact amongst themselves. The
systemic implications of such a configuration are evident, as shown in the theoretical
model of Freixas et al. (2000) who study the impact of central bank liquidity interventions
in the presence of a large money center bank. Within the context of our modelling
framework, the core-periphery topology allows us (i) to explore the implications of a real-
world topology (ii) introduce heterogeneity (via banks’ position in the network) into the
system and (iii) explore dynamics related to the location of shocks in the network. In
order to provide a benchmark for the core-periphery structure, the model is also run on the
complete and cyclical topologies similar to Acemoglu et al. (2015). Despite the fact that
such structures cannot be taken as indicative of real interbank networks, they allow us to
compare the systemic impact of increasing connectivity, as done by Allen and Gale (2000)
as well as the feedback effects of localised shock propagation. A similar structural analysis
is undertaken by Roukny et al. (2016) within the context of a cascading defaults model
(similar to chapter 2 in this thesis) wherein multiple equilibria give rise to uncertainty in
systemic risk measurement.
Our choice of WPR as a modelling benchmark is driven by our desire to shed light on
the macroeconomic impact of the structure of the interbank market. By abstracting from
the more complex modelling approaches and frictions mentioned above, we are able to
zoom in on the network drivers of economic and financial fluctuations. Broadly speaking,
our model can be summarised as follows: We introduce four ‘regions’ that raise liquidity
on the inter -regional wholesale market, characterised by a specific network structure, in
order to complement intra-regional deposits used to finance intra-regional credit3.
3In this regard, our model is similar to the region-specific DSGE with banking sector models developed
by Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015) and Bokan et al. (2016).
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The results of our model are presented in two steps: first we compare the effect of adding
a regional banking shock to a baseline scenario consisting of four productivity shocks
across all regions under the different network structures. Herein, we study the impact of
each imposed network on the dynamics of interbank variables. The second step compares
the networks directly by analysing the responses of aggregated (that is, summed across
all four regions) variables from the real economy. In this section, we provide a policy
perspective by comparing model dynamics when banks are subject to liquidity injections
by the central bank.
Our results highlight the importance of taking the network into account when studying
economic fluctuations, a key reason being that local shocks are easily transmitted via
banks’ interlocking exposures. Thus, a bank not itself subject to a shock can still be
affected through its network of counterparties (and their counterparties etc.). This is
made clear in the interbank dynamics under the cyclical and core-periphery topologies.
The latter is prone to large potential instability when the core bank is constrained by the
network structure, thereby limiting its ability to obtain wholesale funding. By contrast,
the complete network performs a stabilising, dissipative role due to the large number of
links. Turning to the policy side, we observe that the impact of liquidity injections varies
depending on the network. The complete network is again, subject to relatively smaller
downturns while the remaining structures require stronger central bank intervention.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 develops the model’s micro-
foundations, section 1.3 outlines the imposed network structures, section 1.4 provides the
calibrations used, section 1.5 reports the results and section 1.6 concludes.
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1.2 The Model Economy
Following Allen and Gale (2000), the economy is divided into four ex-ante identical regions
i = {A,B,C,D}. Each region consists of a household and firm who act as lenders and
borrowers of funds, respectively. In addition, we introduce a regional banking sector which
finances lending to firms through access to two markets. In the retail financial market,
banks obtain deposits from households within the same region while the wholesale financial
market allows banks across regions to raise funds by borrowing and lending amongst
themselves.
The microfoundations in our model are based primarily on De Walque et al. (2010).
However, in addition to the aforementioned regional structure, our approach differs in
a number of ways. Firstly, we depart from the notion that banks perform a specialised
function as either originators or receivers of funding stemming from household deposit
supply and firm credit demand, respectively. In this setup, the interbank market arises
to restore equilibrium between banks with a liquidity surplus and those in deficit. By
contrast, the banks in our approach perform a dual role by intermediating between re-
gional households and firms and lending/borrowing on the wider interbank market. As
such, each regional bank is subject to counterparty default on credit markets (by firms
for whom the repayment rate is endogenous) as well as on the interbank market, where
borrowing banks feature an endogenous repayment rate on past interbank loans. Other
features of the banking sector include own funds commitment, insurance funds and port-
folio diversification.
The second major contribution is our use of a stylised, tractable framework for modelling
bank interconnectedness across regions. As detailed in section 1.3, the manner in which
banks can exchange liquidity is constrained by the network structure. In this regard, two
banks i, j can be connected such that i can only borrow from j or vice versa.
The economy is represented schematically in Figure 1.1. In addition to the three types of
agents, all flows between them as well as the relevant interest rates are reported. Since
our approach allows banks to both lend and borrow on the interbank market simultane-
ously4, we compile bank i’s lending and borrowing choice vis-a`-vis counterparty j into the
parameter Ξb,ij =
{
Lb,ij, Bb,ij
}
for ease of exposition.5
4The concept that banks enter into long and short interbank positions has been observed empirically, using
German balance sheet data, by Bluhm et al. (2016)
5Note that the interbank trading parameters given by Ξ capture the maximum number of exposures
between banks as represented by the ‘complete’ network in Figure 1.3(a).
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Figure 1.1: Flows between agents within and across regions
1.2.1 Households
The household in region i chooses consumption Ch,it and deposit supply to its local bank
Dh,it to maximise a logarithmic utility function comprising a quadratic disutility term for
deposits. This represents households’ preference for a stable level of deposits around their
long-run optimum.6
max
{Ch,it ,Dh,it }
∞∑
s=0
βsEt
ln(Ch,it+s)− χ2
(
Dh,it+s
1 + rd,it
− D¯
h
1 + rd
)2 (1.1)
6The reason for this non-standard convex disutility term is purely technical, as explained in footnote 10 of
WPR. Briefly, calibrating a low, positive value for χ ensures that the steady state for Dh,it is determined
while having only a marginal impact compared to the standard setup where χ = 0.
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The household budget constraint is given by
Tt + C
h,i
t +
Dh,it
1 + rd,it
= wtNt +D
h,i
t−1 (1.2)
where Tt denotes a lump-sum tax levied on households to finance both liquidity injections
into the banking sector by the central bank and an insurance fund that allows banks to
recover a fraction of non-performing loans on the interbank and credit market. Finally,
we impose an exogenous labour supply Nt = N¯ .
7 Solving the dynamic problem yields the
following Euler equation for consumption (augmented with the deposit target term):
1
Ch,it
= βEt
[
1
Ch,it+1
]
− χ
1 + rd,it
(
Dh,it+s
1 + rd,it
− D¯
h
1 + rd
)
(1.3)
1.2.2 Banks
The primary function of bank i in each region i = {A,B,C,D} is the intermediation of
funds between depositors (households) and ultimate borrowers (firms). This comprises the
retail market of the national financial market. In addition, we allow banks to obtain and
provide wholesale funding on the interbank market. Counterparty information is provided
by the sets Si (suppliers) and Di (demanders) which determine from whom i can obtain
funds and to whom i can provide funds, respectively. The expected payoff function of bank
i consists of a concave representation of profits, pib,it less a non-pecuniary disutility cost db
associated to the endogenous default decision vis-a`-vis its interbank creditors, j ∈ Si. On
the interbank market, the set of endogenous variables for each i thus consists of the default
rate δb,ijt on past borrowing as well as current borrowing, B
b,ij
t from creditors j ∈ Si and
bilateral lending, Lb,ijt to debtor banks j ∈ Di. In their role as financial intermediaries,
banks choose fund allocation from amongst deposits from households Db,it and credit to
firms in region i, Xh,it as well as investment in risky securities, S
b,i
t . Finally, banks are
subjected to a positive linear utility dF b for the buffer of own funds chosen by the bank
7Again, we maintain the assumption of WPR. Though this is contrary to the the majority of the RBC
literature wherein labour supply is endogenous, the authors found that the wealth effects generated
on impact of the market book shock resulted in countercyclical employment. In order to avoid this
counterintuitive result, endogenous employment was considered out of scope.
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F b,it above the minimum regulatory capital requirement represented by the coverage ratio
k as well as the respective risk weights wf,it ,
{
wb,ijt
}
j∈Di
, wSt on firm credit, interbank
loans and the bank’s securities portfolio. The balance sheet of each bank can thus be
represented as:
LiabilitiesAssets
Deposits (Di)Firm credit (X
i)
Interbank borrowing (
∑
Bi)Interbank lending (
∑
Li)
Market book (Si)
Own funds (F i)
Figure 1.2: Bank balance sheet
Putting these together yields the following bank maximisation programme:
max{
{δb,ijt ,Bb,ijt }j∈Si ,{Lb,ijt }j∈Di ,
Db,it ,X
b,i
t ,F
b,i
t ,S
b,i
t ,pi
b,i
t
}
∞∑
s=0
Et
{
βs
[
ln
(
pib,it+s
)
− db
∑
j∈Si
(
1− δb,ijt+s
)
+ dF b
(
F b,it+s − k
(
wf,it+sX
b,i
t+s +
∑
j∈Di
wb,ijt+sL
b,ij
t+s + w
S
t S
b,i
t+s
))]}
,
(1.4)
subject to constraints on the profit function, the law of motion of own funds and the
dynamic evolution of the capital requirement risk weights:
pib,it =
Db,it
1 + rd,it
− X
b,i
t
1 + rl,it
+ (1 + Γt)S
b,i
t−1 − Sb,it
+
∑
j∈Si
Bb,ijt
1 + rb,ijt
+
∑
j∈Di
δ
bji
t L
b,ij
t−1 + ζb
∑
j∈Di
(
1− δbjit−1
)
Lb,ijt−2 + α
f,i
t X
b,i
t−1 + ζf
(
1− αf,it−1
)
Xb,it−2
−
Db,it−1 + ∑
j∈Di
Lb,ijt
1 + rb,ijt
+
∑
j∈Si
δb,ijt B
b,ij
t−1 +
ωb
2
(∑
j∈Si
(
1− δb,ijt−1
)
Bb,ijt−2
)2 (1.5)
F b,it = (1− ξb)F b,it−1 + νbpib,it (1.6)
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wf,it = w˜
f
[(
α
αf,it+1
)ηf]
(1.7)
wb,ijt = w˜
b
[(
δ
δb,ijt+1
)ηb]
for each j ∈ Di (1.8)
Equation 1.5 defines the period profits of bank i. The first line collects the bank’s activity
on the retail and credit market namely, deposits remunerated at rate rd,it less credit to
firms at the rate rl,it as well as the stochastic return on past securities investment, denoted
by Γt which follows an AR(1) process, less current purchases. The second line collects
the parameters pertaining to an inflow of funds in period t. The first two terms outline
interbank borrowing from all creditors j ∈ Si and repayment by debtor banks j ∈ Di on
past interbank loans. Note that this includes the repayment rate δb,jit which is featured in
counterparty j’s optimisation programme and thus, taken as given by i. The insurance
fund allows banks to recover a fraction ζb of each borrowing counterparty’s default on
the interbank market. Similarly, each bank is subject to the default of regional firms on
credit extended in the previous period. Similar to interbank lending, the repayment rate
is exogenous to the bank while an insurance fund allows it to recover a fraction ζf of
the firm’s defaulted amount. Finally, the third line collects all outflows of funds. This
includes lending on the interbank market as well as repayment on past interbank loans.
The latter features the repayment rate parameter δb,ijt which is now endogenous to i. The
last term represents the quadratic pecuniary penalty associated to interbank loan default
and reflects inter alia the reputation costs of defaulting.
Equation 1.6 provides the law of motion of own funds. This consists of contributions to
the insurance fund managed by the government (represented by the parameter ξb, this
is used to recover losses from counterparty defaults) and an exogenous fraction of profits
νb redirected towards own funds. Equations 1.7 and 1.8 reflect the risk-sensitive credit
weights on loans to firms and banks, respectively. Set by the supervisory authority, the
risk weights increase as expectations of default increase.
A key feature of our microfounded network model is that the pattern of interlinkages be-
tween banks maps into the number and composition of the policy functions. To be precise,
given that each banks’ optimisation programme features three bilateral interbank vari-
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ables (those superscripted by ij namely, lending, borrowing and default), each additional
interbank link thus gives rise to three additional first-order conditions.
The above characterises the relationship between the network and the number of policy
functions. The difference in composition occurs when imposing an asymmetric8network
structure where banks differ in the manner in which they’re connected to their counter-
parties. For example, if bank i only lends to bank j, this is reflected in the interbank
components of i profit function comprising only Lb,ij while removing the borrowing vari-
ables Bb,ij and δb,ij (with the inverse holding for bank j). Another bank in the same
network that both lends and borrows would feature all interbank variables.
For the sake of brevity, we compute the first-order conditions assuming the (symmetric)
cyclical network topology shown in Figure 1.3(b) wherein each bank i has two distinct
counterparties, one from which it borrows (indexed by j) and another to which it lends
(indexed by k):9
λpitB
b,ij
t−1 = Et
[
βλpit+1ωb
(
1− δb,ijt
)(
Bb,ijt−1
)2]
+ db (1.9)
λpit
1 + rb,ikt
= Et
[
βλpit+1δ
b,ik
t+1 + β
2λpit+2ζb
(
1− δb,kit+1
)]
− dFbkw¯b,ikt Et
[(
δ
δb,kit+1
)ηb]
(1.10)
λpit
1 + rb,ijt
= Et
[
βλpit+1δ
b,ij
t+1 + β
2λpit+2ωb
(
1− δb,ijt+1
)2
Bb,ijt
]
(1.11)
λpit
1 + rl,it
= Et
[
βλpit+1α
f,i
t+1 + β
2λpit+2ζf
(
1− αf,it+1
)]
− dFbkw¯f,it Et
[(
α
αf,it+1
)ηf]
(1.12)
λpit
1 + rd,it
= Et
[
βλpit+1
]
(1.13)
dFbνb =
(
λpit −
1
λpit
)
− Et
[
β (1− ξb)
(
λpit+1 −
1
λpit+1
)]
(1.14)
where λpit is the Lagrange multiplier associated to bank profits and Equations 1.9-1.12 are
the Euler equations for interbank lending, borrowing and firm lending respectively.
8Throughout the paper, we refer to symmetric networks as those in which each bank features the same
number of incoming and outgoing links. In this case, the choice of optimising bank is arbitrary as their
interbank policy functions will be identical albeit with different counterparty superscripts.
9Appendix 1.A reports the relevant equations for all networks.
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1.2.3 Firms
Each firm maximises the discounted sum of expected payoffs by choosing employment,
borrowing from its regional bank in the current period and the repayment rate on previous
period borrowing, αf,it (the default rate from the point of view of the bank). Similar to
the bank, defaulters are subject to both a linear disutility cost, df as well as a quadratic
pecuniary cost on profits, represented by the parameter ωf . The firm maximisation pro-
gramme is then given by
max
{Nt,Xf,it ,αf,it ,Kt,}
∞∑
s=0
Et
{
βs
[
pif,it+s − df
(
1− αf,it+s
)]}
(1.15)
subject to the following constraints
pif,it = AtY
i
t − witN it − αf,it Xf,it−1 −
ωf
2
[
(1− αf,it−1)Xf,it−2
]2
(1.16)
Kit = (1− τ)Kit−1 +
Xf,it
1 + rl,it
(1.17)
where Equation 1.16 represents period profits of the firm. At is a stochastic AR(1) total
factor productivity shock. Each firm produces output using an identical CRS Cobb-
Douglas production function with capital and labour as inputs, Kµt N
1−µ
t . Equation 1.17
is the law of motion of capital with depreciation rate τ and expansion of capital stock
financed by firm borrowing from its regional bank.
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The first-order conditions are given by:
wit = (1− µ)At
(
Kit
N it
)µ
(1.18)
λKt
1 + rl,it
= Et
[
βαf,it+1 + β
2ωf
(
1− αf,it+1
)2
Xf,it
]
(1.19)
Xf,it−1 = βωf
(
1− αf,it
)(
Xf,it−1
)2
+ df (1.20)
µAt
(
Kit
N it
)µ−1
= λKt − Et
[
βλKt+1(1− τ)
]
(1.21)
1.2.4 Central bank and government
Government
As mentioned, the government levies a lump-sum tax on households which is used to fund
the insurance scheme (in addition to the period contributions into the fund by banks and
firms) against interbank counterparty and regional firm default. We assume that central
bank money creation is not financed by the immediate lump-sum tax on households.
Rather, we assume that the central bank is not balance-sheet constrained and can thus
create real cash balances by itself.
In addition to the standard Ricardian equivalence assumption of fiscal policy, we also
assume that each of the four regions is responsible for its own taxation scheme. For the
interbank market, this implies that each regional government provides insurance to its
own local bank against default to its counterparties in other regions. Thus, each regional
government is tasked with minimising outgoing spillovers due to local financial strains.
Finally, by treating taxation in a disaggregated manner, we abstract from consideration of
the redistributive effects of taxation. The government budget constraint thus comprises
four equations (one for each region) of the form:
Tt = ζb
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Di
(
1− δb,ijt−1
)
Bb,ijt−2 +
∑
i∈N
(
1− αf,it−1
)
Xb,it−2 − ξb
∑
i∈N
F b,it−1 (1.22)
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The first two terms in Equation 1.22 collect all payments to banks out of the insurance
fund. The last term (in parentheses) denotes payments into the insurance fund (taken
out of banks’ own funds).
Central bank
Since we restrict our attention to a purely real model, the standard approach to short-
term nominal rate setting via a Taylor policy-rule does not apply in this context. In our
framework, the central bank injects liquidity into the banking system in order to equalise
supply and demand of interbank funding between each pair of connected banks10. The
general form of central bank liquidity injections is thus given by
M ijt = B
ij
t − Ljit , ∀i, j ∈ E (1.23)
where M ijt > (<)0 represents an injection (withdrawal) of liquidity by the central bank
into (from) the bilateral transfer between banks i and j. We assume no liquidity injections
at steady state, M ijt = 0, ∀i, j ∈ N .
While the above equation signifies how the monetary policy instrument in our setup
features in banking sector dynamics, it does not provide the main objective of monetary
policy. Following WPR, liquidity injections serve to smooth interbank rate fluctuations
relative to their long run value11 via the following rule:
MDt = ν
(
r¯b − rb) (1.24)
As Mt is also driven by autoregressive shocks, we use the superscript D to denote the
deterministic component of liquidity injections. The variable r¯b denotes the average inter-
bank rate. From a network perspective, each directed edge between banks constitutes a
10The identity of connected banks depends on the particular network structure applied to represent the
interbank market, as will be made clear in Section 1.3
11Though highly stylised, this methodology closely mirrors central banks’ use of the overnight rate to signal
the policy stance and launch the monetary policy transmission mechanism. An early study by Bernanke
and Blinder (1992) confirms the importance of the US federal funds rate as an indicator for monetary
policy. More recently, Linzert and Schmidt (2011) study the drivers of the widening spread between the
EONIA and ECB MRO rate.
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market for which a price is determined either purely through market forces (setting ν = 0)
or through a combination of market forces and central bank liquidity injections. In this
case, the value of ν > 0 represents the responsiveness of the central bank to deviations in
the average interbank rate from its steady state value.
1.2.5 Closing the model
Structural shocks
The model features three types of autoregressive shocks, total factor productivity shocks,
shocks to bank profits (represented by an unexpected change in the market book) and a
liquidity shock. All three follow stochastic AR(1) processes. The productivity shock is
applied to firms in all four regions and is given by:
Ait =
(
Ait−1
)ρA exp (εAt ) (1.25)
where i = {A,B,C,D}. In the first section of our impulse response analysis (see sec-
tion 1.5.1), we treat the aggregate productivity shock scenario as a benchmark against
which we study the additional impact of a localised banking shock on variable dynamics12.
Including the benchmark provides a common basis for comparison between the dynamics
of shocked and non-shocked banks in each network structure, thus highlighting the prop-
agation profile of the shock. Moreover, the banking shock is applied on a regional rather
than aggregate basis in order to highlight how the shock is transmitted across the net-
work via banks’ interlocking interbank asset and liability structures. The banking shock
specification is as follows:
ΓAt =
(
Γ¯
)1−ρΓ (Γt−1)ρΓ exp (εΓt ) (1.26)
where Γ¯ > 0 is the (calibrated) average market book return of banks. In this case, the
shock is applied only to bank A. As will be made clear in section 1.3, the choice of A
as the target for a banking shock is arbitrary for two of the structures, the complete
and cyclical networks, due to their symmetry. By contrast, for the (asymmetric) core-
periphery topologies, the location of the shock has a marked impact on its propagation
dynamics.
12From a modelling perspective, this implies taking advantage of the linearity of the policy functions to
add the impulse responses under the two shocks.
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Similar to the above scenario in which a regional banking shock is compared to a bench-
mark comprising an aggregate productivity shock, section 1.5.2 maintains the banking
and productivity shock scenario as a benchmark against which to compare the impact of
central bank liquidity injections. Recall that these consist of a deterministic component
given by Equation 1.24 as well as a stochastic AR(1) component given by:
MSt = ρMMt−1 + exp
(
εMt
)
(1.27)
The central bank policy rule is then obtained by adding the stochastic and deterministic
(i.e. liquidity injection) components:
Mt = M
S
t +M
D
t (1.28)
Finally, all innovations are assumed to be i.i.d-normally distributed i.e. εZt ∼ N (0, σ2Z)
where Z = {A,Γ,M}.
Market clearing
Note that the central bank liquidity injections given in Equation 1.23 provide the clearing
conditions for the interbank market. In order to bridge the gap between the policy rule
(Equation 1.28) and central bank interventions, we simply divide Mt by the number of
links of the network being considered. This yields the individual M ijt values, thereby
assuming equal treatment by the central bank of the interbank market constituents.13
In the simulations that do not feature liquidity injections, interbank market clearing is
simply given by:
Bijt = L
ji
t , ∀i, j ∈ E (1.29)
13Though this stylised approach is an abstraction from reality, it bears some similarity to the pre-crisis
allotment policies of the major central banks who fix the aggregate volume of open market operations
(OMOs) at their discretion (Blenck et al., 2001).
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1.3 Interbank network structures
An interbank network consists of a set of banks connected by interbank claims on one
another. In Section 1.2, we outlined banks’ optimisation programmes subject to the
optimising behaviour of regional households and firms as well as other banks to whom
they are connected (constituting the interbank market). The latter revolves around the
lending and borrowing counterparty sets Si and Di respectively which constrain to (from)
whom banks can provide (request) liquidity. Up to now, these sets remain undefined.
Following Allen and Gale (2000), this section proceeds to defining several stylised network
structures, classified based on completeness and interconnectedness. Consequently, the
interbank network provides the foundation on which the DSGE microfoundations are
superimposed.
1.3.1 Complete and cyclical topologies
In the complete (i.e. perfectly interconnected) network, each bank has exposures to all
other banks in the system. Though unrealistic, the complete network structure allows us
to study the case where banks are maximally connected. In our stylised model of four
banks, each bank thus lends to and borrows from the three remaining banks corresponding
to six directed edges per banks for a total of 12 edges in the network. This is captured in
Figure 1.3(a) below14:
A B
C D
A B
C D
(a) (b)
Figure 1.3: (a) Complete and (b) Cyclical network topologies
14For simplicity, we combine the ingoing and outgoing edges between bank pairs. A double-headed arrow
between nodes i and j indicates that i both lends to and borrows from j and vice versa.
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The cyclical structure in Figure 1.3(b) assumes that each bank has one borrowing and
one lending relationship to two distinct adjacent banks. Notice that both topologies
are symmetric across banks. Depending on the interbank network structure in place, the
support of the bank optimisation programme given in Equation 1.4 consisting of interbank
market transactions (lending, borrowing and defaults) will vary. For example, under a
cyclical network, the set of bilateral transactions consists of the following set of optimal
lending and borrowing choices and the interbank rate that clears each market:15
Ξ =
{{
Lb,AC , Bb,CA
}
,
{
Lb,CD, Bb,DC
}
,
{
Lb,DB, Bb,BD
}
,
{
Lb,BA, Bb,AB
}}
R =
{
rb,AC , rb,CD, rb,DB, rb,BA
}
1.3.2 Core-periphery topologies
Though the aforementioned network topologies are interesting cases for the study of the
implications of financial interconnectedness, they are somewhat unrealistic and cannot
be seen to represent the structure of real interbank networks. By contrast, mounting
empirical evidence points towards the tiered/core-periphery topology as representative
of the form and function of the interbank market. Here, the form refers to the densely
interconnected core connected to a sparsely interconnected periphery while the function
refers to the fact that larger core banks act as money centre banks who intermediate
between smaller peripheral banks who do not exchange liquidity amongst themselves
(Craig and Von Peter, 2014). While maintaining the same stylised 4-bank structure, we
provide the following two core-periphery configurations:
A
B
C D
A
B
C D
(a) (b)
Figure 1.4: Core-periphery network with (a) core bank as a net borrower and (b) core as
a net lender
15For bilateral rates rb,ij , we adopt the following convention: The first superscript i denotes the lending
counterparty (located at the tail of the link connecting them in the network) while the second corresponds
to the interbank borrower.
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Unlike the previous setup, the core-periphery topology features more distinct roles for
banks vis-a`-vis each other. Under both configurations, bank A acts as a market-maker,
redistributing liquidity across the banking system. However, in configuration (a), the
core relies on two banks (C and D) for wholesale funding compared to one (bank B) in
configuration (b).
This asymmetry between banks depending on their position in the network implies that
the location of the banking shock is no longer arbitrary as in the complete and cyclical
frameworks. To account for this in our analysis, we target the banking shock according
to the following three configurations:
A
B
C D
A
B
C D
A
B
C D
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1.5: Shock configurations under core-periphery net borrower network.
In configuration (a), the core bank is subject to a market book shock. By virtue of its
centrality in the network, the shock is then transmitted to all remaining banks due to
the core optimally changing its portfolio composition in response to the shock. Note
however, that banks B and C will be impacted differently due to their different roles as
core borrower and core lender, respectively. By contrast, D will face the same impact as
C. In the results, we thus only report the impulse responses for C for the sake of brevity.
The same set of shocks are applied to the net-lender setup given in Figure 1.4(b). In this
case, a shock to bank B (Figure 1.5(b)) will have a different impact due to B’s role as the
sole provider/recipient of interbank funding.
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1.4 Calibration
We calibrate our model following WPR who use average historical real quarterly US
data from 1985Q1 to 2008Q2. However, our modelling methodology differs along two
dimensions: (i) we combine their heterogeneous banking sector into one representative,
regional bank who intermediates directly between households and firm in the same region
and (ii) the interbank market is represented as a form of intra-regional transfers of funds
between banks. Consequently, the parameter values inferred at steady state will not only
differ from those in their contribution (due to the difference in modelling framework) but
will also differ across the imposed network structures in our own approach.
Relative to WPR, we maintain the same base weight values on risky asset exposures.
However in their approach, bank exposures are either to the interbank market (in the
case of the deposit bank) or to the credit market (in the case of the merchant bank) while
our intermediary is exposed to firm as well as interbank default risk on the asset side of
its balance sheet. In addition, the steady states values for various flow variables obey
the following ratios as per WPR: L = 0.5X, B = L and D = 2X while the steady state
interbank and firm repayment rates are given by δ = 0.99 and α = 0.95, respectively.
Table 1.1 below reports the remaining banking sector calibrations:
Table 1.1: Parameter calibration: Banks
Parameter Definitions Value
Capital requirement
k Minimum own funds ratio 0.08
w˜f,i Risk weight: loans to firms 0.8
w˜b,ij Risk weight: interbank loans 0.05
w˜S Risk weight: market book 1.20
Insurance fund
ζb Insurance coverage: interbank default 0.80
ζf Insurance coverage: firm default 0.80
ϑb Insurance fund contributions from profits 0.5
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We collect the parameters implied at steady state in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 in order to study
how they differ depending on the network structure. The first table provides the inferred
values for the complete and cyclical networks. The three rates were set in order to
minimise the differences between the two sets of parameters.
Table 1.2: Inferred parameters: Banks (Symmetric networks)
Parameter Definition Network structure
Complete Cyclical
rd Deposit rate 0.5% 0.5%
rl Prime lending rate 0.1% 0.5%
rb Interbank rate 1.2% 1%
db Interbank default disutility 3773 3642
dF b Own funds utility 7849 9148
ξb Insurance fund contribution 0.0548 0.0640
ωb Interbank default cost 326 532
As shown in Appendix 1.A, the manner in which nodes are connected in the core-periphery
structure imposes a degree of asymmetry which affects the set of variables in banks’
optimisation programmes (depending on their location in the network).
Table 1.3: Inferred parameters: Banks (Asymmetric networks)
Parameter Definition Network structure
CP-nb CP-nl
A B C/D A B C/D
rd Deposit rate ” 0.05% ” ” 0.05% ”
rl Prime lending rate ” 0.04% ” 0.04% ”
rb Interbank rate ” 0.09% ” ” 0.09% ”
dib Interbank default disutility 3760 5233 - 2325 - 5233
diF b Own funds utility 10462 12458 9290 8131 150150 12458
ξib Insurance fund contribution 0.0480 0.0403 0.0540 0.0617 0.0540 0.0403
ωb Interbank default cost 637 637
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Tables 1.4 and 1.5 report the parameters associated to the real economy (firms and house-
holds) and the stochastic processes specified in the model.
Table 1.4: Parameter calibration: Real economy
Parameter Definitions Value
Households
χ Deposit gap disutility 0.01
N¯ Labour supply 0.20
D¯h Deposit target 0.38
Firms
df Firm default disutility 0.163
ωf Firm default cost 15
µ Capital share 0.333
τ Capital depreciation rate 0.03
Table 1.5: Parameter calibration: Exogenous processes
Parameter Definition Value
ρA AR parameter: productivity shock 0.95
σA Standard deviation: productivity shock 0.1
ρΓ AR parameter: banking shock 0.5
σΓ Standard deviation: banking shock 0.1
ρM AR parameter: liquidity shock 0.5
σM Standard deviation: liquidity shock 0.1
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1.5 Results
In this section, we discuss the results of the model. In order to analyse how the network
structure contributes to financial stability, we provide two simulation studies.16 Both
take the form of a ‘crisis simulation’ whereby the innovations of the relevant stochastic
processes are set to one negative standard deviation. All impulse responses are reported
as variations from the steady state, in % points for the repayments and in % for the other
variables.
1.5.1 Responses to a banking shock
In the first simulation, we focus on the effect of adding a banking shock to the baseline
productivity shock as outlined in Section 1.2.5. Given that all banks are ex-ante homoge-
nous and the regional productivity shocks are identical, impulse responses across the four
banks in the benchmark scenario will not vary. The banking shock introduces ex-post
heterogeneity into the system. As this is calibrated to hit only one of the four banks,
analysing the impact on the remaining banks via the different network structures (i.e.
those in regions only hit by productivity shocks to firms) will provide an indication of its
shock transmission properties. To this effect, our impulse response analysis in this section
focuses specifically on the evolution of banking sector variables namely, interbank rates,
lending and borrowing and bank repayment rates.
Cyclical network
Recall that the cyclical network given in Figure 1.3(b) entails one interbank lending and
one borrowing relationship for each bank. In order to simplify the interpretation of the
bilateral variables, the region to which a particular IRF is associated is given in bold font
above the y-axis. Figures 1.6-1.7 below report the impulse responses of banking sector
variables under the cyclical network topology.
16We are grateful to the authors of De Walque et al. (2010) for providing us with their Dynare codes.
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As shown in Figure 1.6, interbank volumes experience a small increase on impact following
the baseline aggregate productivity shock. This is immediately followed by a larger-
magnitude decrease wherein the exposures for all banks decrease relative to the steady
state before gradually converging 20 periods into the simulation.
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Figure 1.6: Interbank lending and borrowing volumes - Cyclical network
By contrast, the addition of a regional banking shock is not only larger in magnitude for all
exposures, but exhibits more persistent dynamics as well. For example, bank A’s lending
to C (Lb,AC)17 shows an initial decrease of approximately 4% followed by an increase to
a peak of 6% (with the transition from negative to positive occurring eight periods into
the simulation).
Comparing this with (Lb,BA) i.e. the volume of interbank liquidity borrowed by A, we
see that the dynamics (and corresponding magnitudes) are inverted but identical. Thus
changes in the shocked bank’s lending behaviour are offset by changes in its borrowing
behaviour. The interbank repayment rates, given in Figure 1.7 below further highlight
this symmetry between the shocked bank’s immediate counterparties. Namely, A’s re-
payment rate on borrowing from B, δb,AB features the same offsetting effect relative to
C’s repayment on borrowing from A, δb,CA. Furthermore, comparing the loan volumes to
their corresponding repayment rate18 reveals that the initial decrease in lending from A
to C results in a corresponding decrease in C’s repayment to A and vice versa. This quid
pro quo mechanism also applies to B’s initial increase in lending to A.
Network effects come into play when observing the same intermediary dynamics for non-
shocked banks as any banking dynamics herein occur solely due to the outward propaga-
tion from the source through the network. As before, analysis of Lb,DB and Lb,CD wherein
17Due to the market clearing conditions under no liquidity injections, studying both the lending and
borrowing components of a bilateral exposure is redundant. We thus restrict our focus to interbank
lending.
18Note that insofar as the network links represent a flow of liquidity from a lender to a borrower, repayment
rates flow in the opposite direction as they are undertaken by borrowers towards their lenders.
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the intermediary D is not subject to a banking shock, reveals a similar but imbalanced
offsetting effect, with the trough in D’s lending being smaller than the corresponding peak
in borrowing.
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Figure 1.7: Interbank repayment - Cyclical network
The same asymmetry is present in the corresponding repayment rates (though the two
still follow the same general trajectory as before). We explain these dynamics within
the context of the network as follows: A’s financial distress is propagated to B through
increased loan delinquencies which then drives B to increase its borrowing and repayment
from D. Given that the initial default is only transmitted in this direction due to the
network (and not from A to C, as this entails a lending relationship), this accounts for
the observed asymmetry.
The notion that the cyclical network transmits banking shocks outwards is further corrob-
orated through analysis of the interbank rates. We begin by reporting the spread between
the market rate on each bank’s lending subtracted by the market rate of borrowing in
Figure 1.8 below
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Figure 1.8: Interbank rate spreads - Cyclical network
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At first glance, it is apparent that strains in the regional productive sector do not af-
fect (what can loosely be interpreted as) the bid-offer spread on wholesale funding. By
contrast, the banking shock produces persistent dynamics across all banks’ spreads. The
leftmost figure reports the spread between the rate at which A provides liquidity (to C)
and the rate at which it receives liquidity (from B). The initial widening on impact is
contrasted by the remaining spreads which experience a small decline followed by an in-
crease in their lending relative to their borrowing rate. Analysis of the superscripts in
panels B and C reveal that only one of the variables in the spreads stems from the shocked
bank, which explains their smaller magnitudes. Panel D reports the spread for interbank
rates not directly connected to A. As expected, the magnitude is smaller compared to
the previous cases, indicating that while the shock does propagate through the network,
its impact dissipates as proximity to the source decreases. Though less indicative than
spreads, Appendix 1.B provides a further decomposition of interbank rates. Specifically,
Figure 1.B.1 shows that the dynamics of standalone rates are largely driven by the decline
due to the aggregate productivity shock. Isolation of the banking shock in Figure 1.B.2
shows an initial increase in interbank rates across all regions. The magnitudes follow the
cyclical structure with the initial rate increase being the largest for rAC followed by rCD,
rDB and finally, rBA.
Complete network
The complete network is characterised by a high density of linkages which makes a market-
by-market analysis similar to the above more complex due to the large number of endoge-
nous variables associated to each (interbank) link. However, the symmetry of the complete
network (combined with the asymmetry introduced due to the localised banking shock)
allows us to restrict our attention to a few key cases. These are provided above the rel-
evant plots as 2- or 3-node schematics to indicate the counterparties being analysed. As
before, we begin by looking at the impulse responses of interbank lending and borrowing
volumes:
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Figure 1.9: Interbank lending and borrowing volumes - Complete network
where the three scenarios correspond to (i) shocked bank lending to a non-shocked bank,
(ii) non-shocked bank lending to a shocked bank and (ii) exposure between two non-
shocked banks. Initial comparison with the interbank exposures under cyclicality provided
in Figure 1.6 shows a smaller impact of the baseline under completeness. The same applies
when a banking shock is incorporated. This highlights the dissipative characteristics of
complete networks, as documented by Allen and Gale (2000). Under this structure,
banks are maximally exposed to the wholesale market, allowing them to more efficiently
redistribute risk across counterparties and limit individual exposures.19 Analysis of the
rightmost panel indicates that as the shock propagates outwards from A, the impact on
lending between non-shocked banks is minimal, having almost the same trajectory as the
baseline.
The interbank repayments behave in a similar manner, as shown in Figure 1.10 below with
a smaller increase in banks’ defaults under completeness than their cyclical counterparts.
Comparing A’s repayment on borrowing from B and B’s default on borrowing from D,
we obtain the intuitive result that the former exhibits a higher default rate due to the
shock than the latter.
19A counterargument in which the same links can exacerbate interbank tensions by acting as a channel for
financial contagion for large shocks is well documented in the literature (Acemoglu et al., 2015). However,
such mechanisms are not included in our theoretical model and thus, are outside the scope of this paper.
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Figure 1.10: Interbank repayments - Complete network
We now proceed to the analysis of interest rate spreads. These involve three banks of
which the intermediary is located in the middle of the three-node linear networks given
below:
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Figure 1.11: Interbank rate spreads - Complete network
As before, aggregate productivity shocks have minimal impact on interbank spreads. The
largest swings occur when A is the intermediary whereas the smallest occurs when none
of the banks involved is shocked, both of which are intuitive results. Moreover, there is a
substantial difference in magnitudes (but not dynamics) between the scenarios where A
is the first bank in the intermediation chain (third panel) compared to when it is the last
(rightmost panel). Specifically, the magnitudes of the initial decline and peak 20 periods
into the situation are both smaller when A is the terminal node in the chain compared to
when it is the initial node, which further highlights the ability of the network to transmit
local shocks beyond their immediate vicinity.
Another interesting case study involves the degree of reciprocity between bank pairs who
simultaneously lend to and borrow from one another. This is captured in Figure 1.12 for
the cases when one of the two banks or neither is subject to a banking shock:
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Figure 1.12: Interbank rate spreads (reciprocity) - Complete network
As expected, the spread is negligible in the absence of a shock to either of the banks.
By contrast, the lack of reciprocity is manifested in the left panel through an increase
in A’s lending rate to B relative to its borrowing rate. This lends further weight to the
argument that complete networks are stability-enhancing: In the event of a shock to bank
A, it benefits from preferential treatment vis-a`-vis its counterparty via a higher lending
rate and/or a lower borrowing rate. This is also in line with the ‘relationship lending’
argument made in the general introduction.
We end our discussion of interbank dynamics under the complete network by referring to
Figures 1.B.3 and 1.B.4 in Appendix 1.B which, unlike the cyclical dynamics, do not show
any marked heterogeneity in interbank rates. This further exemplifies the stabilising role
of the complete network.
Core-periphery networks
We end this section by reporting the IRFs under two variations of the core-periphery
topology: one in which the core is a net borrower and one in which the core is a net lender
on the interbank market as outlined in Figure 1.4. Given the inherent asymmetry of the
structure, we expand the set of banking shock configurations from one to three in order
to show how the location of the shock can affect inter-bank dynamics (see Figure 1.5).
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Core bank as net borrower As in the previous cases, we begin our treatment by
reporting the response of interbank volumes to an aggregate negative productivity shock
and regional negative banking shock.
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Figure 1.13: Interbank volumes under CP network - net borrower case.
As expected, a negative shock to the core bank A results in the largest and most persistent
fluctuations by virtue of its high centrality in the system. Upon impact, A reduces lending
to B (its only borrower in this setup) while increasing its borrowing from C and D.
Another intuitive result arises when C is subject to the banking shock: given its role as
one of the main providers of funding for A and ultimately B, we observe a large decrease
in lending from C to A followed by a slightly smaller decrease in lending from A to B. In
this case, A’s role as an inter-bank intermediary dampens the pass-through of the shock.
Interestingly, the same shock also produces a small reduction in D’s lending to A. This
shows that shock propagation in a core-periphery network is not necessarily linear and
can impact banks off the direct transmission path. Finally, we observe that the shock to
B produces (relative to the other configurations) subdued dynamics due to its relatively
less important role in the interbank market compared to the intermediary and initial
providers of funding.
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
δ
b , B A
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
δ
b , A C
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
δ
b , A D
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
r b , A B− r b , C A
 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
r b , A B− r b , D A
A gg . p r o d u c t i v i t y s h o c k + b an k i n g s h o c k ( A ) + b an k i n g s h o c k ( B ) + b an k i n g s h o c k ( C )
Figure 1.14: Interbank repayment rates under CP network - net borrower case.
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As in the previous cases, repayment dynamics closely mirror interbank volumes. Closer
observation of the impulse response magnitudes reveals that the initial increase in B’s
default when A is shocked is similar to A’s default rate when C is shocked. This highlights
that shocks to the ‘periphery’ can also drive interbank market tensions (compared to core
shocks) when core banks are dependant on them for funding.
Due to its structure, the core-periphery network only permits two spreads, reported in
Figure 1.15 which are symmetric around A for most of the shock specifications the excep-
tion being the shock to C which has a much smaller (but not zero) impact on the spread
between B and D via bank A compared to the case given in the left figure.
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Figure 1.15: Interbank rate spreads under CP network - net borrower case.
The isolated banking shock reported in the Appendix (Figure 1.B.6) shows an across
the board increase in interbank rates. However, unlike the previous cases (complete and
cyclical), where the initial increases were between 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points, several
of the initial rate spikes were between 0.1 and 0.15 p.p. Closer analysis reveals that the
shock to B results in (comparatively) smaller increases due to its non-central role in the
network. By contrast, the core shock in the first row is followed by increases greater than
0.2 p.p with the largest occurring on A’s lending to B.
Core bank as net lender Under this setup, the core bank now has two banks that
depend on it for interbank lending along with one sole source of wholesale funding.
Despite having the same base-structure as the net-borrower case, the IRFs follow different
trajectories with large differences in magnitude. For example, a banking shock to B results
in a 20% decline in lending to A which then translates (via A) to a 10% decrease in lending
to both C and D. This contrasts with the much smaller decline in volumes due to a shock
to B under the net borrower case. As mentioned, the core-periphery specification imbues
the network with a function in addition to the basic form. Under the net lender case, A
is reliant on B for funding followed by both C and D being reliant on A. Thus a negative
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Figure 1.16: Interbank volumes under CP network - net lender case.
shock to the only source of funds will have a more pronounced effect than a shock to the
ultimate recipient of funds. Similar to lending volumes, interbank repayments fare much
worse under the net lender case than their net borrower counterparts
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Figure 1.17: Interbank repayment rates under CP network - net lender case.
The shock to B also has a strong impact on the interbank rate spreads, showing a relative
increase in A’s cost of borrowing. Interestingly, the shock to A exhibits much more
subdued dynamics than its counterpart. We posit that this occurs due to the interbank
market dynamics playing out in strong fluctuations in volumes and repayment rates rather
than in the interest rate. This is justified by Figure 1.B.8 wherein the rate increase in the
first column is smaller in magnitude than the second and third. The higher spike due to
the B shock is consistent with the dynamics explored thus far.
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Figure 1.18: Interbank rate spreads under CP network - net lender case.
The main takeaway from the core-periphery analysis is that a small-variation in the pat-
tern of linkages can have wide-ranging effects on the system’s ability to withstand certain
shocks. We have shown, in a stylised manner, that when a core bank is limited in its abil-
ity to obtain funding, this is easily transmitted to downstream banks who are themselves
dependent on the core.
We end our discussion of banking sector dynamics by observing that the impulse responses
to a market book shock resulted in fairly large swings above and below the steady state
prior to converging. This is likely due to general equilibrium effects associated to the
comprehensive manner in which banking sector specificities are taken into account in
banks’ maximisation programmes. Notably, the nonlinear pecuniarity penalty associated
to interbank loan defaults as well as the countercyclical capital buffer are likely to engender
large movements and countermovements in the impulse response functions. As we will
highlight below, this can lead to counterintuitive results when paired with the ex-ante
heterogeneity arising due to the two core-periphery structures.
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1.5.2 Real economy effects
The second simulation study provides the policy dimension of the paper. Specifically,
we analyse how central bank liquidity injections (given by Equation 1.24) can alleviate
strains to the real economy brought on by the banking shock and its transmission through
the network. We now treat the second scenario from the first simulation (aggregate
productivity and regional banking shock20) as the benchmark and toggle on the central
bank policy function.
We begin by comparing the total volume of liquidity injections (m, whose dynamic process
is given in Equation 1.28) across the different network structures. In order to provide a
basis for comparison, we normalise m by dividing by the number of links which yields:
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Figure 1.19: Total normalised central bank liquidity injections
As expected, our crisis simulation prompts the central bank to action, injecting liquidity
into the banking sector across all imposed networks. However, despite the same shock
calibration, the central bank response varies widely across networks. As has been shown
in the paper, the complete network is highly stable due to the shock-dissipative effect of
its high interconnectedness. Interestingly, the core-periphery network in which the core
bank is a net borrower requires the second lowest aggregate central bank intervention over
time. We posit that this occurs due to the relative stability that having two sources of
funding and only one source of default risk can provide. This argument is strengthened
by the relatively inferior performance of the net lender case, in which the central bank
had to intervene more aggressively. In this case, the core is subject to two sources of
default risk and only one source of retail funding. As a result, it increases its reliance on
wholesale funding.
20In the case of the core-periphery networks, we restrict our attention to the first configuration in which
the core bank A is subject to the banking shock.
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Having compared the effect of interbank network structure on the dynamics of interbank
variables in section 1.5.1, we now analyse how a negative banking shock, within the context
of our model, affects total credit to firms and total output. Note that the former provides
the link by which interbank market tensions are transmitted to the real economy namely,
through a reduction in credit availability :
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Figure 1.20: Total credit
The figure above confirms that the initial banking shock and its transmission through
the network results in a reduction in credit provision to firms. The stability-enhancing
properties of the complete network are again evident given the lower reduction in credit
it exhibits. However, we notice that the increase in total output following central bank
interventions is comparatively smaller. Thus, the positive impact of liquidity injections
are also subject to dissipative effects, resulting in a lower total impact.
Though difficult to observe, the CP-nl network exhibits a slightly smaller decrease in
credit than the cyclical and CP-nb cases. This puzzling feature seems to contradict the
relative instability of this network observed in the previous section along with the larger
central bank interventions reported above. As mentioned at the end of the last section,
the various adjustments present in the bank maximisation programme, combined with
heterogeneity in terms of the interbank variables (and associated disutilities) can create
unexpected effects within a general equilibrium framework.
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Figure 1.21: Total output
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Analysing the variation in total output across the four networks, it is evident that liquidity
injections into the banking sector play a positive role in stabilising economic output.
Again, the complete network features the smallest decrease while the remaining structures
are more difficult to distinguish.
Throughout the analysis, the complete network has revealed itself to be conducive to
financial stability, both in terms of interbank market dynamics and within the context of
spillovers to the real economy. In order to provide the first step towards a normative anal-
ysis of the impact of network structure, Figure 1.22 below provides the impulse response
functions for total household consumption when moving from the complete network to
the three remaining alternatives. In this way, we analyse the impact on global welfare in
the event of shocks that forces the network to self-organise into a less stable configura-
tion. Consequently, this provides a first glimpse into possible future analyses aiming to
endogenise the network structure. Note that IRFs below are without liquidity injections.
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Figure 1.22: Change in total consumption with complete network benchmark
Interestingly, both the cyclical and the CP-nb networks exhibit a decreases in total con-
sumption when moving from the complete network. By contrast, the CP-nl (which recall,
is the most prone to interbank market instability) shows an instantaneous increase when
compared to the complete network. Similar to the total credit case, we argue that these
unusual dynamics arise due to general equilibrium effects related to bank heterogeneity
in terms of optimisation programmes.
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1.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we develop a novel methodology for taking into account financial system
interconnectedness within the framework of a DSGE model. The RBC-DSGE model
we use as a benchmark is part of a recent but growing literature that recognises the
importance of the banking sector for the transmission and propagation of shocks. Before
developing the crux of our modelling framework, we modify the bank microfoundations
in our benchmark model by allowing for one regional, representative bank intermediating
funds between households and firms. We then assume four regions, each comprising the
three agents just mentioned.
Our main contribution arises in the manner in which these four regions interact. Specifi-
cally, we assume that banks are connected in an interbank network which provides them
access to inter-regional wholesale funding to complement intra-regional retail funding from
households. We vary the structure of this network across a set of stylised but suitably var-
ied configurations namely, the complete, cyclical and core-periphery network topologies.
This structure is then imposed on the microfounded model and the effect of the network
is analysed using two simulation studies.
In the first simulation, we study how interbank market dynamics are driven by the network
structure. We do this by first establishing a benchmark consisting only of aggregate pro-
ductivity shocks. Since transmission through the interbank network is minimal (occurring
only indirectly through changes in firm credit demand), it provides a basis for comparing
the propagation of a regional banking shock which is transmitted directly through the
network. Following this, we study how central bank liquidity injections directly into the
banking sector can alleviate the spillover of banking sector shocks to the real economy
via decreases in credit provision to firms.
Our results highlight the important role played by the network structure in driving eco-
nomic fluctuations. We show that the complete network acts as a system stabiliser by
allowing shocks to dissipate across the large number of linkages. Further evidence of this
is provided when analysing central bank liquidity injections and the real economy. Un-
like the complete network, the cyclical setup allows for a more in-depth analysis of the
transmission of the banking shock through the network since it features nodes that are
not directly connected to the source of the shock. A recurring result is that IRF magni-
tude decreases as distance from the source of the shock increases. However this decrease
is never negligible which highlights the importance of accounting for interconnectedness.
The core-periphery topology introduces a degree of reality into the model given that real
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interbank networks are known to exhibit such a structure. Moreover, from a modelling
perspective, it allows for heterogeneity in banks’ microfoundations and a more complete
view of how shock location (which was redundant in the symmetric structures treated
above) can drive system dynamics.
We now turn to a comparison of our modelling framework with the two pillars on which it
is based namely, the benchmark DSGE model of De Walque et al. (2010) and the optimal
risk sharing model of Allen and Gale (2000). Regarding the former, our combination of
WPR’s single purpose deposit and merchant banks and the resulting interbank markets
into one bank accepting deposits and extending credit better aligns the model with the in-
termediating role played by real banks. Moreover, the additional structural realism gained
through the use of core-periphery networks also adds a level of behavioural realism due to
the heterogeneity between peripheral banks, who are either borrowers or lenders on the
interbank market and the core bank, who plays the role of intermediary. It should also be
noted that by keeping to WPR’s microfoundations, we could replicate their analysis while
adding additional research avenues due to the additional banks and network structure (as
outlined below). Compared to Allen and Gale (2000), the main advantage is the move
from a partial to a general equilibrium setup and the addition of a productive firm sector
allowing for the analysis of macroeconomic fluctuations. Moreover, several elements of
our model are contained in their discussion (section IX) namely, point D on allowing for
stochastic returns on the illiquid asset which is taken into account in our market book
shock and point E on the addition of a central bank, a key element of our model that is
intrinsically linked to the network given its intervention in the interbank market.
We end our discussion by pointing out a number of caveats in our modelling framework
along with potential directions for future research. As mentioned, this chapter is to our
knowledge, the first to combine networks and DSGE modelling in this way. As such, we
have relied on very simple models along both fronts. Our use of WPR as a benchmark
model was driven primarily by our desire to focus on the role played by the network in
transmitting and propagating shocks while abstracting from the more complex frictions
present in New-Keynesian DSGE models a`-la Smets and Wouters (2003). From a pure
modelling standpoint, we believe that the banking sector developed by WPR includes
a number of realistic features (heterogeneity, endogenous defaults, adherence to capital
requirements etc.) and thus, provides a relevant benchmark.
Having said that, our approach for incorporating the network is flexible enough to incor-
porate an alternative set of microfoundations. One possibility would thus be to study
how the network could be included in the canonical BGG financial accelerator model
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and whether interesting insights could be gained from their interaction. Alternatively,
researchers could experiment with relaxing the assumptions on convex deposit disutil-
ity and exogenous labour supply to provide a more holistic macrofinancial analysis. This
would then allow for the pinpointing of the general equilibrium effects that could generate
counterintuitive impulse responses, especially in a heterogeneous framework.
From a policy perspective, the model highlights the effectiveness of direct intervention by
the central bank via changes to its monetary policy framework to inject liquidity directly
into the banking sector . This is reflected in the figures for credit and output in which
central bank intervention successfully averts temporary decreases in those variables. An
important feature of the model in this context is that it shows how the structure of the
interbank network affects the volume of liquidity injections required to stabilise interbank
rates with core-periphery networks, due to the instability inherent in their structure, re-
quiring the highest level of intervention. Consequently, the chapter recommends that
central banks incorporate the network structure into their monetary policy framework in
order to ensure that interventions on the interbank market take into account its struc-
tural specificities . An extension along this dimension (for example by allowing for het-
erogeneous liquidity injections conditional on the network structure) would constitute an
important addition to the literature on incorporating financial stability into the objective
function of central banks and the separability of price and financial stability.21
Insofar as policy-relevant extensions are concerned, the model features a number of pa-
rameters whose further study could provide relevant insights into the tools available to
regulators to mitigate systemic risk. For example, combining our core-periphery net-
work study with a more in-depth treatment of the capital requirements would provide an
interesting analysis of capital surcharges for banks deemed ‘too big to fail’.
21The importance of such an analysis for policymakers was discussed by ECB executive board member
Peter Praet at the 14th Annual Internal Banking Conference on 10 November 2011 (https://www.ecb.
europa.eu/press/key/date/2011/html/sp111110.en.html) and BIS General Manager Jaime Caruana
on 06 June 2014 (https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp140606.pdf).
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In order to align our methodology with the state-of-the-art in DSGE modelling, future
work would revolve around developing a valid estimation strategy. Central to this is
the need for a data-driven underpinning of the interbank linkages in our model. As
granularity remains an issue, one possibility would be to turn to country-level cross-
border interbank holdings. Within the context of our model, the four regions would
thus represent countries. Given that the purpose of this chapter was to develop the
methodology by which two distinct fields, DSGE and financial network analysis, could be
combined into one coherent framework, we chose to remain as close to the behavioural
benchmark as possible and considered estimating or developing a more realistic calibration
framework out of scope.
Turning now to the network, it is clear that four nodes is the minimum required to provide
a reasonably varied set of structures on which to conduct our analysis. However, this belies
the complexity of real financial networks. A next step would be to increase the number
of nodes and links, allowing for example for an interbank core comprising more than one
bank. This would then allow researchers to apply tools from network science such as
the analysis of network centrality and distribution. Incorporating a less stylised network
would also allow for an analysis of common/correlated shocks. This adds another degree
of realism into the model as banking sector shocks are unlikely to hit only one bank in
the event of a crisis.
Though a number of extensions are possible, we believe that our approach provides a
promising and intuitive benchmark for considering how banks’ behaviour is affected by
the structure of the system in which they reside. The intuitive aspect is largely due to
the four-node network structure which has the advantage of providing a simple and visual
representation of the network while allowing for a holistic view of financial system and
the manner in which institutions are connected.
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1.A Computations
1.A.1 Cyclical network
In the cyclical network topology of Figure 1.3(b), each bank i = {A,B,C,D} lends to
and borrows from two distinct banks. Thus, this network is symmetric and the interbank
components of the profits function are identical across banks. We thus report one bank
profit function. Interconnectedness is captured in Table 1.A.0:
Table 1.A.0: Counterparties of i in cyclical network topology
i j ∈ Si k ∈ Di
A B C
B D A
C A D
D C B
where i denotes the bank of interest with lending and borrowing counterparties given
by j and k, respectively. With respect to bank i’s optimisation programme given in
Section 1.2.2, Figure 1.A.2 below provides the basis for the first-order conditions given in
Equations 1.9 - 1.14:
ij k
Figure 1.A.1: Local interbank market for each bank i under cyclical network
We begin with the observation that while the interbank component of bank profits vary
depending on the network structure, the remaining components namely deposits, lending
and market book exposures remain constant. In order to focus on cross-network hetero-
geneities, we extract the following ‘constant’ (C) terms from banks’ profit function:
pib,it (C) =
Db,it
1 + rd,it
−Db,it−1−
Xb,it
1 + rl,it
+αf,it X
b,i
t−1 +ζf
(
1− αf,it−1
)
Xb,it−2 +(1 + Γt)S
b,i
t−1−Sb,it
The remaining terms in pib,it comprise the interbank (IB) components of bank profits under
cyclicality:
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pib,it (IB) =
Bb,ijt
1 + rb,jit
−δb,ijt Bb,ijt−1−
Lb,ikt
1 + rb,ikt
+δb,kit L
b,ik
t−1+ζb
(
1− δb,kit−1
)
Lb,ikt−2−
ωb
2
((
1− δb,ijt−1
)
Bb,ijt−2
)2
At the steady state, pib,i(C) is also constant across the different networks while pib,i(IB)
will vary depending on the number of borrowing and lending counterparties. Under
cyclicality, we obtain:
pib,i(IB) =
(
1
1 + rb
− δb
)
Bb +
(
δb + ζb (1− δ)− 1
1 + rb
)
Lb − ωb
2
[((
1− δb)Bb)2]
Recall that B = L at steady state. Plugging this in and simplifying terms, the steady
state interbank component of bank profits under cyclicality is given by:
pib,i(IB) = ζb (1− δ)Lb + ωb
2
[((
1− δb)Lb)2]
1.A. Computations 77
1.A.2 Complete network
In the complete network topology of Figure 1.3(a), each bank i = {A,B,C,D} lends
to and borrows from the three remaining banks in the economy. Despite the increasing
complexity, the network remains symmetric vis-a`-vis the number of counterparties (six
for each bank as opposed to two under the cyclical topology). Similar to the above
example, we represent bank profits for an arbitrary bank i and its lending and borrowing
counterparties, {j, k, l}:
Table 1.A.1: Counterparties of i in complete network topology
i j ∈ Si = Di k ∈ Si = Di l ∈ Si = Di
A B C D
B A C D
C A B D
D A B C
Figure 1.A.1 below represents the table in (local) network form:
ij
kl
Figure 1.A.2: Local interbank market for each bank i under cyclical network
Derivation of the interbank component of bank i’s profits under completeness gives:
pib,it (IB) =
Bb,ijt
1 + rb,jit
+
Bb,ikt
1 + rb,kit
+
Bb,ilt
1 + rb,lit
− δb,ijt Bb,ijt−1 − δb,ikt Bb,ikt−1 − δb,ilt Bb,ilt−1
− L
b,ij
t
1 + rb,ijt
− L
b,ik
t
1 + rb,ikt
− L
b,il
t
1 + rb,ilt
+ δb,jit L
b,ij
t−1 + δ
b,ki
t L
b,ik
t−1 + δ
b,li
t L
b,il
t−1
+ ζb
[(
1− δb,jit−1
)
Lb,ijt−2 +
(
1− δb,kit−1
)
Lb,ikt−2 +
(
1− δb,lit−1
)
Lb,ilt−2
]
− ωb
2
[((
1− δb,ijt−1
)
Bb,ijt−2
)2
+
((
1− δb,ikt−1
)
Bb,ikt−2
)2
+
((
1− δb,ilt−1
)
Bb,ilt−2
)2]
,
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which, at steady state, is equal to:
pib,i(IB) = 3
(
1
1 + rb
− δb
)
Bb+3
(
δb + ζb (1− δ)− 1
1 + rb
)
Lb− 3ωb
2
[((
1− δb)Bb)2] .
Simplifying terms as before, we arrive at:
pib,i(IB) = 3ζb (1− δ)Lb + 3ωb
2
[((
1− δb)Lb)2]
1.A.3 Core-periphery networks
The link asymmetry inherent in the core-periphery network precludes the kind of sym-
metric analysis (i.e. pib,it (IB)∀i ∈ N ) undertaken above. Moreover, there are substantial
differences between the two core-periphery networks considered.
Net-borrower case
Beginning with the case where i is a net borrower of funds, we provide the set of coun-
terparties for each bank in the table below:
Table 1.A.2: Counterparties of i in core-periphery network topology (net borrower case)
i j ∈ Si k ∈ Di
A C,D B
B A ∅
C ∅ A
D ∅ A
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where ∅ indicates that the bank does not have any counterparties with whom it has a
lending or a borrowing relationship. As a result, the profit equation will vary across banks:
pib,At (IB) =
Bb,ACt
1 + rb,CAt
+
Bb,ADt
1 + rb,DAt
− δb,ACt Bb,ACt−1 − δb,ADt Bb,ADt−1 −
Lb,ABt
1 + rb,ABt
+ δb,BAt L
b,AB
t−1
+ ζb
(
1− δb,BAt−1
)
Lb,ABt−2 −
ωb
2
((
1− δb,ACt−1
)
Bb,ACt−2
)2
− ωb
2
((
1− δb,ADt−1
)
Bb,ADt−2
)2
pib,Bt (IB) =
Bb,BAt
1 + rb,ABt
− δb,BAt Bb,BAt−1 −
ωb
2
((
1− δb,BAt−1
)
Bb,BAt−2
)2
pib,Ct (IB) = −
Lb,CAt
1 + rb,CAt
+ δb,ACt L
b,AC
t−1 + ζb
(
1− δb,ACt−1
)
Lb,CAt−2
We omit the equation for bank D as this will have the same form as that for bank
C. Depending on the interbank role played by each bank, certain components of the
general specification do not appear. For example, C and D lend exclusively to A and
do not borrow on the interbank market. Consequently, the pecuniary cost of default
(parametrised by ωb) does not appear in their profit function. From this, it is apparent
that the core-periphery network will feature heterogenous profits at steady state which,
after simplification, are given by:
pib,A(IB) =
(
1
1 + rb
− δb + ζb (1− δ)
)
Lb − ωb
[((
1− δb)Lb)2]
pib,B(IB) =
(
1
1 + rb
− δb
)
Lb − ωb
2
[((
1− δb)Lb)2]
pib,C(IB) =
(
δb + ζb (1− δ)− 1
1 + rb
)
Lb
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Net-lender case
The set of counterparties for each i when A is a net lender of funds is given by:
Table 1.A.2: Counterparties of i in core-periphery network topology (net lender case)
i j ∈ Si k ∈ Di
A B C,D
B ∅ A
C A ∅
D A ∅
Which gives rise to the following profit equations:
pib,At (IB) =
Bb,ABt
1 + rb,BAt
− δb,ABt Bb,ABt−1 −
Lb,ACt
1 + rb,ACt
− L
b,AD
t
1 + rb,ADt
+ δb,CAt L
b,AC
t−1 + δ
b,DA
t L
b,AD
t−1
+ ζb
(
1− δb,CAt−1
)
Lb,ACt−2 + ζb
(
1− δb,DAt−1
)
Lb,ADt−2 −
ωb
2
((
1− δb,ABt−1
)
Bb,ABt−2
)2
pib,Bt (IB) = −
Lb,BAt
1 + rb,BAt
+ δb,ABt L
b,BA
t−1 + ζb
(
1− δb,ABt−1
)
Lb,BAt−2
pib,Ct (IB) =
Bb,CAt
1 + rb,ACt
− δb,CAt Bb,CAt−1 −
ωb
2
((
1− δb,CAt−1
)
Bb,CAt−2
)2
At steady state, these reduce to:
pib,A(IB) =
(
1
1 + rb
− δb + ζb (1− δ)
)
Lb − ωb
[((
1− δb)Lb)2]
pib,B(IB) =
(
1
1 + rb
− δb
)
Lb − ωb
2
[((
1− δb)Lb)2]
pib,C(IB) =
(
δb + ζb (1− δ)− 1
1 + rb
)
Lb
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1.B Figures
1.B.1 Additional impulse response functions: Cyclical network
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Figure 1.B.1: Interbank rates - Cyclical network
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Figure 1.B.2: Interbank rates (Isolated banking shock) - Cyclical network
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1.B.2 Additional impulse response functions: Complete net-
work
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Figure 1.B.3: Interbank rates - Complete network
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Figure 1.B.4: Interbank rates (Isolated banking shock) - Complete network
1.B.3 Additional impulse response functions: Core-periphery
networks
Net borrower case
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Figure 1.B.5: Interbank rates - CP network (net borrower case)
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Figure 1.B.6: Interbank rates (Isolated banking shock) - CP network (net borrower case)
Net lender case
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Figure 1.B.7: Interbank rates - CP network (net lender case)
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Figure 1.B.8: Interbank rates (Isolated banking shock) - CP network (net lender case)

Chapter 2
Default cascades and systemic risk
on different interbank network
topologies
2.1 Introduction
In a recent policy brief, Battiston et al. (2016) argue that “network effects matter to
financial-economic stability because shock amplification may occur via strong cascading
trends”. This reflects a growing consensus on the importance of financial sector intercon-
nectedness that has permeated both the research and policy1 worlds. Within the latter,
there has been a concerted effort by policymakers to introduce insights from network
theory into stress testing (Anand et al., 2013; Espinosa-Vega and Sole, 2014) and identi-
fication of Globally Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBS) (BCBS, 2011). By contrast,
academic research has been more multifarious, revolving broadly around two research do-
mains namely (i) use of granular bank-level data from a variety of sources to reconstruct
real-world interbank networks and (ii) simulation studies focussing on the relationship
between financial contagion and network structures (and the role of connectivity) across
different shock specifications and distress channels.
1A notable example being a 2013 speech by then Vice-Chairperson of the Federal Reserve, Janet Yellen
in which “...complex interactions among market actors may serve to amplify existing market frictions,
information asymmetries, or other externalities” (Yellen, 2013). This sentiment has been echoed by
policymakers at the Bank of England (Haldane, 2009), European Central Bank (ECB, 2009) and the
International Monetary Fund.(International Monetary Fund, 2010).
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As is apparent, the two are intrinsically related and potentially mutually reinforcing.
That is, realistic network topologies (derived from real data) can be used as a basis for
counterfactual simulations aimed at assessing the likelihood and drivers of contagious
defaults. Empirically-grounded networks thus lends this approach further credence as a
stress-testing and systemic risk measurement device. Subsequently, these analyses enable
policymakers to identify potential structural vulnerabilities in financial systems and con-
struct adequate early-warning systems (Squartini et al., 2013). Our paper is placed firmly
at this nexus. Using state-of-the-art techniques in probabilistic network simulation, we
generate a variety of network structures that reflect a number of topological properties
of real interbank networks. On the basis of this, we conduct a simulation study using a
combination of random and targeted shocks which are propagated across the network via
a direct and an indirect contagion channel. By doing so, we provide a holistic viewpoint
on the systemic risk associated to a wide class of network structures.
Against this background, the first part of our analysis requires us to determine what
topological features constitute a “realistic” interbank network. In a general sense, the
three key findings mentioned in the general introduction of this thesis come into play:
That real interbank networks feature a degree distribution following a power law, a core-
periphery structure and disassortative mixing. It is important to note that these struc-
tural features are derived from interbank exposure data wherein interbank linkages are
represented exclusively as credit flows between banks. This representation was called
into question by Upper (2011), Summer (2013) and Glasserman and Young (2015) who
argue that interbank exposures alone do not provide a sufficient channel for widespread
default propagation2. With this in mind, alternate transmission channels are being ex-
plored. Chief among these is the notion that financial markets have a limited capacity to
absorb the illiquid external assets due to inelastic demand in the event of a panic-driven
firesale (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2015; Duarte and Eisenbach, 2015).
To highlight the importance of asset price dynamics, Cifuentes et al. (2005) develop a
theoretical model in which sales by distressed banks depress the market price of such
assets. In a mark-to-market framework, this can then induce a further round of endoge-
nously generate firesale which further depresses asset price etc. Consequently, liquidity
effects provide an indirect channel for shock transmission (where the direct channel arises
due to interbank exposures as described earlier). Indirect contagion, defined by Clerc
et al. (2016) as a situation when “ firms’ actions generate externalities that affect other
firms through non-contractual channels” thus represents the next frontier in systemic risk
2An obvious caveat is that this may have been due to ex-post government intervention due to importance
of interbank markets for liquidity reallocation and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
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analysis. While chapter 3 of this thesis considers an ‘overlapping portfolio’ network a`-la
Caccioli et al. (2014), we restrict our analysis here to the topology of the interbank expo-
sure network and incorporate liquidity effects via a single asset following Cifuentes et al.
(2005). Comparison with the base case absent these effects reveals large systemic risk
differences and motivates the multilayer network analysis undertaken in chapter 3.
Parallel to these developments in data-driven interbank network reconstruction, an alter-
native stream of the literature focussed on the development of simulation studies aimed at
delineating the systemic implications of heterogeneous bank balance sheets and varying
network structure/connectivity3. Early network contagion studies, inspired by epidemi-
ological and ecological models, sought to establish theoretical relationships between and
understand the conditions under which the system can undergo a phase transition from
stability to instability. Pioneering examples within this literature are Nier et al. (2007),
Gai and Kapadia (2010), May and Arinaminpathy (2010), Haldane and May (2011) and
Gai et al. (2011). Key findings include: A non-monotonic impact of connectivity on fi-
nancial stability (Nier et al., 2007), and a “Robust-yet-fragile” property in which despite
low probabilities of occurrence, shocks can be extremely widespread when problems occur
(Gai and Kapadia, 2010).
While these studies opened up a new field of research, as Hu¨ser (2015) points out, they re-
lied primarily on the random network archetype which has since been shown to be a poor
fit when compared to more realistic structures (Craig and Von Peter, 2014). Moreover,
current state-of-the-art models on interbank dynamics have focussed primarily on devel-
oping behavioural foundations of interbank market behaviour, the lack of which which was
one of the key shortcomings of network contagion models (Upper, 2011)4. For example,
Georg (2013) compares three different networks (random, scale free and small-world) in
a dynamic model featuring portfolio-optimising banks and normal to crisis period regime
switches. The robust-yet-fragile hypothesis is revisited by Acemoglu et al. (2015) who
propose a variety of highly stylised topologies ranging from a complete to a ring network,
identifying a phase transition below which complete networks are stabilising and above
which more connections facilitate contagion. Similarly, Arinaminpathy et al. (2012) pro-
pose a random network model benchmark and fat-tailed/geometric degree distribution
as a realistic alternative followed by endogenous liquidity hoarding behaviour by banks.
3Stemming from the seminal paper by Allen and Gale (2000) who augment the bank run model of Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) to allow for interregional linkages. Their key finding is that the complete network is
stability enhancing.
4Alves et al. (2013) elaborate further on the difference between mechanical propagation models, such as
those mentioned above and those with behavioural foundations.
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They find that the geometric network is stable when shocks occur at random but suscep-
tible to widespread failures under a targeted shock regime.
We argue that while such models contribute to our understanding of systemic risk and
contagion dynamics, they fail to harness the full power of network analysis in providing
an empirically-grounded basis for their simulations. Our paper aims to fill this gap by
proposing a model taking the “best of both worlds” through the development of a simula-
tion study based on a topologically realistic representation of the direct exposure network
combined with an encompassing shock regime (random vs. targeted shocks as well as
varying shock magnitudes) and incorporation of liquidity effects. Moreover, where the
canonical models focus on the relationship between network connectivity (measured ei-
ther by network density or average degree) via a sensitivity analysis of the parameters, our
paper is firmly grounded in network theory through our use of state-of-the-art measures
aimed at capturing various dimensions of network topology. Against this background, we
aim to identify what structural characteristics of interbank networks induce widespread
knock-on defaults and endanger the stability of the financial system.
Using a wide array of stylised facts on real interbank network structures as a benchmark,
we apply the Latin Hypercube methodology developed by McKay et al. (1979) which
provides a more stratified sample compared to traditional Monte Carlo sampling. As a
result, the Latin Hypercube Design (LHD) allows us to explore more of the parameter
and ultimately, create a more representative sample of networks based on the fixed input
parameters5. LHDs have recently been applied to financial Agent-Based Models by Salle
and Yıldızog˘lu (2014) and Bargigli et al. (2018) to create metamodels whose simulated
moments are taken to the data. The LHD produces a large set of parameters which are
subsequently fed into the fitness-based model with mutual benefit (Caldarelli et al., 2002),
recently applied to contagion analysis by Montagna and Lux (2016) to create realistic
simulated interbank networks (where realistic refers to the three structural features men-
tioned above). The contagion model run on the simulated networks closely follows Nier
et al. (2007), Gai and Kapadia (2010) and May and Arinaminpathy (2010). However, we
depart from their setup by allowing for heterogenous banks, weighting of bilateral loans
dependent on the degree of similarity between connected banks and multiple random or
targeted external asset shocks.
5From a statistical standpoint, LHD also results in efficiency gains over MC as it reduces the sampling
error and increases the convergence rate of computed statistics to their theoretical values. The interested
reader is referred to chapter 10.3 of Owen (2013) for the relevant mathematical proofs.
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After running the default cascade model on each of our networks generated via the Latin
Hypercube design, we develop an empirical specification whereby various measures of the
extent of financial contagion are regressed on (i) global network measures, (ii) aggregate
balance sheet variables and (iii) various network centrality measures associated to the set
of initially shocked banks. Our results highlight the important role played by the network
structure in explaining the extent of the default cascades. Absent liquidity effects, a
number of global network measures have a significant impact on the number of failures
during the simulation. Similarly, the strong explanatory power of the network is preserved
when moving to the local scale via the various centrality measures associated to the
shocked bank(s). Specifically, nodes with higher incloseness and betweenness centralities
induce a larger default cascade as opposed to nodes with higher outcloseness and pagerank
centralities which are shown to be stability enhancing. Allowing for liquidity effects
reduces the explanatory power of the network on the number of failures which is intuitive
given that these effects are not wholly propagated through the network. However, we
observe an improved role played by the network at both scales when analysing the impact
on asset price changes.
Though our approach provides the most comprehensive treatment on the impact of net-
work topology on systemic risk (via a large number of global and local network measures),
a number of related studies recognize the importance of moving towards more realistic
representations of the interbank market. Notably, Temizsoy et al. (2017) study the impact
of network centrality on interbank funding rates using e-MID data, finding inter alia that
at the local scale, having more links increases borrowing costs for borrowers and reduces
premia for lender. Globally, they find that banks perceived to be better connected can
borrow at lower rates (echoing an earlier finding by Gabrieli and Georg (2015)). The
concept of ‘systemic centrality’ is revisited by Chan-Lau (2018) in combination with a
community detection framework to analyse groups of firm that can play a ‘too important
to fail’ role in financial stability.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the necessary tools and def-
initions from network theory used in the subsequent analysis. Section 2.3 outlines the
network generation algorithm and latin hypercube design for producing the replicates for
the empirical analysis, Section 2.4 develops the cascading default model run on each sim-
ulated network. Section 2.5 provides the calibrated parameter bounds fed into the LH
design. Section 2.7 develops the empirical model and Section 2.8 concludes and provides
policy recommendations.
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2.2 Network theory
2.2.1 Basic definitions
A directed graph G
(
N , ~E
)
consists of a nonempty set N of nodes and a set of ordered
pairs of nodes called edges where ~E ⊆ N 2. The graph structure can be represented by
the adjacency matrix, A (G) = [aij]N×N where aij = 1 when there exists a directed edge
from node i to node j and 0 otherwise6. For the sake of brevity, any measure associated
to a network will use the shorthand form ~G.
A useful property of directed networks that can be derived from the adjacency matrix is
the in- and out-degree of each node which represent the number of incoming and outgoing
links, respectively:
Definition 1. The in- and out- degree, dini and d
out
i of a node, i ∈ N are given by:
dini =
N∑
j=1
aji = (A>)i · 1 douti =
N∑
j=1
aij = (A)i · 1
Where A> is the transpose of A7, (A)i is the ith row of A and 1 is an N -dimensional
column vector (1, . . . 1)>.
For each node i, we distinguish between its in- and out-degree as this determines its initial
neighbourhood of counterparties for whom i serves as a lender or borrower, denoted by
the sets N li (G) = {j : aij = 1} and N bi (G) = {j : aji = 1} whose cardinalities are given
by the out- and in-degree, respectively.
Another node-specific property is the total number of nodes j ∈ Ni (the neighbourhood of
i) for which a bidirectional edge exists i.e. for which aij = aji = 1. This can be expressed
as:
d↔i =
∑
j 6=i
aijaji = A
2
ii
6Furthermore, we restrict our attention to graphs containing no self-loops aii = 0 or multiple edges
aij ∈ {0, 1}.
7We adopt the convention that the ith row (column) represents node i’s outgoing (incoming) links.
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2.2.2 Global network measures
The set of measures8 provided below aim to quantify different topological characteristics
of the network as a whole (as opposed to individual nodes’ importance as will be developed
in the next section)9. These measures take the form of real-valued functions f : G → R
ascribing a numerical value to some complex feature of the entire network structure.
Following, Gabrieli and Georg (2014), we argue that these measures lend themselves to
an intuitive economic interpretation within the context of interbank liquidity flows.
Density measures how connected the network (N , ~E) is relative to the complete graph
constructed on N (i.e. the graph with the maximum number of edges). In the directed
case, this is given by:
D =
E
N(N − 1)
where E = |~E| denotes the number of edges in the network.
Assortativity measures the tendency of nodes with similar number of edges to connect
to one another and, following Foster et al. (2010), is defined as:
Definition 2. For a directed network, G(N , ~E), a set of four assortativity measures can
be computed. Let µ, ν ∈ {in, out} denote the degree-type and jµi , kνi denote the µ- and
ν-degree associated respectively to the source and terminal node of edge i. Then the as-
sortativity of G is given by the Pearson correlation coefficient:
ρ(µ, ν) =
1
E
∑
i
(jµi − j¯µ)
(
kνi − k¯ν
)
σµσν
8These are computed using the MATLAB programming language, making heavy use of the Brain Con-
nectivity Toolbox developed by Rubinov and Sporns (2010) for various network measures.
9Many of these techniques stem from the field of Social Network Analysis which coopts tools from graph
theory and statistical mechanics to the analysis of human interaction via networks. The interested reader
is referred to Marin and Wellman (2011) for a thorough overview of the field.
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Where j¯µ(k¯ν) denotes the mean µ(ν) degree of the source (terminal) nodes over all edges
in G. σµ (σν) are the standard deviations of the µ(ν)-degree associated to the to the source
and terminal nodes, respectively.
Reciprocity is a feature of directed networks measuring the tendency of nodes to form
mutual connections (i.e. the existence of an ij and a ji edge between nodes i and j). A
robust measure of reciprocity, developed by Garlaschelli and Loffredo (2004) is given by:
r =
∑
i 6=j
(aij −D) (aji −D)∑
i 6=j
(aij −D)2
where, D denotes the density of the network and aij the adjacency matrix element ij.
Average path length captures the ability of the network to efficiently transfer infor-
mation between nodes. Within the context of interbank networks, it measures the average
length of liquidity intermediation chains. Given a directed network ~G, a path between
nodes i and j is defined as a sequence of edges {i1, i2}, {i2, i3} . . . {iN−1, iN} such that
i1 = i and iN = j and each node in the sequence i1 . . . iN is distinct. When multiple paths
exist from node i to node j, the shortest path is referred to as the geodesic) and denoted
dij. The average path length is then computed by taking the average of dij over each node
in the network as follows:
l¯~G =
1
N(N − 1) ·
∑
i 6=j
dij
Diameter Similar to the previous measure, network diameter makes use of the geodesic
to construct a value representing the network structure. However, while the average path
length averages the geodesics between all node pairs in the network, the diameter simply
measures the length of the longest geodesic.
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Clustering coefficient is defined in Watts and Strogatz (1998) as the probability that
two incident edges, ij ∈ ~E are completed by a third one to form a triangle. Fagiolo (2007)
extends the framework to binary (i.e. unweighted) directed networks. Given a node i,
the product aijajkaik denotes any one of the 8 possible triangles that i can form with its
neighbours j and k. Consequently, the local clustering coefficient of i is defined as the
number of directed triangles actually formed by i (tDi ) divided by the total number of
potential triangles i could form (TDi ) . This is expressed mathematically as:
CDi (A) =
tDi
TDi
=
1
2
∑
j
∑
k
(aij + aji)(aik + aki)(ajk + akj)
[dtoti (d
tot
i − 1)− 2d↔i ]
=
(A+ A>)3ii
2 [dtoti (d
tot
i − 1)− 2d↔i ]
Our variable of interest however, is the average clustering coefficient which defines clus-
tering at the network level. This is obtained by simply averaging the local CDi values
across all nodes i ∈ N .
2.2.3 (Local) centrality measures
Unlike the above measures that ascribe a numerical value to some global structural feature
of the network, centrality focuses primarily on the question of what characterises an
important node. The centrality measures described below take the form of real-valued
functions whose output provides a ranking of all nodes based on varying interpretations
of node importance. Many of the definitions provided below make implicit assumptions on
the way information flows in through the network. Borgatti (2005) classifies the measures
based on the characteristics of the flow processes into the following categories: measures
based on shortest paths/geodesics between nodes (betweenness and closeness centralities)
and measures based on number of walks10 (Eigenvector, Katz and PageRank centralities)
between nodes. With regard to economic interpretations, the degree of variation in the
different network measures used implies that when conducting our empirical analysis
on the main drivers of default cascades, we capture a variety of interpretations of what
constitutes an important node. Against this background, these measures aim to determine
the systemic importance of the node. As mentioned by Bramoulle´ et al. (2016), the policy
relevance of conducting such an analysis is clear.
10A walk is a generalisation of a network path (see the definition of average path length) in which the the
nodes in the sequence do not have to be distinct.
94 Chapter 2: Default cascades and systemic risk
Degree centrality is based on the assumption that a node’s importance in the network
is driven purely by the number of connections it has to other nodes in the network. As
such a node i’s in- and out-degree centralities, CD,ini and C
D,out
i are determined by the
number of incoming and outgoing edges, respectively.
Closeness centrality measures the average distance from one particular node to all
other nodes in the network. Using the concept of the geodesic path (see the definition of
average path length), node i’s closeness centrality is given by:
CC,µi =
N − 1∑
j 6=i
dµij
where µ ∈ {in, out} indicates that this measure is defined both for incoming (incloseness
centrality) as well as outgoing (outcloseness centrality) edges. Thus, a node with a high
incloseness centrality can be reached by other nodes in the network in relatively few
steps. Similarly, increasing outcloseness increases the influence exerted by that node via
its ability to reach the other nodes in the network in few steps.
Betweenness centrality was first defined by Freeman (1978) and measures, in a broad
sense, the share of times that any node i needs to use node k (whose centrality we are
trying to measure) to access any node k. Formally, it is defined as the fraction of all
shortest paths between i, j ∈ N passing through k and is expressed as:
CBk =
∑
j∈N b
σij|k
σij
(N − 1)(N − 2)
where σij|k denotes the number of geodesics between i and j passing through k and σij is
the total number of geodesics between the two nodes. Note that this is different to the
length of the geodesic paths, dij used to compute closeness centrality. The denominator
is a normalisation factor denoting the total number of node pairs. The applicability of
this measure to financial network analysis is apparent: a bank with high betweenness
centrality exerts greater control in the intermediation chain and thus, its failure can put
significant pressure on dependant banks.
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PageRank centrality is derived from the Eigenvector centrality measure developed by
Bonacich (1987) which is based on the notion that a node’s relative importance in the
network is determined by the importance of its immediate neighbours. Specifically, given
the adjacency matrix A, the standard eigenvector equation Ax = λ1x is used to populate
the N×1 vector x of node centrality scores where λ1 denotes the largest eigenvector of A.
However, as pointed out by Newman (2010), its power as a centrality measure is limited in
the case of directed networks due to uncertainty over the relative importance of incoming
vs. outgoing edges as well as the occurrence of null centralities arising when selecting
the left or right eigenvectors. These shortcomings are addressed in the centrality measure
developed by Katz (1953) by giving each node a small amount of centrality “for free” via
the parameter β in the equation x = αAx + β1 where α ∈ (0, 1/λ1) is an attenuation
factor that penalises indirect connections made with distant neighbours.
The PageRank11 centrality measure is a variation of the Eigenvector and Katz measures
that conditions a node’s centrality score not only the scores of its neighbours, but also on
the number of neighbours with the logic being that the centrality contribution from each
connected node should be diluted in proportion to the amount that is shared with other
nodes.
x = αAD−1x+ β1
where A,x, α and β are as described above. The key difference is the inclusion of the
diagonal matrix D with elements Dii = max {douti , 1} which ensures that nodes that point
to many others pass only a small amount of centrality on to each of those others, even if
their own centrality is high. To summarise, pagerank centrality is driven by three distinct
factors: (i) the number of incoming links, (ii) the link propensity of the linkers, and (iii)
the centrality of the linkers. Within the context of our study, the pagerank measure
is distinct from degree centrality in that it conditions a node’s centrality on its ability
to influence nodes beyond its immediate neighbours. Moreover, it does not rely on the
assumption that information flows along a geodesic, as is the case for the betweenness
and closeness centrality measures.
11This is actually the trade name for the algorithm developed by Brin and Page (1998) to rank web pages
in the original Google search engine.
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2.2.4 Network structures
Erdo˝s-Renyi networks
Given that our objective is to compare contagion dynamics across a wide variety of net-
work topologies, the Erdo˝s-Renyi or random network archetype provides a useful bench-
mark for our simulations. The basic premise of the model is that nodes form links ran-
domly with independent probability p. The degree distribution is given by:
pk =
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k
which is a binomial distribution. This property limits the applicability of the random
graph model since real-world networks typically possess right-skewed degree distributions
with most vertices having low degree but with a small number of high-degree “hubs”
(Newman et al., 2001). Another unrealistic feature of Erdo˝s-Renyi networks is their low
clustering coefficient.
Small-world networks
In order to grow random graphs exhibiting more realistic clustering, Watts and Stro-
gatz (1998) developed an algorithm to generate so-called small-world networks (Milgram,
1967), interpolating between a regular ring lattice (a type of network in which each node
has the same degree) and an Erdo˝s-Renyi network assuming a fixed number of nodes, and
edges. The algorithm works by visiting each node in the lattice sequentially and rewiring
it (i.e. taking one of the edges and connecting it to a random node in the lattice) with
probability β or leaving it in place with probability 1 − β and proceeding to the next
node. Barrat and Weigt (2000) provide the full degree distribution arising from the algo-
rithm as a function of the rewiring probability, β, finding that as β → 0, the distribution
approaches the Dirac delta function of the lattice graph while as β → 1, it approaches
the Poisson distribution of the random graph.
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Scale-free networks
While the Watts-Strogatz model generates networks possessing the high clustering and
low average path length of real-world networks, it is unable to produce a realistic degree
distribution. Baraba´si and Albert (1999) observe that many real-world networks exhibit
a scale-free degree distribution characterised by a power law: pk ∼ k−γ where γ is a
scaling parameter typically taking values between 2 and 3. In order to generate such
networks, the authors developed the “preferential attachment” algorithm that features
two key ingredients (i) network growth whereby, starting with a small number m0 of
nodes, a new node with m ≤ m0 edges is linked to the m nodes already present in the
system and (ii) preferential attachment which states that the probability that a new node
is connected to an existing one is proportional to the degree of the existing node.
Ultimately, the algorithm produces a scale-free network with scaling parameter γ = 3.
In addition to this restrictive result, the clustering coefficient predicted by the BA model
are often orders of magnitude lower than in the real-world (Klemm and Eguiluz, 2002).
Caldarelli et al. (2002) develop a “fitness-based model” that eschews the notion of growing
networks via preferential attachment in favour of the idea that two nodes form a link
as a function of some intrinsic value describing their individual fitness/importance. In
addition to the fact that this algorithm is capable of generating scale-free networks with
realistic clustering, we argue that this approach is ideally suited towards the generation
of interbank networks due to the key role played by node fitness heterogeneity in driving
the network structure. This allows us to incorporate bank balance sheet heterogeneity
(a key driver of interbank contagion according to Glasserman and Young (2015)) directly
into our generative model, which we develop in the next section.
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2.3 Network simulation
We begin by establishing the modelling approach for generating a wide variety of network
topologies. This then serves as the basis for our cascading defaults contagion model. The
key components of our network simulation approach involve (i) Setting up the proba-
bilistic methodology for creating the network with the desired topological properties, (ii)
establishing how these properties are driven by model parameters and (iii) Applying the
Design-of-Experiments (DOE) framework to create an ensemble of network structures
encompassing known topological properties of real interbank networks.
2.3.1 Directed network: interbank exposures
Bank size distribution
Prior to launching the fitness-model for generating the network, we develop the probability
distribution from which bank balance sheet heterogeneity is derived. Following Clauset
et al. (2009), we start with the power law probability density function: p(x) dx = Cx−γ dx
where C is a normalising constant. The truncated power-law is obtained by applying the
identity
∫ amax
amin
Cx−γ dx = 1 to compute C. This results in a pdf of the form:
p (a; γa, amin, amax) =
(1− γa)
a1−γamax − a1−γamin
a−γa (2.1)
where {γa, amin, amax} is the parameter set associated to the bank size distribution.
Fitness-based model with mutual benefit
The N -dimensional vector, a of bank sizes are now assumed to represent the node’s in-
trinsic fitness i.e. its ability to attract edges in the generative model. Following Caldarelli
et al. (2002), the probability that two nodes form a link is jointly driven by their fitness
values:
pij = d ·
(
ai
amax
)α
·
(
aj
amax
)β
(2.2)
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where amax denotes the largest bank in a. An important feature of Equation 3.2 is the
relationship between the parameters α and β and in and out degree distributions. Specif-
ically, Caldarelli (2007) prove that Equation 3.2 yield power laws for both distributions,
given by:
g (kin) ∝ k−
1+β
β
in , g (kout) ∝ k−
1+α
α
out (2.3)
Moreover, the parameter d can be adjusted to target different network densities, D:
D =
2
N∑
i,j=1
pij
N(N − 1) ⇒ d =
D ·N(N − 1)aα+βmax
N∑
i,j=1
aαi a
β
j
(2.4)
2.3.2 Latin hypercube sampling
Latin hypercube designs (LHD), developed by McKay et al. (1979) provides a robust al-
ternative to the classical Monte Carlo approach to generating a sequence of random draws
from a given probability distribution. Specifically, it addresses the issue of inefficiency
whereby the Monte Carlo algorithm generates redundant sampling points while leaving
other parts of the parameter space unexplored (Salle and Yıldızog˘lu, 2014). By contrast,
latin hypercubes stratify the random draws equally across the sample space, thereby gen-
erating a sample with good space-filling properties. Assuming an experimental design
with p runs and d input variables/dimensions, we provide the following definition:
Definition 3. An experimental design is expressed as a p× d matrix
X =

x11 . . . x
d
1
...
. . .
...
x1p . . . x
d
p

in which each column represents a variable and each row represents a sample. The exper-
imental design is a latin hypercube if each column is a random permutation of {1,2,. . . p}.
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To illustrate our approach, we provide a toy example below comprising five random draws
over two variables i.e. (p, d) = (2, 5). The two-dimensional structure allows us to visualise
the hypercube as a space-filling latin square:
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
X =

3 5
4 2
2 1
1 3
5 4

Figure 2.1: A space-filling latin hypercube design (source: (Santner et al., 2013))
2.4 Contagion model
Following the counterfactual simulation of p random networks via latin hypercube de-
sign, we now develop the cascading defaults model featuring inter alia: (i) heterogenous
bank balance sheets, (ii) nonlinear liquidity effects (iii) weighted bilateral loan and shock
transmission derived from bank pairs’ link probability given by Equation 3.2 and (iv) a
varying shock regime that drives the cascading dynamics.
2.4.1 Initialisation
We consider an interbank market comprising N = |N | banks linked together by their
claims on one another (where the exact pattern of interbank assets and liabilities is driven
by the edge structure of the simulated network). Recall that the networks are directed.
Following convention, we assume that an edge from i to j constitutes an interbank rela-
tionship where i lends to j, with the contrary resulting from a j to i edge. Each bank/node
is then imbued with the following balance sheet structure: assets, Ai comprising inter-
bank lending, li and external asset holdings, ei and liabilities, Ii comprising interbank
borrowing bi and customer deposits, di:
Ai = li + ei (2.5)
Ii = bi + di (2.6)
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where Ai is drawn from a truncated power law distribution. This provides the first of
two sources of bank heterogeneity (the second being derived from the network structure).
The balance sheet identity, which fixes bank capital, ηi is then expressed as the difference
between i’s assets and liabilities:
ηi ≡ (li + ei)− (di + bi) ≥ 0 (2.7)
where ηi ≥ 0 is the solvency condition for bank i. In our conceptual framework, a shock
(either exogenous or transmitted from connected banks) that forces a bank’s capital into
negative territory results in that bank being declared insolvent. This entails removing the
bank from the system while propagating any residual shock onwards to connected banks,
which forms the crux of our contagion model. The specifics of the contagion mechanism
will be provided in Section 2.4.2. Following Nier et al. (2007) and Montagna and Lux
(2016), we define the parameters θ and γ which determine, respectively, the external asset
to asset and capital to asset ratio.
ei = θAi
li = (1− θ)Ai (2.8)
ηi = γAi
Note that i’s aggregate interbank assets are fixed ex ante, determining the magnitude of its
exposure to counterparty defaults. Up to now, we have been dealing with an unweighted,
directed network. In order to specify the magnitude of bilateral exposures, we introduce
the following specification for specifying individual loan amounts lij based on i’s aggregate
interbank lending:
lij =
pij∑
j∈N li
pij
li (2.9)
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Recall that pij is the probability that banks i and j form a directed edge which is driven
by their similarity in size (resulting in a disassortative graph). Equation 2.9 states that
banks will weight bilateral lending as an increasing function of counterparties’ relative
similarity in terms of size. Note that both li and lij are nonzero for banks that have at
least one outgoing edge in the simulated network.
Similarly, for banks that borrow on the interbank market (i.e. have at least one incoming
edge), aggregate interbank liabilities, bi are determined by summing over lji
bi =
N∑
j=1
lji (2.10)
Lastly, we treat customer deposits as a residual, populated after total assets and interbank
liabilities have been fixed.
di = (ei + li)− (ηi + bi) (2.11)
2.4.2 Cascading defaults model
Once the network has been simulated and heterogenous balance sheets created, we proceed
to defining the shock that triggers potential default propagation through the network. We
begin by fixing the following notation: In each iteration, the set of shocked banks is given
by the set N S,t ⊆ N . As we will show in this section, this set is updated as the initial
shock propagates outwards through the chain of interbank exposures. Following Nier
et al. (2007), we assume that the initial shock, si wipes out a fraction f of a bank, or set
of banks’ external assets such that si = f · e0i . In this setting, the first iteration of the
model, i’s external asset entry on its balance sheet is updated as:
e1i = (1− f)e0i (2.12)
where e0i corresponds to the initial value obtained from i’s total assets and the parameter
θ. The loss is first absorbed by bank capital ηi followed by interbank liabilities and lastly
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by deposits as the ultimate sink. Mathematically, if si < ηi, the shock is absorbed by
bank capital and is not transmitted to i’s creditors. Otherwise, the shock wipes out i’s
capital and the shock residual si − ηi > 0 is propagated onwards. If si − ηi > bi, bank
i’s aggregate borrowing cannot absorb the entire shock. In this case, depositors face a
loss of si − ηi − bi. Otherwise, the residual si − ηi is transmitted to i’s creditors and bi is
reduced by the same amount. We assume that bilateral shock transmission is conducted
on an equally-weighted basis across i’s creditors. This entails dividing the residual by
bank i’s in-degree, dini . Once the shock has been transmitted, the updated set of shock
banks perform the same exercise, checking whether they hold sufficient capital to absorb
the shock.
As described above, the asset-side shock is then compared to capital and interbank lia-
bilities to determine whether the shock is halted or propagated onwards. We summarise
these dynamics in Figure 2.2 below
A L
Bank 1
s11
e01
e11
l01
η01
b01
b11
d01
A L
Bank 2
s12 = (s
1
1 − η01) /2
η12 = η
0
2 − s12 > 0
η02
A L
Bank 3
s13 = (s
1
1 − η01) /2
η01
η13 = η
0
3 − s13 < 0
Figure 2.2: Cascading defaults model
In this simplified setup, the model is launched with a shock of magnitude s11 to bank 1’s
external assets. It is clear that bank 1’s initial capital η01 is insufficient to absorb the
shock. The shock residual is then divided equally across creditors 2 and 3. Where bank 2
has sufficient capital to absorb the shock (and curtail further propagation), bank 3 does
not, resulting in the non-absorbed component of the initial residual being transmitted
onward to its creditors.
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Liquidity effects
In order to incorporate the finding that direct interbank exposures do not generate default
cascades of sufficient size, we introduce liquidity risk via the firesale mechanism developed
by Cifuentes et al. (2005) and introduced into the network contagion framework by Nier
et al. (2007) and Gai and Kapadia (2010). In this framework, liquidity effects arise due
to the limited ability of the market to absorb failed banks’ assets.
The mechanism by which liquidity effects are introduced into the contagion dynamics of
the model is as follows: if the asset-side shock (either to external assets in the initial case
or via interbank claims in subsequent rounds) forces bank i into insolvency in iteration
round t, all remaining external assets of this bank are sold off in the market, inducing a
decline in market price according where the law of motion of market price is given by the
following inverse demand function
pt+1 = pt · exp
−ω ·
∑
{i∈NS :ηti<0}
eti
∑
i∈N
eti
 (2.13)
Equation 2.13 shows how the external asset price declines from pt to pt+1 as a function
of the relative amount of external assets sold in iteration t. The parameter ω measures
the the speed at which market price declines as external assets are sold. Following Gai
and Kapadia (2010), we calibrate ω such that the asset price falls by 10% when 10% of
system assets have been sold.
For each insolvent bank, additional losses to capital are imposed, equal to (pt − pt+1)
per unit of external assets sold. Thus, liquidity effects are transmitted to creditors in
an additive manner via the direct channel of interbank exposures. However, assuming
that external assets are marked-to-market, an indirect channel emerges whereby all other
banks incur an additional loss brought about by the revaluation of their assets from price
pt to pt+1.
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Cascade algorithm
In order to demonstrate how shocks propagate through the interbank network, the pseu-
docode for the cascading defaults models provided in Algorithm 1. For simplicity, we do
not include liquidity effects in the algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Default cascade
Require: ActiveBanks
1: stop = False
2: FailedBanks ← 0
3: while not stop do
4: FailureCount ← 0
5: AbsorbCount ← 0
6: for (CurrentBank in ShockedBanks) do
7: if CurrentBank.Shock <= CurrentBank.Capital then
8: AbsorbCount = AbsorbCount + 1
9: CurrentBank.Capital ← CurrentBank.Capital - CurrentBank.Shock
10: Shockpropagate = 0
11: else
12: FailureCount = FailureCount + 1
13: FailedBanks → append(CurrentBank)
14: ShockedBanks ← CurrentBank.Lenders
15: Shockpropagate = (CurrentBank.Shock - CurrentBank.Capital)/length(CurrentBank.Lenders)
16: end if
17: end for
18: ActiveBanks → remove(FailedBanks)
19: ActiveBanks.Lenders → remove(FailedBanks)
20: ActiveBanks.Borrowers → remove(FailedBanks)
21: if (AbsorbCount == length(ShockedBanks)) or (length(ShockedBanks) == 0) or ((length(FailedBanks) == Num-
Banks) then
22: stop = True . Stop conditions: 1) Shock is absorbed 2) No further creditors 3) All banks failed
23: end if
24: end while
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2.5 Simulations
2.5.1 Parameter bounds for Latin Hypercube design
Before constructing the Latin Hypercube Design, we assume that each parameter from the
set Θ = {amin, aratio, γa, α, β, d, θ, γ} is drawn from a uniform distribution whose support
is given in Table 2.1:
Table 2.1: Calibration bounds for simulation parameters
Parameter Lower bound Upper bound
Network
amin 10 50
aratio 10 50
γa 2 3
α 0.5 1
β 0.5 1
d 0.1 0.5
Balance sheet
θ 0.5 0.9
γ 0.01 0.1
Following this, we implement a Latin hypercube design where the matrix Xˆ comprises
p = 1000 samples of the d = 8 parameters by defining the following vectors:
xLB =
[
10 10 2 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.01
]
, xUB =
[
50 50 3 1 1 0.5 0.9 0.1
]
,
XLB = xLB · 1 and XUB = xUB · 1 where 1 is a p× 1 vector of ones. These are used to
construct the final latin hypercube that is used to generate our ensemble of networks.
X = XLB + (XUB −XLB) ◦ Xˆ (2.14)
where U ◦ V denotes the Hadamard product of U and V . A subset of the latin hyper-
cube is provided in Appendix 2.A.2. Each row provides the parameters used to generate
the realistic interbank networks and heterogenous balance sheets using the methodology
provided in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. Lastly, the model also features directly calibrated pa-
rameters for which we do not explore the impact of heterogeneity via a latin hypercube
design. The first is the parameter ω which, as mentioned, measures the ability of the
market to absorb assets sold in a firesale. We calibrate this as ω = 1.054 following the
definition given in the previous section. The fraction of shocked banks’ external assets
that initialises the model’s cascade dynamics, f = 0.35 following Caccioli et al. (2014).
2.6. Instability dynamics 107
2.6 Instability dynamics
Before running the empirical model, we extract the median network (in terms of density,
an exercise we will repeat in chapter 3) and associated cascading default model run and
report the evolution of total system capital and the number of active banks under the
four shock specifications with and without liquidity effects. Starting with the latter in
Figure 2.3, we can immediately identify the five-bank targeted shock which not only takes
longer to pass through the system, but also wipes out more capital. By contrast, the one-
bank targeted shock exhibits relatively subdued dynamics. As we will show later, this can
most likely be attributed to the densely-connected core; A shock hitting a bank within
this set will propagate across the core-core linkages without spilling over to the wider
interbank market.
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Figure 2.3: Model dynamics without liquidity effects.
Allowing for liquidity shocks significantly alters the dynamics, as shown below. While the
network remains resilient to one-bank random shocks, the five bank shocks produce the
largest capital losses. In terms of number of failed banks, all configurations but the one-
bank random shock completely wipe out the banking sector, with the five-bank targeted
shock doing so the most quickly.
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Figure 2.4: Model dynamics with liquidity effects.
The second set of results reveal the unpredictability of systemic risk dynamics when a sec-
ond contagion channel is introduced. As we will demonstrate in the empirical section, this
is due to the fact that liquidity effects operate independently of the network, transmitting
via market-wide price declines rather than bilateral exposures.
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2.7 Empirical Analysis
2.7.1 Simulated network properties
As stated in Section 2.2, we identify a set of six global measures that ascribe a particular
value to some topological feature of the network. Throughout the current section, we will
use the following shorthand forms for density (DSTY ), diameter (DIAM), reciprocity
(RPTY ), assortativity (ASTY µν), average path length (APL) and average clustering
coefficient (ACC). Note that these measures capture the topology of unweighted, directed
networks. Consequently, we abstract from the weights (corresponding to interbank claims)
along each link set in Equation 2.8 in order to focus exclusively on the structural properties
of the network.
Given that our objective in using the latin hypercube design is to create an ensemble of
networks displaying a wide variety of topological characteristics, we begin our analysis
by providing a set of summary statistics of the network measures of interest in Table 2.2
below. Note that since the fitness algorithm developed in Section 2.3 does not provide
a closed-form relationship between the parameters and our network measures of interest,
we aim to produce an ensemble of networks that reproduce key topological features of
real interbank networks as closely as possible. To assess this, we compare the means of
various network measures across the ensemble of simulated networks with a set of measures
obtained directly from mappings of real interbank networks, summarised in Appendix 2.A.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics - Global network measures
Statistic Data Mean St. Dev. Min Max
DSTY 0.003 - 0.007 0.071 0.039 0.010 0.221
DIAM 6.6 - 7.3 5.057 1.395 3 12
RPTY 0.092 0.046 0.015 0.204
ASTY oi −0.049 0.026 −0.141 −0.006
ASTY io −0.027 0.013 −0.091 −0.003
ASTY oo −0.038 0.019 −0.101 −0.003
ASTY ii −0.035 0.013 −0.107 −0.010
APL 2.26 - 2.62 2.451 0.468 1.782 4.549
ACC 0.12 - 0.53 0.166 0.076 0.020 0.328
Given the larger size and dynamic nature of the real interbank networks, a direct re-
production is infeasible. However, we observe that our algorithm creates similarly sparse
networks (as evidenced by the low density value). Another topological feature successfully
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replicated is the disassortativity of real interbank networks, given by the negative ASTY
values. The simulated values for diameter, average path length and clustering are also
within the range of observed values. In order to complement the summary statistics of
our network measures of interest, we provide the correlation matrix below.
Table 2.3: Correlation Matrix - Global network measures
DSTY DIAM RPTY ASTY oi ASTY io ASTY oo ASTY ii APL ACC
DSTY 1
DIAM -0.865 1
RPTY 0.723 -0.649 1
ASTY oi 0.214 -0.266 0.142 1
ASTY io 0.777 -0.710 0.665 0.130 1
ASTY oo 0.769 -0.787 0.639 0.557 0.810 1
ASTY ii 0.406 -0.446 0.299 0.661 0.367 0.467 1
APL -0.875 0.947 -0.722 -0.237 -0.759 -0.825 -0.448 1
ACC 0.906 -0.818 0.941 0.160 0.759 0.740 0.365 -0.869 1
Immediately, we observe that certain network measures are highly correlated. For exam-
ple, average clustering and density and average clustering and reciprocity. Given that
these measures are all derived from the number of links in the network, a certain level
of comovement is expected, however inclusion in the regression specification can pose
multicollinearity concerns, resulting in large standard errors.12 Thus, we use this exer-
cise purely to build the regression specification that minimises the extent of correlation
between independent variables.
To rectify the multicollinearity issue, we apply variance inflation factors which we use as
a diagnostic tool to remove highly correlated predictors from the model. The VIF tables
for each regression (whose dependant variables we will describe below) are provided in
Appendix 2.A.4. On this basis, we propose the following candidates for removal from the
model:
 Average clustering
 Indegree and outdegree centralities
 Initial interbank lending and borrowing of shocked banks
In order to express the extent of contagion in the system as a numerical value, we define
the following terms: Cascade size (CASCSIZE) as the total capital wiped out due to the
12As shown in the correlation matrices in Appendix 2.A.3, multicollinearity is prevalent for the local central-
ity measures of the shocked banks as well. Again, this is expected given the similarity in the calculation
methodologies for certain measures. For example, recall that both the closeness and betweenness cen-
trality measures are computed using the geodesic of the network.
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propagation of the shock through the system, the number of failed banks (NUMFAIL)
over the course of the simulation and the total deposit loss (DEPOSITLOSS) occur-
ring when the shock is too large to be absorbed by bank capital and interbank liabili-
ties.Another variable SIMTIME, indicates the average number of iteration steps before
the simulation loop is terminated due to one of the following occurrences: (i) complete
absorption of the shock by bank capital implying no further propagation (ii) the current
set of insolvent banks have no creditors to whom the shock can be propagated and (iii)
insolvency of all banks in the system.
Recall that CASCSIZE comprises losses due to insolvency (in which case the entirety of
the failed bank’s capital is included in the measure) as well as shock absorption. In this
case, capital is reduced by the relevant amount with the difference added to CASCSIZE.
In addition, we define the following additional variable:
DIFFUSION =
CASCSIZE
SHOCKSIZE
where SHOCKSIZE is the total capital wiped out due to the initial shock (i.e. prior to
further propagation through the network). By dividing total lost capital after propagation
by the exogenous initial capital loss, we obtain a variable that measures the extent to which
the shock has spread through the network. The variable is, by construction, bounded
above by 1 in the absence of amplifying liquidity effects since all capital losses are driven
by the size and propagation of the initial shock. Thus, lower values indicates that the
shock has not propagated through the network, instead remaining at or close to the
initially shocked node(s). This can arise due to poor connectivity of the shocked banks
and/or the relative amounts of interbank liabilities, external assets and capital.
Formally, our empirical strategy consists of estimating various versions of the following
general linear regression model for each network i
yi = (β
N)′XNi + (β
B)′XBi + (β
S)′XSi + εi (2.15)
where yi can be any one of the cascade variables, CASCSIZE, NUMFAIL orDIFFUSION ,
XNi collects the global network measures (DSTY , DIAM , RPTY , ASTY
µν , APL and
ACC), XBi collects variables associated to aggregate bank balance sheets and X
S
i col-
lects the centrality measures associated to the shocked nodes that initialise the cascade.
Consequently, our empirical framework studies the relative importance of balance sheet
properties and the network from both a global and local perspective.
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Regarding the empirical specification, we employ the beta regression model for the de-
pendant variables expressed in normalised form by dividing by aggregate initial values.
For example, NUMFAIL which recall denotes the number of failed banks due to the
shock, is normalised by dividing by the total number of banks initially present (250).
These variables are thus constrained to the closed unit interval by construction. Given
that beta regression applies to dependant variables in the open unit interval, we follow the
suggestion of Smithson and Verkuilen (2006) and manually rescale the dependent variable
y such that y′′ = n−1(y(n− 1) + 0.5) where n is the sample size (1000).
We end this section by discussing the dependant variables used to measure default cas-
cades: DIFFUSION , NUMFAIL and DEPOSITLOSS. Each measures a different
dimension of financial contagion through the network. As already mentioned, diffusion
measures the degree to which the initial shock has spread through the network. The
number of failed banks is the most typically used indicator in financial contagion models,
measuring the magnitude of the shock. Lastly, the total amount of deposits lost due to
banks’ capital and liabilities inability to absorb shocks can be interpreted as the ability of
the banking sector to contain strains and not pass them onto the real economy. As such,
our empirical framework encompasses a very broad definition of default cascades.
2.7.2 Baseline approach
Recall that model dynamics are driven by idiosyncratic shocks to one or more banks’
external assets. In this section, we compare cascade dynamics under the random and
targeted shock regimes, each consisting of two scenarios: a shock to one or five banks. In
the former, the shocked banks are randomly selected across the entire set of 250 banks.
By contrast, the targeted shock framework identifies the 10 largest banks out of which
the shocked banks are randomly selected. In order to control for extreme events, we run
the model (comprising the random draw of initially shocked banks and cascade model)
100 times for random shocks and 10 times for targeted shocks and average the simulation
results. We begin by conducting the empirical analysis absent liquidity effects, which we
treat as the baseline. With respect to the cascading defaults model, this implies that the
market is sufficiently liquid to absorb the external assets of insolvent banks. As such,
asset prices remain constant, additional losses are not imposed on creditors and external
asset portfolios are not marked to market and subsequently devalued. Summary statistics
of the results of the cascading defaults model over the set of networks are provided in
Table 2.4 below for random shocks
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics - Random shock, liquidity effects off
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
1 bank
NUMFAIL 2.018 1.377 1.000 9.230
CASCSIZE 60.739 28.954 10.442 163.308
DEPOSITLOSS 10.325 15.922 0.000 124.461
SIMTIME 2.293 0.270 2.000 3.400
DIFFUSION 0.877 0.148 0.357 1.000
5 banks
NUMFAIL 10.735 7.780 5.000 60.390
CASCSIZE 302.032 138.501 54.962 732.575
DEPOSITLOSS 51.943 79.208 0.000 659.021
SIMTIME 2.787 0.525 2.000 4.860
DIFFUSION 0.870 0.148 0.326 0.996
Focussing on the mean values, we immediately observe a strong linearity between the
two shock magnitudes for random and targeted shocks (provided in Table 2.5 below) for
the cascade variables CASCSIZE and DEPOSITLOSS. Specifically, total capital and
deposit loss increase approximately fivefold when moving from one to five shocked banks
under both shock regimes. While this rule is obeyed for the NUMFAIL variable under
random shocks, it is clearly violated for targeted shocks, where moving from one to five
shocked banks results in an increase by a factor of eight.
Table 2.5: Summary statistics - Targeted shock, liquidity effects off
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
1 bank
NUMFAIL 5.814 5.819 1.000 33.900
CASCSIZE 220.021 108.319 35.725 550.700
DEPOSITLOSS 19.630 43.468 0.000 372.484
SIMTIME 2.812 0.552 2.000 4.900
DIFFUSION 0.932 0.123 0.348 1.000
5 banks
NUMFAIL 40.521 47.305 5.000 250.000
CASCSIZE 1,054.590 518.857 175.557 2,666.553
DEPOSITLOSS 101.892 216.981 0.000 1,886.960
SIMTIME 3.636 0.982 2.000 7.700
DIFFUSION 0.896 0.133 0.303 0.993
As regards the SIMTIME variable, we observe a much smaller increase when increasing
shock magnitude under both regimes. From a policy perspective, this imposes a larger
burden on regulatory bodies to prevent widespread losses as quickly as possible given that
larger shocks propagate through the network (and inflict commensurately larger losses)
in roughly the same time.
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We now turn to the main set of results which aim to identify the key drivers of cascade
dynamics through a realistic (in the topological sense) interbank network. Though we
have established that targeted shocks result in higher losses and a larger number of bank
failures than their random counterparts, the objective of our empirical study is inter
alia to determine whether targeted shocks result in different aspects of the network/bank
balance sheets having a significant impact on cascade dynamics.
Shock diffusion
In Table 2.6, the dependent variable of interest is DIFFUSION which recall, measures
the extent to which the shock has spread through the network. Given that shock diffusion
is expressed as a ratio, we normalise the relevant RHS variables accordingly. Thus, where
K0 and L0 denote aggregate initial capital and interbank exposures, their normalised
forms, Kˆ0 (N.B. this can also be interpreted as the systemwide leverage ratio13) and
Lˆ0 are obtained by dividing by aggregate initial assets. The positive coefficient of Kˆ0
indicates that system leverage plays an important role in promoting diffusion across all
shock magnitudes and regimes. This is intuitive as a larger capital base implies a lower
likelihood that the shock ‘exits’ the network by being absorbed into bank deposits after
wiping out both capital and interbank liabilities. The same logic applies to the impact
of Lˆ0 on diffusion. However, notice that the difference between the impact of Kˆ0 and Lˆ0
increases when moving to the targeted shock regime. As the shocked banks in this setup
are larger and by construction, more connected and knowing that bank capital is affected
before interbank liabilities in the shock propagation mechanism, it stands to reason that
the role played by bank capital in spreading the shock through the network increases
relative to interbank liabilities.
13We refer here to the Basel III definition of the leverage ratio (BIS, 2014) rather than financial leverage.
The former is given by a bank’s T1 capital over total exposures. Consequently, a higher leverage ratio
implies a better-capitalised bank.
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Table 2.6: Regression results - liquidity effects off
Random shock Targeted shock
1 bank 5 banks 1 bank 5 banks
DSTY 3.920∗∗ 4.059∗∗ −4.703∗ −5.204∗∗
DIAM −0.041 −0.042 0.006 −0.017
APL −0.221 −0.058 −0.307 −0.030
RPTY −5.601∗∗∗ −4.541∗∗∗ 2.909∗ 1.617
ASTY oi 2.894 3.676∗∗ −1.338 −0.214
ASTY io 12.509∗∗∗ 10.663∗∗∗ −4.544 −0.421
ASTY oo −14.044∗∗∗ −11.831∗∗∗ 2.039 −2.028
ASTY ii 5.743∗∗ 1.180 5.184 3.440
Kˆ0 15.535∗∗∗ 15.100∗∗∗ 19.026∗∗∗ 23.426∗∗∗
Lˆ0 12.449∗∗∗ 11.406∗∗∗ 9.967∗∗∗ 7.875∗∗∗
INCLOSES −1, 849.971∗∗ −4, 941.711∗∗∗ 1, 297.129 722.980
OUTCLOSES 2, 065.829∗∗∗ 4, 338.452∗∗∗ −432.176 −51.507
BTWNS −0.001 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.00002 −0.0005
PAGERANKS 417.700∗∗∗ 762.561∗∗∗ 24.599 126.121
kS 0.001 0.001 −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
Constant −2.498 −2.046 −1.672 −2.320
R2 0.771 0.848 0.728 0.755
Notes: ?p < 10%; ??p < 5%; ???p < 1%. RHS: Aggregate capital and interbank claims divided by relevant initial values.
Estimated via beta regression using the following rescaling: y′′ = n−1(y(n− 1) + 0.5) to account for 0,1 occurrences.
Turning now to the impact of global network measures, we first observe the significant
impact of network density on shock diffusion, noting that the impact is positive for ran-
dom and negative for targeted shocks. Given that higher density (i.e. number of links)
implies that the shock can spread more easily through the network, the random shock
results are intuitive. By contrast, increasing network density under targeted shocks de-
creases the shock’s tendency to propagate through the network. This can be attributed
to the fact that a larger density also implies that the density of links amongst the largest
banks is higher. Consequently, the initial shock is quickly dissipated across the set of
densely-connected large banks and fails to spread out further through the network. The
assortativity variable ASTY io is defined as the correlation between the number of incom-
ing edges (i.e. number of lenders) of each source node and the number of outgoing edges
(number of borrowers) of each terminal node. Recalling the manner in which shocks are
transmitted via interbank borrowing (i.e. from terminal to source nodes), this finding is
intuitive as a higher in-out assortativity optimises the degree of contagion between the
terminal (borrower) and source (lender) nodes.
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Our results show that the local centralities of the shocked nodes significantly influence
shock diffusion through the entire network under the random shock regime. Specifically,
closeness centrality plays an important role in diffusing the random shock. Again the
signs of the coefficients follow from the definitions of the network measures and the shock
transmission mechanism. For example, incloseness centrality measures a node’s reacha-
bility via incoming links. Thus, given that the shocked node transmits via its interbank
liabilities (incoming links), it stands to reason that a higher incloseness centrality, indi-
cating that the node is reachable via few links, will mitigate the ability of the shock to
transmit outwards. Lastly, shocked banks with a higher pagerank centrality increase the
spread of the shock through the network. Recall that this measure classifies a bank as
“important” depending on the number of incoming links. Similar to the incloseness case,
the significance of the measure can be attributed to the fact that shocks propagate via
these links.
Number of failed banks
Table 2.7 provides the results for the second dependant variable measuring the extent of
contagion through our network: the total number of failed/insolvent banks. We observe
a negative impact of system leverage, lending further credence to the notion that a better
capitalised banking sector is conducive to financial stability. Interestingly, under the
targeted regime featuring one shock, system leverage becomes relatively more important in
mitigating contagion while five shocks display a similar effect to the random shock regime.
We conclude that, under the targeted 5-shock regime, bank failures are so widespread that
system capital is less capable of mitigating the impact of financial contagion compared to
the 1-shock regime.
Recall from Table 2.6 that the network density coefficient switched from positive to nega-
tive when going from a random to a targeted shock. We see a similar effect forNUMFAIL
within the targeted shock framework: For small shocks, a higher density mitigates the
severity of the default cascade. By contrast, these same links serve as propagation chan-
nels for larger shocks. Regarding the assortativity coefficients, we observe that when
the terminal node measure consists of incoming links ASTY ii and ASTY oi, all coeffi-
cients are significant across all specifications with the former having a negative impact on
NUMFAIL and the latter having a positive impact. Increasing in-in assortativity de-
creases the number of failures as the shock is dissipated over the large number of incoming
links.
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Table 2.7: Regression results - Number of failed banks (liquidity effects off)
Random shock Targeted shock
1 bank 5 banks 1 bank 5 banks
DSTY −0.370 1.733 −2.684∗∗ 4.056∗
DIAM 0.026 0.032∗ 0.053∗ 0.045
APL −0.354∗∗ −0.712∗∗∗ −0.663∗∗ −0.981∗
RPTY −1.011∗∗∗ −1.288∗∗∗ −0.314 −0.883
ASTY oi 2.226∗∗ 2.716∗∗∗ 4.143∗∗∗ 6.121∗∗∗
ASTY io 1.209 1.773 2.567 6.428
ASTY oo −2.871 −2.958 −8.624∗∗∗ −14.099∗∗∗
ASTY ii −3.148∗∗∗ −3.903∗∗∗ −6.808∗∗∗ −6.660∗∗
Kˆ0 −9.666∗∗∗ −10.336∗∗∗ −22.256∗∗∗ −10.317∗∗∗
Lˆ0 1.229∗∗∗ 1.486∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗ 2.463∗∗∗
INCLOSES 567.262 687.248 1, 102.078∗∗ 1, 720.287∗∗
OUTCLOSES −659.774∗∗∗ −1, 127.850∗∗∗ −1, 082.014∗∗∗ −1, 894.556∗∗∗
BTWNS 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
PAGERANKS −122.751∗∗ −330.345∗∗∗ −118.706∗∗∗ −188.852∗∗
kS 0.001 0.002 0.001∗∗ 0.001
Sˆ 11.767∗∗∗ 3.050∗∗∗ 4.241∗∗∗ 2.984∗∗∗
Constant −4.024∗∗∗ −0.821 −2.081 −1.038
R2 0.823 0.837 0.782 0.791
Notes: ?p < 10%; ??p < 5%; ???p < 1%. LHS: NUMFAIL normalised by dividing by total number of banks (250). RHS:
Aggregate capital and interbank claims divided by relevant initial values. Estimated via beta regression using the following
rescaling: y′′ = n−1(y(n− 1) + 0.5) to account for 0,1 occurrences.
Regarding the importance of local network structure, we again observe an important role
played by closeness centrality. Note however that the coefficient signs for these mea-
sures are reversed relative to Table 2.6. Moreover, increasing the incloseness centrality of
shocked banks increases the number of failures under targeted shocks only while increas-
ing outcloseness decreases the number of failures across all specifications. The positive
incloseness coefficient indicates that since the shocked node can be easily reached via inter-
bank borrowing chains, it will induce a larger number of defaults. By contrast, increasing
outcloseness of the shocked bank(s) results in a reduced number of channels for the shock
to propagate outwards. The positive coefficient for betweenness centrality suggests that
increasing a bank’s intermediating role (following the definition of the measure) allows for
easier shock propagation resulting in a larger cascade. By contrast, shocked nodes with
a higher pagerank centrality mitigate the spread of the shock through the system. As
pagerank is driven by a node’s incoming links, this appears to conflict with the positive
coefficient of INCLOSES.
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However, recalling that the pagerank measure also takes neighbours’ centrality and out-
going link propensity into account, we conjecture that the stabilising role played by the
pagerank centrality of the shocked node arises due to the high pagerank of its immedi-
ate neighbours implicit in the measure. As a result, once the shock propagates to these
neighbours, there is a greater dissipation of the shock thereby dampening its further
propagation through the network.
Deposit loss
The final dependant variable analysed in this section is the loss of customer deposits due
to bank insolvencies and insufficient interbank exposures to absorb total capital losses.
Compared to the previous dependant variables studied (diffusion and number of failed
banks) which measure the extent to which the initial shock has spread within the network,
deposit loss measures the amount of shock that has escaped the network i.e. exceeded its
capacity to restrict losses to the banking sector. From a policy perspective, our analysis
sheds light on the variables that, although derived from the network (i.e. the interbank
market), have an impact beyond the network (in this case, the real economy).
Table 2.8: Regression results - Deposit loss (liquidity effects off)
Random shock Targeted shock
1 bank 5 banks 1 bank 5 banks
DSTY 0.080 −1.753 2.909∗∗∗ 2.375
DIAM −0.004 0.009 0.004 0.036
APL −0.043 −0.087 0.209 −0.432
RPTY 0.678∗∗∗ 2.185∗∗∗ −1.511∗∗ 0.087
ASTY oi −0.435 −1.932∗ 0.010 −0.375
ASTY io −0.831 −4.260∗∗ 2.884 1.401
ASTY oo 2.302∗∗ 5.747∗∗∗ −0.357 0.468
ASTY ii −1.652∗∗ −0.662 −1.916 −3.559
Kˆ0 −2.101∗∗∗ −6.404∗∗∗ −3.520∗∗∗ −10.065∗∗∗
Lˆ0 −2.191∗∗∗ −5.744∗∗∗ −3.695∗∗∗ −7.471∗∗∗
INCLOSES 103.659 2, 437.583∗∗∗ −609.722 −737.440
OUTCLOSES −367.997∗∗∗ −2, 270.915∗∗∗ 383.325∗ −412.517
BTWNS 0.0002 0.002∗∗∗ −0.0001 0.0001
PAGERANKS 17.187 −232.774∗∗∗ −6.700 −108.458
kS −0.0001 −0.0002 0.001∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Sˆ 1.160∗∗∗ 0.092 1.205∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
Constant −6.229∗∗∗ −4.716∗∗∗ −6.089∗∗∗ −0.149
R2 0.798 0.846 0.618 0.684
Notes: ?p < 10%; ??p < 5%; ???p < 1%. LHS: DEPOSITLOSS normalised by dividing by total initial deposits. RHS:
Aggregate capital and interbank claims divided by relevant initial values. Estimated via beta regression using the following
rescaling: y′′ = n−1(y(n− 1) + 0.5) to account for 0,1 occurrences.
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As the results in Table 2.8 show, system leverage and normalised interbank exposures
continue to play an important role in mitigating the impact of financial shocks on agents
outside the system. Amongst the global network measures, the only variable to maintain
a significant impact is network reciprocity under random shocks. This is likely due to the
the fact that the DEPOSITLOSS variable occurs outside the network (i.e. after the
network transmission channels have been used up). As a result, it is less likely that the
network structure will have an impact on its magnitude.
Similar logic applies to the set of centrality measures. As shown in Table 2.7, the closeness,
betweenness and pagerank centralities of the shocked banks all had a significant impact on
NUMFAIL, with the sign of the coefficient following from the definition of the measure.
By contrast, only outcloseness remains significant across the random shock regime.
The empirical analysis conducted above lends itself to a set of key findings across all
dependent variables under the baseline approach. First, it is clear that amongst the three
dependant variables analysed, the network structure (at both global and local scales)
provides the strongest explanatory power for the number of failed banks. This is ex-
pected as bank failures serve as the triggering effect for shock propagation. By contrast,
DIFFUSION , which is driven by CASCSIZE (i.e. total capital lost by banks over the
simulation) also includes capital losses of banks who absorbed the shock through capital
and did not propagate via the network. Similarly, DEPOSITLOSS, measures the im-
pact of the shock on customer deposits, which are affected after capital and interbank
liability adjustments and thus, occur outside the network.
2.7.3 Liquidity effects
We now activate the liquidity effects developed in Section 2.4.2 in which the market’s
demand for illiquid assets is less than perfectly elastic, resulting in sales by distressed
institutions depressing the market price of such assets. As mentioned, this comprises a
direct channel whereby insolvent banks’ losses due to firesales are added to the shock
transmission via interbank liabilities and an indirect channel due to marked-to-market
accounting forcing all banks (even those not directly connected to the insolvent bank) to
revalue their asset portfolios.
120 Chapter 2: Default cascades and systemic risk
Note that we now consider a new dependant variable, ∆ASSETPRICE denoting the
endogenous change in asset price (due to firesales) from its initial value of 1. Moreover,
we remove the diffusion variable from our analysis as it is no longer restricted to the closed
unit interval as capital losses can now arise due to external asset firesales in addition to the
propagation of the initial shock via interbank exposures. As a result, it is not feasible from
an empirical standpoint to compare shock diffusion with and without liquidity effects.
Beginning with the random shock, comparison of Table 2.4 and Table 2.9 below reveals
substantially increased indicators of financial distress in the presence of liquidity effects.
Notably, a random shock to 1 bank resulted in an average of two failures without liquidity
effects, increasing to 25 when liquidity effects are included. A similar twelvefold increase
is observed when five banks are initially shocked. Though less extreme, total capital losses
more than doubled under liquidity effects. By contrast, deposit losses remain more or less
constant under both setups. The twofold increase in shock diffusion further highlights the
important role played by liquidity effects. However, the low value of ∆ASSETPRICE
suggests that marked to market accounting (indirect channel) plays a much smaller role
than the additive contribution of firesales to direct interbank contagion.
Table 2.9: Summary statistics - Random shock, liquidity effects on
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
1 bank
NUMFAIL 25.371 38.791 1.000 201.490
CASCSIZE 123.095 113.071 10.650 599.400
DEPOSITLOSS 10.402 15.688 0.000 121.753
SIMTIME 2.258 0.181 2.000 2.880
DIFFUSION 1.735 1.254 0.497 6.343
∆ASSETPRICE 0.009 0.010 0.003 0.063
5 banks
NUMFAIL 128.750 87.679 5.030 250.000
CASCSIZE 746.024 455.710 76.341 2,644.463
DEPOSITLOSS 52.806 78.914 0.000 617.373
SIMTIME 2.394 0.419 1.100 3.310
DIFFUSION 2.097 0.774 0.711 4.386
∆ASSETPRICE 0.060 0.049 0.019 0.232
Turning now to model dynamics under targeted shocks, comparison of Tables 2.5 and 2.10
below reveals that the combination of targeted shocks and liquidity effects results in more
widespread financial distress relative to the baseline. Comparing the increase in the
number of failed banks for random shocks without and with liquidity effects (2.018 →
25.371) to the the targeted shock setup (5.814 → 100.339) reveals another nonlinearity
under targeted shocks as the former involves an increase by a factor of 12 compared to
17 for the latter.
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Table 2.10: Summary statistics - Targeted shock, liquidity effects on
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
1 bank
NUMFAIL 100.339 112.630 1.000 250.000
CASCSIZE 536.730 558.070 37.892 3,664.604
DEPOSITLOSS 20.380 43.909 0.000 398.570
SIMTIME 2.531 0.489 1.000 3.800
DIFFUSION 2.224 1.788 0.213 8.337
∆ASSETPRICE 0.043 0.057 0.012 0.398
5 banks
NUMFAIL 249.911 1.439 220.600 250.000
CASCSIZE 2,287.057 1,516.877 114.748 7,950.257
DEPOSITLOSS 105.975 218.149 0.000 1,766.362
SIMTIME 1.619 0.576 1.000 3.000
DIFFUSION 1.956 0.936 0.237 4.638
∆ASSETPRICE 0.179 0.153 0.060 0.652
Lastly, the SIMTIME variables when considering liquidity effects are also lower than
their counterparts. Combined with the larger shock impact, this is particularly important
from a financial stability perspective as it indicates that when taking liquidity effects into
account, shocks pass through the system faster and induce higher losses on banks.
Number of failed banks
As in the baseline approach, we now provide the results of the empirical model when the
dependant variable is the (normalised) number of failed banks in Table 2.11 below. At
first glance, we observe that the explanatory variables under targeted shocks exhibit a
much lower level of significance, contrary to Table 2.7 wherein many of the variables had
a significant impact across all specifications (with others, such as network density and
incloseness centrality being significant only for targeted shocks). Moreover, the targeted
shocks to 5 banks specification exhibits an extremely low R2 value relative to the other
three. Combined with the low level of significance, this suggests that our variables have
very low predictive power in the face of large shocks. This is supported by the summary
statistics table for targeted shocks in which all banks fail very quickly. Thus, the network
is unable to drive dynamics in a meaningful way.
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Table 2.11: Regression results - Number of failed banks (liquidity effects on)
Random shock Targeted shock
1 bank 5 banks 1 bank 5 banks
DSTY 1.253 0.771 −2.660 −0.041
DIAM 0.086∗∗ −0.004 0.084 −0.005
APL −0.526 0.009 −0.041 0.260
RPTY −1.624∗∗∗ −1.447∗∗∗ −0.800 −0.076
ASTY oi 3.967∗∗ 2.614 2.567 −2.171
ASTY io 5.964∗ 4.509 6.024 −2.720
ASTY oo −4.593 −5.479 −3.550 3.566
ASTY ii −7.004∗∗∗ −4.351 −6.920 2.472
Kˆ0 −55.565∗∗∗ −58.516∗∗∗ −62.830∗∗∗ −2.431
Lˆ0 0.288∗∗ −1.694∗∗∗ −1.454∗∗∗ −0.279
INCLOSES −1, 789.284∗∗ 238.350 −527.476 384.458
OUTCLOSES 866.543∗ −174.728 183.999 −22.366
BTWNS 0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ −0.0001 0.0001
PAGERANKS 42.199 62.384 74.830 −31.083
kS 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001
Sˆ 17.754∗∗∗ 9.515∗∗∗ 3.124∗∗∗ −0.102
Constant 0.894 1.071 3.444 5.630∗
R2 0.878 0.913 0.822 0.034
Notes: ?p < 10%; ??p < 5%; ???p < 1%. LHS: NUMFAIL normalised by dividing by total number of banks (250).
RHS: Aggregate capital and interbank claims divided by relevant initial values. Estimated via beta regression using
the following rescaling: y′′ = n−1(y(n− 1) + 0.5) to account for 0,1 occurrences.
As regards the impact of the aggregate balance sheet variables, we observe that higher
system leverage continues to play a strong stabilising role across all shock configurations.
Furthermore, comparison of the magnitudes with Table 2.7 shows that capital becomes
more important in containing the number of failed banks when allowing for liquidity
effects.
Amongst the global network measures, we see a stabilising role played by link reciprocity
for random shocks, as was the case under the baseline. Moreover, the magnitude of the
coefficient is similar. By contrast, the impact of assortativity as well as average path
length and density on the number of failed banks is reduced compared to the baseline.
This allows us to summarise that global networks hold less predictive power when taking
liquidity effects into account. Given that a large part of these effects (i.e. marked to
market updating of all banks’ external asset portfolios due to the firesale of one bank) do
not propagate through the network via interbank liabilities, it stands to reason that the
network structure does not drive model dynamics.
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The same finding (less significant impacts of variables on the number of failed banks) can
be deduced from the impact of the local centrality measures. Where betweenness had
a consistent significant positive impact on the number of failed banks absent liquidity
effects, it is now only significant for random shocks. In addition, the ability of closeness
and pagerank centrality to predict the number of failed banks is diminished under liq-
uidity effects. However, comparing the BTWN coefficient with its baseline counterpart
in Table 2.7, we see that the value has doubled. As a result, under the scenario where
shocks spread rapidly through the network and inflict large losses on banks, the ability of
a shocked node’s betweenness in the network to predict large default cascades is improved
relative to the baseline.
Deposit loss
Recall that under the baseline approach, the coefficients of the global network measures
with DEPOSITLOSS as the dependant variable showed a lower level of significance than
the results for NUMFAIL, especially for targeted shocks. This finding is maintained
when liquidity effects are present. Moreover, unlike NUMFAIL, the magnitudes and
signs of the coefficients do not change dramatically when moving from the baseline. A
key example is system leverage Kˆ0 which, for NUMFAIL, goes from a a magnitude of
approx. -10 under the baseline (random shock 1 and and 5 banks as well as the targeted
shock to 5 banks) to -60 in Table 2.11. By contrast, the marginal impact of the same
variable on DEPOSITLOSS remains within the -2 to -7 range across both setups in
Table 2.12 below.
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Table 2.12: Regression results - Deposit loss (liquidity effects on)
Random shock Targeted shock
1 bank 5 banks 1 bank 5 banks
DSTY −0.196 −2.553∗∗ 2.254∗∗ −1.834
DIAM −0.007 0.009 0.015 0.033
APL 0.063 −0.006 0.138 0.692
RPTY 0.810∗∗∗ 2.057∗∗∗ −0.071 −0.293
ASTY oi −0.739 −1.161 −0.765 −1.076
ASTY io −1.907∗ −3.480∗∗ 1.032 −0.064
ASTY oo 2.890∗∗ 4.254∗∗ 2.035 −2.275
ASTY ii −0.976 −1.641 −2.239 −0.247
Kˆ0 −2.107∗∗∗ −7.155∗∗∗ −4.241∗∗∗ 0.130
Lˆ0 −2.179∗∗∗ −5.735∗∗∗ −3.622∗∗∗ −7.028∗∗∗
INCLOSES 453.682∗∗ 2, 394.289∗∗∗ 176.290 1, 425.974∗
OUTCLOSES −528.463∗∗∗ −2, 110.757∗∗∗ −232.661 −219.269
BTWNS 0.0003∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003
PAGERANKS −71.731∗∗ −109.768 −118.891∗∗∗ −227.224∗∗∗
kS 0.0002 −0.0002 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Sˆ 1.274∗∗∗ −0.179 1.095∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗
Constant −6.494∗∗∗ −5.297∗∗∗ −5.871∗∗∗ −7.179∗∗∗
R2 0.802 0.844 0.632 0.574
Notes: ?p < 10%; ??p < 5%; ???p < 1%. LHS: DEPOSITLOSS normalised by dividing by total initial deposits. RHS:
Aggregate capital and interbank claims divided by relevant initial values. Estimated via beta regression using the following
rescaling: y′′ = n−1(y(n− 1) + 0.5) to account for 0,1 occurrences.
While the impact of global network measures on deposit losses remained constant rela-
tive to the baseline, we observe the opposite effect for the centrality measures: several
coefficients exhibiting low levels of significance improved when adding liquidity effects.
Notably, betweenness centrality showed a significant positive impact for three of the four
specifications with liquidity effects compared to one under the baseline. Similarly, pager-
ank centrality continues to play a strong preventative role in shock propagation, now
extending beyond the confines of the network.
Change in asset price
The last dependant variable in our analysis is the change in asset price due to external
asset fire sales driven by bank insolvencies. Note that ∆ASSETPRICE is not available
under the baseline approach as asset price does not deviate from its initial value of 1. One
of the first notable features of Table 2.13 below is the high level of significance across all
variables under the random shock to 1 bank regime. Second, where the previous tables
(i.e with NUMFAIL and DEPOSITLOSS as dependant variables) showed a reduced
explanatory power of global network measures relative to their baseline counterparts, the
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network structure appears to exert a stronger influence on ∆ASSETPRICE. For exam-
ple, increasing average path length induces smaller asset price spirals. Similar dynamics
were observed under the basline model in Table 2.7 with the number of failed banks as
the dependant variable. Similarly, network reciprocity plays a stabilising role under both
setups.
Again, we observe a lower R2 value under the large shock (i.e. targeted shock to 5 banks)
regime combined with a lower level of significance across all variables as in Table 2.11.
This further highlights the limited explanatory power of the network in the face of very
large shocks.
Table 2.13: Regression results - Change in asset price (liquidity effects on)
Random shock Targeted shock
1 bank 5 banks 1 bank 5 banks
DSTY 2.607∗∗ 0.431 5.282∗∗∗ −1.519
DIAM 0.055∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.036 −0.061
APL −1.382∗∗∗ −0.666∗ −1.726∗∗∗ 0.442
RPTY −1.597∗∗∗ −1.005∗∗ −0.837 −0.627
ASTY oi 4.233∗∗∗ −0.232 3.273 −2.866
ASTY io 5.238∗∗∗ 0.658 −1.174 −5.673
ASTY oo −4.642∗∗ −0.972 −2.820 3.881
ASTY ii −7.031∗∗∗ −0.107 −8.652∗∗∗ 6.088
Kˆ0 −7.078∗∗∗ −35.923∗∗∗ −17.384∗∗∗ −5.319∗∗∗
Lˆ0 1.232∗∗∗ −0.510∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ −0.891∗∗∗
INCLOSES −917.883∗∗ −1, 713.057∗∗ −945.944 1, 012.980
OUTCLOSES −535.230∗∗ 1, 139.284∗∗ −952.562∗∗ −143.643
BTWNS 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0004
PAGERANKS −97.700 368.465∗∗ −58.060 −87.382
kS 0.001 0.003∗ 0.001 0.001
Sˆ 23.528∗∗∗ −2.091∗∗∗ 3.889∗∗∗ −1.555∗∗∗
Constant −0.549 −0.124 3.824 −2.438
R2 0.865 0.759 0.694 0.208
Notes: ?p < 10%; ??p < 5%; ???p < 1%. LHS: ∆ASSETPRICE constrained on [0,1] interval. Larger value indicates
a larger deviation from initial value of 1. RHS: Aggregate capital and interbank claims divided by relevant initial values.
Estimated via beta regression using the following rescaling: y′′ = n−1(y(n− 1) + 0.5) to account for 0,1 occurrences.
While the impact of global network measures exhibited increased explanatory power on the
change in asset price relative to the other dependant variables when allowing for liquidity
effects, this finding is less conclusive when considering the impact of node centrality.
However, betweenness centrality continues to play a destabilising role, a consistent finding
throughout the analysis.
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2.8 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have extended the canonical cascading defaults model along two di-
mensions. First, we recognise that the use of random networks represents an unrealistic
assumption given the growing consensus that real interbank networks exhibit a number
of common features namely, a power-law degree distribution, disassortative mixing and
a tiered/core-periphery structure. With this in mind, we apply a state-of-the-art proba-
bilistic network simulation methodology capable of generating realistic (in the topological
sense) interbank networks.
Then, rather than restricting our analysis to the standard approach of conducting com-
parative statics around the various balance sheet parameters at play, we apply a sophisti-
cated Monte Carlo simulation methodology known as Latin Hypercube Sampling to obtain
a stratified sample of networks on which the same cascading defaults model is run. Taking
each replicate as an observation, we develop an empirical model by which various rep-
resentative measures of the shock cascade are regressed on three categories of variables:
(i) Global network measures representing various topological features of the network as
a whole, (ii) aggregate balance sheet properties and (iii) local measures associated to
the set of initially shocked banks. This last category comprises balance sheet variables
associated to the shocked banks as well as various network centrality measures widely
used in the social network analysis literature. Note that while we used variance inflation
factors to control for multicollinearity, one possible extension would be to apply the rank
transformation methodology (Iman and Conover, 1979) to the variables and rerun the
same empirical exercise.
Our empirical strategy is built on comparing the magnitude of the default cascade when
initial shocks are random or targeted and with or without liquidity effects. Given that
several studies have highlighted the relatively minor contribution of interbank exposures
to systemic risk, allowing for asset firesales and endogenous price spirals adds further
realism to our contagion model.
As shown in the results of our empirical model, the impact of the balance sheet and
network-related variables varies significantly depending on the default cascade measure
used as well as the presence of liquidity effects and whether the shock is random or
targeted. However, one common finding across all specifications is the important role
played by system capital in mitigating the spread of the initial shock. From a policy
perspective, this makes a case for a macroprudential viewpoint of bank leverage.
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In the baseline model without liquidity effects, we find that amongst the three explanatory
variables used to measure the magnitude of the default cascade, the number of failed
banks is better explained by the structure of the network at both the global and local
levels compared to deposit losses and shock diffusion. In this setup, we find that average
path length plays a mitigating role in the default cascade. This finding follows from the
definition of the measure. Amongst the global measures, network density is shown to shift
from playing a stabilising role to promoting default cascades when moving from one to
five banks. This echoes the “robust-yet-fragile” property of financial networks. Within
the same setup, we also observed an important role played by the local centralities of the
shocked banks.
We then allow for liquidity effects i.e. endogenous price spirals triggered by failure-
induced asset firesales and a limited ability of the market to absorb these assets. This
comprises a direct channel whereby additional losses due to firesales are compounded on
to losses from interbank assets and an indirect channel stemming from banks’ marking to
market their external asset portfolios. While the former is propagated via the interbank
network, indirect contagion is largely independent of the network, affecting all banks
simultaneously. The existence of effects occurring outside the propagation capabilities of
the network is reflected in the results of our empirical model which shows a significantly
reduced role played by the network in predicting default cascades (as measured by the
number of failed banks) at both the global and local levels. However, allowing for liquidity
effects also introduces a new measure of the extent of the default cascade namely, the
change in asset price. Unlike the number of failed banks measure, the asset price factors
liquidity effects into its computation. Consequently, we expect the network to have greater
explanatory power for this measure, which we observe in the results. At the global level,
the same stabilising role is played by average path length while increasing network density
induces larger price spirals. Amongst the centrality measures, betweenness continues to
have a positive impact on the dependant variable, thereby mitigating financial stability.
Throughout the analysis, we have shown that the network structure has an important
role to play in systemic risk analysis and financial system stability. This applies to the
topology of the network as a whole as well as via the the use of local centrality measures
to identify systemically important banks. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to
not only consider cascading defaults within the context of realistic simulated interbank
networks but also the first to posit a link between a variety of topological measures of the
network and the extent of the default cascade, which we then identify empirically.
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The approach developed in this paper also opens up several avenues to future work. Start-
ing with specific modelling features, a more in-depth treatment of liquidity effects would
be highly relevant within the systemic risk literature. For example, limiting the banks
impacted by a marked-to-market decline in their assets as a function of the number of
edges from the shocked node(s). Similarly, recognising the feedback loops present in fire
sales and asset price spirals and the high volatility this engenders from an accounting per-
spective would make for an interesting study of informational contagion. Another possible
extension lies in allowing for alternative shock propagation mechanisms within the same
directed, weighted network. Note that the present framework entails a borrower default-
ing on its liability and impacting the asset side of the lenders balance sheet. Switching
the directionality of shock propagation (assets to liabilities) introduces liquidity hoarding
into the system, whereby funding constraints limit lenders’ participation in the interbank
market. The following chapter of the thesis operates within this framework, using the
same simulated network approach combined with an Agent-Based Model incorporating
both funding and counterparty risks.
Coming now to more general research avenues, recall that the cascading defaults model
features banks passively receiving and propagating shocks absent any behavioural consid-
erations. As mentioned, the development of models of bank behaviour across a variety
of markets represents a fruitful area of research which could be incorporated into our
analysis. Another promising area still in its infancy is the use of granular bank data to
construct financial networks. Then, rather than relying on simulation methods as we have
done, researchers could compute the various topological measures associated to the finan-
cial system of a particular country, sector etc. The combination of these two dimensions
into one coherent approach would constitute a powerful addition to the systemic stress
testing toolbox. In this idealised setup, policymakers possess a dashboard consisting of a
large set of financial institutions and interdependencies. Then, highly central nodes could
be identified and subjected to a set of exogenous shocks which spread through the network
following the model specification. Based on the results of this exercise, microprudential
tools could be applied accordingly. From a macroprudential perspective, we have shown
that the structure of the network as a whole also affects financial stability. Through
early identification of such global vulnerabilities, policymakers could then implement the
necessary macroprudential tools to ensure a more resilient financial system.
Chapter 2 Appendices
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2.A.2 Latin hypercube parameter draws
Table 2.A.1: Random draws from Latin Hypercube Design
amin aratio γa α β d θ γ
36.916 49.433 2.802 0.692 0.981 0.757 0.620 0.025
48.179 35.443 2.849 0.536 0.617 0.525 0.644 0.098
37.146 36.189 2.358 0.944 0.684 0.704 0.665 0.078
28.628 21.755 2.501 0.827 0.534 0.922 0.534 0.085
37.037 34.937 2.688 0.671 0.973 0.851 0.512 0.049
17.780 34.487 2.380 0.923 0.895 0.800 0.659 0.047
28.785 32.633 2.726 0.524 0.686 0.754 0.805 0.038
36.639 30.380 2.821 0.897 0.859 0.960 0.698 0.018
27.480 21.645 2.002 0.593 0.644 0.747 0.774 0.099
13.304 31.890 2.498 0.733 0.656 0.656 0.514 0.035
11.109 20.354 2.960 0.794 0.865 0.935 0.692 0.078
38.066 25.014 2.277 0.548 0.740 0.768 0.847 0.093
21.835 47.717 2.839 0.971 0.949 0.540 0.699 0.044
15.891 26.037 2.512 0.819 0.659 0.514 0.741 0.041
40.869 48.358 2.863 0.877 0.958 0.514 0.794 0.045
31.717 45.980 2.713 0.907 0.984 0.783 0.745 0.052
48.688 42.263 2.374 0.959 0.694 0.882 0.862 0.062
42.433 34.907 2.240 0.898 0.866 0.739 0.809 0.069
35.245 32.205 2.435 0.576 0.725 0.508 0.897 0.088
18.109 39.196 2.958 0.522 0.985 0.813 0.683 0.051
15.011 35.206 2.947 0.925 0.654 0.542 0.716 0.077
23.013 32.794 2.754 0.547 0.551 0.597 0.636 0.067
41.941 21.663 2.496 0.875 0.549 0.613 0.894 0.020
15.925 31.599 2.979 0.849 0.713 0.887 0.673 0.021
37.210 20.117 2.410 0.784 0.862 0.824 0.527 0.035
28.857 30.726 2.207 0.570 0.762 0.820 0.691 0.089
22.478 32.618 2.061 0.586 0.626 0.983 0.645 0.094
23.619 24.579 2.889 0.898 0.549 0.729 0.589 0.019
47.949 20.080 2.468 0.999 0.971 0.907 0.522 0.072
41.991 23.675 2.281 0.653 0.698 0.644 0.806 0.041
32.864 27.624 2.099 0.720 0.616 0.645 0.829 0.028
49.746 41.044 2.098 0.754 0.751 0.772 0.865 0.084
32.459 43.137 2.519 0.674 0.558 0.827 0.628 0.019
37.459 42.985 2.361 0.841 0.748 0.960 0.633 0.068
17.671 20.327 2.631 0.887 0.515 0.715 0.807 0.100
12.629 23.465 2.100 0.840 0.571 0.731 0.732 0.019
45.066 27.292 2.760 0.618 0.849 0.534 0.680 0.076
47.774 46.495 2.740 0.896 0.713 0.792 0.519 0.046
30.980 49.755 2.356 0.915 0.884 0.890 0.661 0.026
20.643 34.603 2.844 0.530 0.916 0.604 0.839 0.014
24.342 32.826 2.144 0.815 0.542 0.856 0.659 0.085
47.695 47.034 2.735 0.600 0.519 0.867 0.818 0.054
11.331 36.943 2.043 0.763 0.688 0.556 0.737 0.069
36.756 30.701 2.872 0.638 0.606 0.656 0.775 0.084
19.673 26.371 2.828 0.841 0.609 0.549 0.837 0.055
29.619 43.549 2.248 0.845 0.862 0.594 0.740 0.014
14.957 33.394 2.734 0.651 0.745 0.996 0.665 0.060
43.409 38.892 2.993 0.998 0.742 0.584 0.615 0.096
12.372 43.165 2.121 0.712 0.510 0.623 0.648 0.041
42.834 38.677 2.886 0.572 0.978 0.926 0.646 0.056
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2.A.3 Correlation matrices - Centrality measures
Baseline approach
Random shocks
Table 2.A.1: Correlation Matrix - centrality measures (1 bank, liquidity effects off)
INDEGS OUTDEGS INCLOSES OUTCLOSES BTWNS PAGERANKS S
INDEGS 1
OUTDEGS 0.998 1
INCLOSES 0.932 0.931 1
OUTCLOSES 0.919 0.921 0.994 1
BTWNS -0.746 -0.744 -0.861 -0.861 1
PAGERANKS -0.175 -0.186 -0.315 -0.339 0.694 1
S -0.079 -0.079 -0.117 -0.128 0.212 0.296 1
Table 2.A.1: Correlation Matrix - centrality measures (5 banks, liquidity effects off)
INDEGS OUTDEGS INCLOSES OUTCLOSES BTWNS PAGERANKS S
INDEGS 1
OUTDEGS 1.000 1
INCLOSES 0.936 0.937 1
OUTCLOSES 0.923 0.925 0.996 1
BTWNS -0.869 -0.870 -0.962 -0.963 1
PAGERANKS -0.405 -0.412 -0.561 -0.597 0.703 1
S -0.092 -0.094 -0.115 -0.126 0.115 0.175 1
Targeted shocks
Table 2.A.1: Correlation Matrix - centrality measures (1 bank, liquidity effects off)
INDEGS OUTDEGS INCLOSES OUTCLOSES BTWNS PAGERANKS S
INDEGS 1
OUTDEGS 0.901 1
INCLOSES 0.935 0.878 1
OUTCLOSES 0.856 0.933 0.939 1
BTWNS -0.679 -0.687 -0.665 -0.675 1
PAGERANKS 0.387 0.173 0.422 0.223 0.311 1
S -0.022 -0.028 -0.040 -0.051 0.165 0.162 1
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Liquidity effects
Random shocks
Table 2.A.1: Correlation Matrix - centrality measures (1 bank, liquidity effects on)
INDEGS OUTDEGS INCLOSES OUTCLOSES BTWNS PAGERANKS S
INDEGS 1
OUTDEGS 0.998 1
INCLOSES 0.930 0.931 1
OUTCLOSES 0.916 0.920 0.994 1
BTWNS -0.747 -0.748 -0.867 -0.867 1
PAGERANKS -0.110 -0.124 -0.259 -0.286 0.644 1
S -0.067 -0.067 -0.106 -0.114 0.164 0.204 1
Table 2.A.1: Correlation Matrix - centrality measures (5 banks, liquidity effects on)
INDEGS OUTDEGS INCLOSES OUTCLOSES BTWNS PAGERANKS S
INDEGS 1
OUTDEGS 1.000 1
INCLOSES 0.937 0.938 1
OUTCLOSES 0.924 0.926 0.996 1
BTWNS -0.874 -0.876 -0.962 -0.963 1
PAGERANKS -0.430 -0.438 -0.571 -0.607 0.708 1
S -0.093 -0.092 -0.111 -0.121 0.111 0.163 1
Targeted shocks
Table 2.A.1: Correlation Matrix - centrality measures (1 bank, liquidity effects on)
INDEGS OUTDEGS INCLOSES OUTCLOSES BTWNS PAGERANKS S
INDEGS 1
OUTDEGS 0.904 1
INCLOSES 0.935 0.878 1
OUTCLOSES 0.859 0.933 0.940 1
BTWNS -0.693 -0.699 -0.691 -0.707 1
PAGERANKS 0.377 0.168 0.410 0.214 0.301 1
S -0.027 -0.029 -0.043 -0.052 0.165 0.164 1
Table 2.A.1: Correlation Matrix - centrality measures (5 banks, liquidity effects on)
INDEGS OUTDEGS INCLOSES OUTCLOSES BTWNS PAGERANKS S
INDEGS 1
OUTDEGS 0.907 1
INCLOSES 0.936 0.880 1
OUTCLOSES 0.861 0.934 0.941 1
BTWNS -0.743 -0.740 -0.726 -0.735 1
PAGERANKS 0.390 0.185 0.437 0.239 0.240 1
S -0.025 -0.031 -0.041 -0.053 0.170 0.165 1
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2.A.4 Variance Inflation Factors
Baseline approach
Table 2.A.1: Variance Inflation Factors for DIFFUSION regression (liquidity effects
off)
Random shock Targeted shock
1 bank 5 banks 1 bank 5 banks
Density 207.485 874.094 229.933 359.100
Diameter 11.797 12.071 13.560 13.857
Average Path Length 159.659 197.790 230.638 241.639
Average Clustering 282.021 291.794 325.399 402.851
Reciprocity 102.234 105.195 104.762 111.238
OutIn Assortativity 12.466 13.065 12.241 12.729
InOut Assortativity 11.946 12.280 11.113 11.357
OutOut Assortativity 28.494 30.762 28.110 28.485
InIn Assortativity 6.551 7.209 7.200 7.248
Norm Init Capital 4.149 4.323 4.197 4.195
Norm Init IB exp 3.637 3.580 3.738 3.341
Indeg cent SB 437.579 1784.132 131.632 269.378
Outdeg cent SB 297.469 1434.463 145.990 275.287
Inclose cent SB 335.005 540.207 314.668 415.860
Outclose cent SB 148.236 286.657 113.999 133.108
Btwn cent SB 27.765 59.831 19.882 43.699
Pagerank cent SB 11.927 11.251 26.924 50.051
Init capital SB 6.098 6.297 6.386 6.151
Init IBB SB 192.280 979.614 27.017 29.005
Init IBL SB 196.125 984.768 27.664 29.184
Table 2.A.1: Variance Inflation Factors for NUMFAIL regression (liquidity effects off)
Random shock Targeted shock
1 bank 5 banks 1 bank 5 banks
Density 204.269 805.269 208.132 328.787
Diameter 12.271 12.375 12.916 12.595
Average Path Length 153.748 190.842 221.588 252.111
Average Clustering 286.922 293.093 303.188 401.550
Reciprocity 99.417 100.332 103.536 115.062
OutIn Assortativity 11.710 12.406 12.089 14.684
InOut Assortativity 10.774 11.362 10.952 12.829
OutOut Assortativity 27.107 29.620 26.116 30.243
InIn Assortativity 5.824 6.313 6.849 7.443
Norm Init Capital 6.540 7.177 6.828 6.876
Norm Init IB exp 2.903 2.921 2.834 2.908
Indeg cent SB 431.845 1911.526 121.969 257.178
Outdeg cent SB 327.636 1541.187 132.864 240.046
Inclose cent SB 321.004 535.415 281.091 401.398
Outclose cent SB 151.111 295.020 102.556 134.905
Btwn cent SB 29.777 60.783 19.000 52.274
Pagerank cent SB 12.424 9.722 26.610 62.333
Init capital SB 6.542 6.786 6.312 6.381
Init IBB SB 212.870 1024.626 28.858 30.583
Init IBL SB 216.354 1026.871 27.488 29.498
Norm Shock size 3.508 3.620 3.655 3.777
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Table 2.A.1: Variance Inflation Factors for DEPOSITLOSS regression (liquidity effects
off)
Random shock Targeted shock
1 bank 5 banks 1 bank 5 banks
Density 203.071 871.763 227.311 382.836
Diameter 11.882 12.656 14.422 15.345
Average Path Length 153.681 195.161 231.779 258.805
Average Clustering 288.132 291.511 334.507 410.585
Reciprocity 101.930 103.934 107.076 111.837
OutIn Assortativity 12.851 13.008 12.694 12.615
InOut Assortativity 11.930 12.616 11.534 11.820
OutOut Assortativity 28.879 31.529 29.427 30.825
InIn Assortativity 6.469 7.383 7.381 7.665
Norm Init Capital 5.962 6.580 6.180 6.509
Norm Init IB exp 3.514 3.770 3.482 3.782
Indeg cent SB 416.549 1810.574 129.315 285.919
Outdeg cent SB 301.806 1466.887 146.036 299.277
Inclose cent SB 323.754 546.832 326.844 462.535
Outclose cent SB 148.070 284.471 111.609 128.565
Btwn cent SB 28.865 59.098 19.162 41.659
Pagerank cent SB 12.079 11.318 25.919 44.952
Init capital SB 6.280 6.366 6.254 6.409
Init IBB SB 207.888 1005.394 27.014 28.151
Init IBL SB 212.776 1009.657 27.461 28.888
Norm Shock size 3.333 3.527 3.398 3.519
Liquidity effects
Table 2.A.1: Variance Inflation Factors for DIFFUSION regression (liquidity effects on)
Random shock Targeted shock
1 bank 5 banks 1 bank 5 banks
Density 235.262 712.371 203.029 308.772
Diameter 11.472 11.617 12.159 12.252
Average Path Length 153.083 192.315 224.038 238.552
Average Clustering 295.206 294.578 333.573 411.549
Reciprocity 103.903 103.719 109.156 113.478
OutIn Assortativity 13.432 13.786 13.571 13.985
InOut Assortativity 12.382 12.688 12.020 12.417
OutOut Assortativity 29.949 31.150 28.884 29.847
InIn Assortativity 6.357 6.951 7.398 7.590
Norm Init Capital 4.142 4.222 3.939 3.943
Norm Init IB exp 3.188 3.210 2.988 3.006
Indeg cent SB 474.434 1770.632 123.699 237.386
Outdeg cent SB 324.916 1406.214 120.246 220.544
Inclose cent SB 313.538 536.691 283.005 389.287
Outclose cent SB 145.097 309.667 110.904 136.580
Btwn cent SB 28.341 54.877 25.083 51.573
Pagerank cent SB 10.623 9.876 34.894 63.101
Init capital SB 6.718 6.622 6.325 6.351
Init IBB SB 252.538 1051.234 27.603 30.474
Init IBL SB 254.306 1045.181 28.145 30.223
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Table 2.A.1: Variance Inflation Factors for NUMFAIL regression (liquidity effects on)
Random shock Targeted shock
1 bank 5 banks 1 bank 5 banks
Density 242.105 681.100 201.503 309.689
Diameter 12.506 11.809 12.174 12.149
Average Path Length 159.891 192.788 225.209 244.371
Average Clustering 281.931 304.296 332.601 412.582
Reciprocity 96.677 108.261 108.958 113.747
OutIn Assortativity 12.431 13.909 13.530 13.925
InOut Assortativity 11.027 13.309 11.971 12.415
OutOut Assortativity 28.464 31.783 28.876 29.905
InIn Assortativity 5.904 7.203 7.371 7.583
Norm Init Capital 7.507 5.525 6.906 6.045
Norm Init IB exp 2.907 3.990 3.189 3.190
Indeg cent SB 480.480 1812.102 122.999 238.393
Outdeg cent SB 341.801 1486.386 119.149 221.266
Inclose cent SB 314.225 548.964 282.521 393.040
Outclose cent SB 144.530 307.480 110.783 138.499
Btwn cent SB 26.445 56.798 25.354 52.136
Pagerank cent SB 10.652 10.463 35.133 63.628
Init capital SB 6.356 6.344 6.353 6.352
Init IBB SB 242.451 1061.344 27.715 30.757
Init IBL SB 242.176 1051.434 28.128 30.463
Norm Shock size 3.592 3.513 3.461 3.410
Table 2.A.1: Variance Inflation Factors for DEPOSITLOSS regression (liquidity effects
on)
Random shock Targeted shock
1 bank 5 banks 1 bank 5 banks
Density 223.380 743.676 211.387 348.572
Diameter 11.902 12.473 14.571 15.462
Average Path Length 156.636 198.817 227.526 238.896
Average Clustering 290.187 284.117 344.227 428.343
Reciprocity 102.709 101.979 105.645 111.754
OutIn Assortativity 12.820 12.506 12.305 12.698
InOut Assortativity 12.056 12.029 10.950 12.190
OutOut Assortativity 29.163 30.016 28.445 32.245
InIn Assortativity 6.467 7.319 7.416 7.390
Norm Init Capital 6.319 6.539 6.209 6.200
Norm Init IB exp 3.555 3.763 3.475 3.885
Indeg cent SB 465.421 1829.949 128.759 265.281
Outdeg cent SB 330.494 1380.450 133.901 267.563
Inclose cent SB 320.419 572.782 304.832 452.416
Outclose cent SB 143.928 295.953 113.220 129.664
Btwn cent SB 27.695 47.721 23.116 46.510
Pagerank cent SB 10.516 10.620 29.944 53.537
Init capital SB 6.547 6.351 6.223 6.352
Init IBB SB 242.498 943.372 26.437 28.733
Init IBL SB 245.162 935.723 27.495 29.741
Norm Shock size 3.448 3.498 3.438 3.463
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Table 2.A.1: Variance Inflation Factors for ∆ASSETPRICE regression (liquidity effects
on)
Random shock Targeted shock
1 bank 5 banks 1 bank 5 banks
Density 248.598 708.394 202.932 311.508
Diameter 12.584 11.862 12.606 12.027
Average Path Length 153.330 203.995 227.511 237.453
Average Clustering 283.404 292.451 311.158 413.830
Reciprocity 97.026 102.447 104.605 114.117
OutIn Assortativity 11.340 13.625 13.140 13.947
InOut Assortativity 10.788 11.821 11.840 12.722
OutOut Assortativity 27.311 30.100 27.878 30.052
InIn Assortativity 5.560 6.553 7.092 7.578
Norm Init Capital 7.391 6.855 6.650 5.895
Norm Init IB exp 2.948 3.075 2.899 3.350
Indeg cent SB 475.317 1778.091 124.825 237.634
Outdeg cent SB 339.091 1387.879 120.779 221.399
Inclose cent SB 314.630 534.904 282.585 385.308
Outclose cent SB 132.991 310.855 109.126 136.704
Btwn cent SB 25.248 55.428 26.546 51.802
Pagerank cent SB 10.695 9.965 34.545 63.682
Init capital SB 6.760 6.373 6.170 6.447
Init IBB SB 247.828 1121.925 28.502 29.891
Init IBL SB 247.640 1114.903 27.797 30.289
Norm Shock size 3.917 3.523 3.620 3.433
Chapter 3
Central bank policy experiments
using a multilayer network and an
embedded agent-based model of the
interbank market
3.1 Introduction
A key feature of the 2007-2008 financial crisis was the resulting impairment of global
money markets (Brunnermeier, 2009). Beginning in August 2007, risk premia on the
unsecured, interbank market rose to unprecedented levels in both the EU (Brunetti et al.,
2010) and US (Taylor and Williams, 2009). This was accompanied by a sharp reduction
in interbank lending volumes (Afonso et al., 2011). In light of the ongoing turmoil, and
given the importance of the interbank market in facilitating private sector credit provision
and as the first step in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, central banks were
quick to intervene by increasing the stock of aggregate bank reserves and lowering short-
term interest rate targets to near zero in order to restore interbank market functioning
and minimise spillovers to the real economy. Despite an unprecedented level of policy
intervention in both the US (Sarkar, 2009) and EU (Giannone et al., 2012) in the early
stages of the crisis, the unsecured interbank market in both these jurisdictions remained
severely impaired and credit conditions tightened (Iyer et al., 2013). Following successive
rounds of unconventional monetary policy, interest rates stabilised (Abbassi and Linzert,
2012) as central banks, in their capacity as lenders of last resort, gradually replaced the
interbank market in allocating liquidity across the banking sector (Garcia-de Andoain
et al., 2016).
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This puzzling disconnect between aggressive liquidity provision by monetary authorities
and continued hoarding behaviour by banks has spawned a rich research agenda attempt-
ing to identify the drivers of interbank market tensions. To date, two opposing viewpoints
have emerged, without consensus. The first revolves around increases in counterparty risk
as banks, unsure of the creditworthiness of borrowers, require higher risk premia (taking
the form of higher interbank rates) to participate in the market. The opposing viewpoint
points to increases in liquidity risk driven by banks’ uncertainty regarding their ability to
attract funding in the future.
Counterparty risk is defined as “the risk that a party to an contract may fail to perform on
its contractual obligations, causing losses to the other party” (Canabarro and Duffie, 2003).
Intuitively, it involves banks using private information1 to form an assessment on their
counterparties which in turn, may incentivise liquidity hoarding. This is the case in Heider
et al. (2015) who develop a model in which the interplay between endogenous liquidity and
asymmetric information about the risk of banks’ assets exacerbates counterparty credit
risk and can lead to hoarding behaviour. In their model, intervention by the central bank
crowds out private liquidity supply thereby impeding price discovery and peer monitoring.
Similarly, Acharya and Bisin (2014) identify a counterparty risk externality arising due
to the opacity of bilateral financial transactions.
In contrast to counterparty risk, the liquidity risk driver of interbank market dynam-
ics states that bank behaviour on the interbank market is driven primarily by concerns
over their own ability to attract funding (Diamond and Rajan, 2011). Turning to the
interbank market, Eisenschmidt and Tapking (2009) argue that counterparty risk alone
cannot account for the increased spreads in the unsecured interbank market. They iden-
tify a funding liquidity risk premium whereby banks lend at elevated rates in term money
markets in order to account for the risk of borrowing in the overnight segment while
Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013) develop an empirical model in which the liquidity risk
premium is based on banks’ bidding behaviour in central bank open market operations
(OMOs). The impact on liquidity hoarding is explored by Acharya and Skeie (2011) who
develop a model in which lenders’ willingness to provide term funding is driven by the
risk of being unable to roll over their own maturing debt. Acharya and Merrouche (2012)
hypothesise and confirm, using UK Sterling Money Market data, a precautionary motive
to liquidity hoarding by banks during the crisis. The precautionary aspect of liquidity
hoarding is corroborated by Berrospide (2013) and De Haan and van den End (2013) for
1Seen as one of the key elements of decentralised interbank markets by Rochet and Tirole (1996) in that
it motivates effective peer monitoring between banks.
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the U.S and Dutch banking sectors, both finding that increased funding liquidity risk puts
downward pressure on bank lending.
A number of articles, recognising the importance of disentangling credit and liquidity
effects, propose empirical models to this effect. Notably, Taylor and Williams (2009)
find that increased counterparty risk played a predominant role in driving the widening
LIBOR-OIS spread during the crisis. By contrast, Michaud and Upper (2008) find a
significant role played by interbank bid-ask spreads which are commonly used as liquidity
measures. More recently, Schwarz (2015) develops a robust set of liquidity and credit
risk measures which, when applied to the Italian e-MID dataset during the crisis, shows
that market liquidity effects explain more than three times the variation in interbank
rate spreads relative to credit. Within the literature applying term-structure models to
interbank spreads, both Filipovic´ and Trolle (2013) and Dubecq et al. (2016) confirm the
significance of credit and liquidity effects at various stages of the crisis.
Thus, while the empirical literature is converging on the notion that interbank rate dy-
namics are driven by a combination of liquidity and credit factors, current theoretical
models remain firmly entrenched within the two camps. This is due to the fact that
such models lack the flexibility to concretely incorporate both counterparty and liquid-
ity risk concerns into bank behaviour let alone study the implications of the interactions
and feedback effects between them on financial stability and central bank policy. With
these concerns in mind, we argue that Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) provides a flexi-
ble environment in which the various types of risk can be incorporated into a dynamic,
behavioural model in a tractable manner. At their core, ABMs are essentially comput-
erised simulations of autonomous agents interacting in a bottom-up fashion through a set
of prescribed heuristics. According to Farmer and Foley (2009) and Haldane (2016), the
inclusion of agent heterogeneity and interaction makes such models particularly useful
towards the study of complex economic dynamics. Similarly, Bookstaber et al. (2017)
argues that agent heuristics and interactions must be considered in parallel in order to
properly model financial crises.
Operating at the nexus of individual bank behaviour and inter-bank interactions, our
approach entails embedding an Agent-Based Model (ABM) inside a network calibrated
to replicate certain topological features of real interbank networks. Where the net-
work determines the initial set of interdependencies between banks, the ABM dictates
how banks interact with one another in this environment by fixing interbank borrow-
ing/lending volumes as well as interest rates. Our model makes use of the bounded ratio-
nality paradigm whereby agents/banks form expectations based on observable quantities
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which are updated in each period as additional observations become available. More-
over, bank decision-making on the interbank market is characterised by simple heuristics
which determine inter alia lenders’ willingness to provide interbank funding, their setting
of interbank risk premia along with borrowers’ firesale of securities to meet interbank
obligations. Against this background, we incorporate counterparty, market and funding
liquidity risk into the behavioural specification of banks in a tractable framework wherein
each driver features in the different heuristics throughout the simulation.
The model proceeds in two steps. The first step involves simulating a core-periphery
network following the empirical literature documented in the general introduction of the
thesis. To do this, we make use of the generative algorithm developed by Montagna and
Lux (2016) also used in chapter 2. However, where the previous chapter assumed the
directionality of the interbank linkages, we now simulate an undirected network where
edge directions and weights arise due to bank behaviour, resulting in a dynamic repre-
sentation of the interbank market. In this way, we also partially endogenise the network
structure. Similarly, abstracting from directionality ex ante provides a stronger alignment
with the notion of a bank ‘relationship’ that can be mobilised to provide/request liquidity
as needed.
In addition, we incorporate the findings by Upper (2011), Summer (2013), Clerc et al.
(2016) and Caccioli et al. (2018) that direct exposures alone are not a significant contrib-
utor to systemic risk by also allowing banks to hold overlapping portfolios of securities,
thus providing a form of indirect dependency between banks via the endogenous price
and firesale dynamics of the securities within their portfolios. This extends the single-
asset framework (where portfolio overlap is maximal by definition) used in chapter 2
where allowing for liquidity effects via a combination of firesale-induced price spirals and
marked-to-market accounting created large systemic risks in the network. Our simulation
methodology in the current chapter is based on Caccioli et al. (2014) who develop a model
to simulate a random bipartite network representing banks’ asset holdings. Note that un-
like the direct exposure layer, we remain agnostic about the structure of the overlapping
portfolio layer, relying on the random network structure. We justify this by recognising
that empirical studies along this dimension are still in their nascent stage. For example,
Huang et al. (2013) uses US balance sheet data and the bipartite formulation in a cas-
cading defaults model but does not elucidate the topology of the network. A more recent
article by Fricke and Roukny (2018) examines banks’ diversification incentives in terms
of firm credit via a bipartite representation of Japanese bank-firm data.
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Combining the direct exposures and overlapping portfolio networks, we obtain a multi-
layer structure comprising two forms of interdependency between the same set of banks
whereby interbank dynamics occur not only within the two layers, but across them as
well. In this way we align the chapter with the state of the art in interbank network
modelling. Moreover, it extends the complex network structure developed in chapter 2
while developing a comprehensive behavioural framework for interbank dynamics, as was
done in chapter 1.
Once the network has been generated, we embed the ABM using the approach developed
by Lux (2015) where the balance sheet elements of each heterogeneous bank are initialised
using the bank sizes (populated in the network generation step) and a set of calibrated
weight parameters. The ABM then proceeds sequentially over a fixed simulation time,
with each period comprising three phases in which various aspects of interbank trading
occur. In phase 1, a deposit shock determines whether banks go to the interbank market
as lenders or borrowers. The interbank market arises when borrowers (those hit by a neg-
ative shock) make funding requests to their local neighbourhood of counterparties. This
reallocation of funds from excess to deficit banks as the prime motivation for interbank
markets forms part of the standard banking model developed by (Allen and Gale, 2004).
Furthermore, similar to Acemoglu et al. (2015), our model incorporates the real economy
via an illiquid investment made both by liquidity-long and short banks. A key modelling
assumption throughout the paper is that bank decisions vis-a`-vis the size and composi-
tion of their balance sheet revolve around the adjustment of assets/leverage rather than
capital.2
After borrower requests have been transmitted to the counterparties in their local neigh-
bourhood (within the network), lenders first allocate available liquidity across their local
counterparties and then proceed to fixing the interbank rate offered to each borrower.
Funding liquidity risk is incorporated in the first step: Each lender chooses how much of
their available reserves to allocate to interbank lending (conversely, how much to hoard in
that period) based on its perception of its own past ability to attract wholesale funding
the last time a negative shock cast it into a borrowing role. This is broadly in line with
the definition given by Brunnermeier (2009) regarding borrowers’ perceived difficulties in
rolling over short-term debt. Mathematically, this heuristic is expressed as a scaling factor
applied to lenders’ available reserves. Following the decision on total interbank volumes,
lenders set a counterparty risk premium for each borrower based on their past repayment
2This follows the observation by Adrian and Shin (2011) who relate this to the costs associated to equity
issuance (for example, due to the opacity of bank balance sheets and business models)
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behaviour. Similar to the funding liquidity case, we define the heuristic around a stylised
fact associated to interbank market dynamics namely, the finding by Babus (2011) and
Bra¨uning and Fecht (2016) that banks engage in repeated interactions with a small set of
counterparties (in order to minimise search frictions and information asymmetries) which
in turn, enables them to infer borrowers’ default risk on the basis of past reneging of
interbank loan repayments. Against this background, the heuristic is intuitive: Lenders
observe their history with each borrower, locating periods in which a loan was provided
and setting a counterparty risk premium that increases with the default rate. By allowing
banks to alternate between lending and borrowing on the basis of their liquidity needs, we
follow the seminal model of ?. Moreover, conditioning current dynamics on both lending
and borrowing histories imbues the model with a high-degree of complexity, albeit in a
stylised and tractable framework.
Following the transferral of liquidity from lenders to borrowers, phase 2 begins with a
system-wide liquidity shock to banks’ external asset portfolios. Immediately afterwards,
borrowers are required to repay their interbank loans. This comprises both the principal
and interest which, recall respectively incorporate lenders’ funding liquidity and counter-
party risk. In order to meet their interbank obligations in full, borrowers first allocate
available reserves after which they sell begin to liquidate external assets at the current
market price. As a result, defaults (either partial or full) will only occur if, given low
reserves, asset prices are sufficiently depressed such that the required volume of firesales
exceeds the holdings of the bank. By proceeding in this manner (i.e. bank defaults after
reserves and asset holdings have been exhausted), we incorporate the finding by Glasser-
man and Young (2015) that interbank contagion due to pure spillover/domino effects are
rare. Moreover, conditioning banks’ firesale behaviour on short-term debt obligations is
in line with what was observed during the crisis (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011)3. Note that
firesale activity by borrowers influences their ability to repay creditors in full, which is
exacerbated as the market becomes more illiquid. Consequently, mounting defaults set in
motion by illiquid borrowers will be reflected in higher risk premia on future loans (using
the mechanism developed in phase 1). Thus our model incorporates a positive feedback
effect between firesales and counterparty risk following the model of Caballero and Simsek
(2013).
3An alternative motivation for firesales, based on meeting a predefined leverage target is provided by
Greenwood et al. (2015) and Cont and Schaanning (2017). This is implicit in our model, where the
target is borrowers’ leverage prior to taking on the loan.
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Using the mechanism developed by Cifuentes et al. (2005) and expanded in Montagna
and Kok (2016), second-round price spirals are triggered endogenously using an inelastic
demand function reflecting the market’s imperfect absorption ability4. While this has no
direct impact on borrower repayments in the current period, the combination of overlap-
ping portfolios and mark-to-market accounting provides an indirect transmission channel
in which all banks holding the distressed assets (as determined by the bipartite network)
revalue their portfolios on the basis of the updated price.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to combine a realistic, multilayer net-
work and a comprehensive behavioural model of interbank market dynamics. As regards
the latter, the flexibility of ABM and the power of computer simulations allows us to
imbue our model with a large amount of detail by recasting well-established methodolo-
gies within the context of the heuristics driving bank behaviour and interactions. From a
modelling perspective, our paper is most closely related to Georg (2013) in which dynamic
interbank behaviour is derived from portfolio optimisation. Also closely related are the
ABMs of Halaj and Kok (2015), and Iori et al. (2015), whose modelling of trust between
banks based on repeated interactions is closely related to our counterparty risk argument.
Within the literature studying financial contagion/stability through the lens of network
theory, such models combining bank behaviour and network structure constitute the state-
of-the-art, addressing the criticism of Upper (2011) that static network models’ lack of
behavioural foundations precludes their usefulness as policy tools. This refers to models
operating either within the clearing payment vector paradigm developed by Eisenberg and
Noe (2001) (notably, Cifuentes et al. (2005) and Montagna and Kok (2016), whose market
impact function is applied to model endogenous asset price movements in this paper) or
those based on a mechanistic contagion process via cascading defaults such as Nier et al.
(2007), Gai and Kapadia (2010) and May and Arinaminpathy (2010).
As our ABM entails “growing a society from the bottom-up” (Epstein and Axtell, 1996) no
established methodology exists prima facie for presenting the results. While this lack of
a harmonised framework constitutes a shortcoming of ABMs, it also affords practitioners
a certain degree of flexibility to decide what features of agent behaviour to report in
order to motivate a particular research question. We start by recalling the core argument
of the paper: that strains in the interbank market persisted despite aggressive policy
intervention by the central bank due to the combination of unfolding counterparty and
4The link between market liquidity and asset prices is well-documented in the literature. The seminal
paper by Allen and Gale (1994), posits a link between limited market participation and asset price
volatility. Brunnermeier (2009) puts firesale externalities arising due to falling lending standards and
tightening margins at the heart of the crisis.
146 Chapter 3: Central bank policy experiments
funding liquidity risk. Against this background, we construct two counterfactual policy
experiments, each of which includes a fixed crisis period in which market liquidity declines
and asset prices are subject to negative shocks. Starting with the baseline model in which
unconventional central bank policy is not present, these risks are allowed to to develop
unchecked. In the second experiment, the central bank intervenes with a short delay
following the onset of the crisis. As we will demonstrate in the next section, this was
largely the case.
Our simulation results are in line with the findings of Afonso et al. (2011) and Gabrieli
and Georg (2014): while the crisis put significant strain on the interbank market, it did
not freeze entirely. Similarly, while credit conditions did tighten as banks adjusted to
decreased wholesale liquidity and rising counterparty defaults, the unprecedented policy
intervention by the central bank was able to avert a full-scale credit crunch. Again, this
is in line with the empirical findings of Giannone et al. (2012) and Ciccarelli et al. (2015).
Our finding on the importance of funding liquidity risk as a key driver of interbank market
tensions is in line with de Haan et al. (2017).
Regarding the emergency liquidity provision role played by the central bank, our findings
are in line with Garcia-de Andoain et al. (2016), that between 2008 and 2010, the ECB
“took over’ the liquidity provision role of the interbank market. Moreover, policymakers
recognised that such interventions were unsustainable within the monetary policy frame-
work of the ECB as they promote the misalignment between the ECB’s policy rate and
the yield curve. Notably, ECB executive board member Lorenzo Bini Smaghi in a 2008
speech5 stated that “When considering possible further measures to revive the money mar-
ket, the ECB must carefully balance the objective of steering short-term money markets
and ensuring sufficient liquidity in the banking sector, on the one hand, and its wish to
foster a reactivation of the money market, on the other hand.”
The paper is organised as follows: Section 3.2 describes the simulation methodology for
the bilayer network, Section 3.3 develops the ABM, Section 3.4 outlines the calibrations
used to generate the network and run the ABM, Section 3.5 provides the results of our
two policy experiments and Section 3.6 concludes and provides policy recommendations.
5Available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2008/html/sp081201.en.html.
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3.2 Simulating the bilayer network
Before developing the dynamic portion of the model, we first outline the methodology for
simulating a bilayer network while satisfying the topological properties of interbank net-
works mentioned earlier. Bilayer networks consider two different types of interdependency
connecting the same set of nodes. In our model, the two forms of bank interdependency
are (i) direct exposures due to short-term, unsecured interbank lending/borrowing and
(ii) indirect exposures arising due to overlapping portfolios and firesales of securities held
within those portfolios. Moreover, our framework allows for transmission and feedback
effects between the two layers as banks’ activities vis-a`-vis their counterparties on the
interbank market condition their need to firesale assets in their portfolio and vice versa.
A simple toy model is provided in Figure 3.1 below:
11 2 2
3
3
4
4
5
5
11 2 2
3
3
4
4
5
5
Figure 3.1: Toy bilayer network with 5 banks (black circles) and 2 external assets (white
circles). Top layer = direct exposures (directed graph). Bottom layer = indirect exposures
(bipartite graph)
3.2.1 Interbank network
Definitions
The initial direct exposure network is an unweighted, undirected graph (also referred to
as a simple graph), GIB(N , E) comprising node set N and the edge set E containing all
unordered pairs of connected nodes, E ⊆ N 2. The number of nodes in the network N
is given by the cardinality of N . In our model, nodes represent banks while the edges
determine the presence of a pre-existing lending/borrowing relationship. Intuitively, such
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a relationship should be directed in order to reflect the difference between node i lending
to or borrowing from j. Indeed, our model allows for oriented edges between banks
though we incorporate these into the ABM wherein an undirected edge between banks
is transformed to a directed one depending on the bank’s role as a supplier or demander
of liquidity in the transaction6. In this way, our approach is more flexible than those
assuming fixed directed edges between banks.
The network is represented by the symmetric, binary adjacency matrix [aij]N×N = A(GIB)
where aij = 1 if there exists an edge connecting i and j and aij = 0 otherwise. Similarly,
our simple graph model precludes the presence of self-loops (aii = 0) and multi-edges
(aij > 1). Consequently, the maximum number of edges possible in such a network is
given by N(N − 1)/2.
Simulation
We assume that intrinsic fitness of each bank i ∈ N stems from the total assets ai, of the
bank. Consequently, large banks (that is, banks holding a large number of assets on their
balance sheets) are more likely to connect with large banks than small banks due to the
aforementioned fitness-based model. The first step is thus to populate the node set with
N banks. This is done using the following truncated power law :
f(a; γa, amin, amax) =
(1− γa)
a1−γamax − a1−γamin
a−γa (3.1)
Where γa is an exogenous parameter dictating the shape of the power law distribution
and amin and amax represent the smallest and largest banks in the system, respectively.
This determines the initial (i.e. at time t = 0) size of each bank i in the system. We
denote this by a0i . These values are then passed to the following function which gives the
probability, pij of an undirected edge existing between i and j Dropping the 0 superscript
for simplicity, the probability function is given by:
pij = P (ai, aj) = d ·
[(
ai
amax
)
·
(
aj
amax
)]γp
(3.2)
6Moreover, undirected edges can also be interpreted as being bidirectional i.e. encompassing a directed
edge from i to j and from j to i.
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Two additional parameters, d and γp are introduced. These are calibrated to control the
density of the network (by affecting the probability that two nodes will form a link). Note
that the original fitness-based model with mutual benefit proposed in Caldarelli et al.
(2002) and applied in Montagna and Lux (2016) simulates a directed network with the
network structure relying on two calibrated exponents, {α, β}. The undirected version
in our model involves setting α = β = γp The adjacency matrix is then constructed
according to the following rule:
aij =
{
1, with probability pij
0, with probability 1− pij
(3.3)
Moreover, the model is known to produce a scale-free degree distribution with the value
of the exponent depending on the α and β. Under our calibration, we obtain a theoretical
degree distribution, p(k) ∝ k−2 which is consistent with numerous empirical findings of
interbank network structure.
3.2.2 Overlapping portfolio network
Definitions
The network given by GOP (N ,M, E) comprises the same set of nodes N whose interde-
pendence in this layer arises indirectly via the degree of overlap in their external asset
portfolios. The set of external assets is given by M whose cardinality, M is the total
number of assets across all banks. The notion of a bipartite network from the graph the-
ory literature offers an ideal representation. Specifically, this framework allows for two
distinct types of nodes (defined by the disjoint sets N and M above) where edges are
only permitted between nodes in different sets. A graphical representation is provided in
Figure 3.2.
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1 2 3
1 2 3 4 5
Banks
External assets
Figure 3.2: Bipartite graph representing banks’ common holdings of external assets
Given the structure of a bipartite graph, the biadjacency matrixA
(GOP) ∈ R(N+M)×(N+M)
is symmetric and expressed in block-matrix form:
A
(GOP) = [0N B
B> 0M
]
where B is an N ×M block representing all bank-asset edges and 0N and 0M are N ×N
and M ×M zero matrices representing the null graphs of interbank and interasset edges.
Mathematically, the elements of the biadjacency matrix
[
aOPij
]
N×M = A
(GOP) are equal
to 1 if there exists a link between i ∈ N and j ∈M and 0 otherwise.
Following Caccioli et al. (2014), we provide a set of parameters associated to the bipartite
network. First, the average diversification of the banks is the average number of assets
held by each bank i ∈ N given by its degree, degOPi .
µb =
1
N
N∑
i=1
degOPi (3.4)
Similarly, the degree of each asset k ∈ M represents the number of banks holding it in
their portfolio. The average degree is thus given by:
µa =
1
M
M∑
k=1
degOPj (3.5)
Since the total degrees of both banks and external assets must match, the following
condition must hold: µbN = µaM .
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In order to define the degree of overlap between banks, the crowding parameter, n = N/M
measures the extent to which banks’ portfolios contain the same assets. Finally, We denote
the total value of external assets held by bank i in period t by
eti =
M∑
=1
stij · ptj, ∀i ∈ N (3.6)
Where stik denotes the number of shares of asset k held by bank i and p
t
k the price of
asset j at time t. Note that stik is nonzero if bank i holds asset j in its portfolio and
zero otherwise. We define the 1×M asset vector of bank i, sti = [sti1, . . . stiM ] along with
the 1 ×M price vector pt = [pt1, . . . ptM ]. Equation 3.6 can thus be expressed in vector
notation as eti = s
t
i · (pt)>.
Simulation
Keeping to the framework developed by Caccioli et al. (2014), we consider random net-
works with Poisson degree distribution for both banks and external assets. Consequently,
the probability of a link being formed between each bank-asset pair is given by µb
M
. The
result is an Erdo˝s-Renyi graph with average degrees for banks and assets given by µb
and µa = µb · NM , respectively. For simplicity, we denote the number of assets held in i’s
portfolio by Mi.
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3.3 The Model
3.3.1 Initialisation
Following Lux (2015), we create the initial entries of the balance sheet using the N bank
size values drawn in the previous section:
e0i = αai, c
0
i = (1− α)a0i
d0i = βa
0
i , k
0
i = (1− β)a0i
Where e0i and c
0
i respectively represent external asset and cash holdings on the asset-
side of i’s balance sheet at t = 0 while initial liabilities comprise deposits d0i and capital
k0i . α, β are calibrated parameters representing the initial fraction of external assets and
deposits respectively. The above implies that l0i = b
0
i = 0 i.e. no interbank lending exists
ex-ante. Rather, the interbank market arises endogenously due to the shocks and ensuing
liquidity positions of banks in the network.
Recall that our assumption of relationship between banks involves each i ∈ N having
a local neighbourhood of counterparties with whom it engages in lending/borrowing on
the interbank market. We denote i’s set of counterparties by Ni. The number of i’s
counterparties is determined from node i’s degree, |Ni| = Ni = degIBi =
∑N
j=1 aij.
In order to allow for heterogeneity as well as overlap in banks’ asset portfolios, we assume
that initially, the market prices of the M assets held by each bank are identical and equal
to one viz. p0 = 1 where 1 is an M -dimensional vector. Assuming an initially equally-
weighted portfolio, we obtain the following individual asset holdings: s0ik =
e0i
M
for each
k ∈ M. This formulation implies that larger banks will ex ante have larger securities
portfolios as a whole as well as hold a larger amount of each of the securities.
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3.3.2 Balance sheet
The asset side of the stylised balance sheet, ai comprises cash reserves, ci, interbank loans,
li and securities holdings, ei. At each period, the balance sheet identity requires that this
equals total liabilities, ii comprising customer deposits di, interbank borrowing bi and
bank capital ki. That is,
ai = ei + li + ci
ii = di + bi + ki
Figure 3.3 provides a simple schematic with 3 banks of differing size in which a core bank
(bank 2) intermediates between two peripheral banks. Despite banks 1 and 3 not having
a direct lender/borrower relationship, an indirect relationship arises due to their common
holdings of a particular security.
A L
et3
ct3
dt3
bt32
kt3
Bank 3
A L
et2
lt23
ct2
dt2
bt21
kt2
Bank 2
A L
et1
lt12
ct1
dt
kt
Bank 1
Figure 3.3: Interlocking balance sheets with 3 banks
3.3.3 Dynamic model
In order to simplify the exposition of the model, we adopt a set of conventions that will
remain constant throughout the model. First, all bilateral parameters (involving a lender
and a borrower) are subscripted by ij or ji where i refers to the lending and j refers to the
borrowing counterparty. Second, a variable x that is provisional (i.e. whose final value is
fixed at a later stage) is denoted by x˜.
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One of the key points of the dynamic model is the evolution of the balance sheet over
time. In order to provide a realistic depiction of interbank market activity, we consider
a temporal structure consisting of t = 1, . . . T periods in simulation-time, each of which
comprises τ = 3 phases. In order to highlight how certain parameters evolve over time,
each variable is defined by a period-phase 2-tuple {t, τ}. Figure 3.10 below outlines the
main dynamics of the ABM as well as the ordering in which agents interact with one
another.
Phase 0
Update active banks
Update active assets
Update adjacency matrices
Phase 1
Borrower
requests
Interbank loans
Interbank rate
Loan
reception
Deposit
shock
Phase 2
Required
repayment
Firesales
Final
repayment
Asset price
shock
Phase 3
Insolvency
check
Central bank
intervention
Figure 3.4: Model dynamics
As the above indicates, the basic framework of the model is simple: Borrowers initiate
short-term loans on the basis of their liquidity needs. Observing these requests, lenders
decide how much to allocate to interbank lending and at what rate to provide the funds.
The red boxes indicate a behavioural component. Specifically, loan volumes are condi-
tioned on lenders’ perception of their own funding liquidity risk while the interbank rate is
determined by the counterparty risk associated to a specific borrower. In phase 2, the loan
becomes due. Borrowers will first try to settle their obligations using available reserves.
If these are insufficient to cover the principal + interest, the borrower sells of a portion of
its external assets at the prevailing market price. However, a negative asset price shock
increases the stock of external assets that need to be sold to cover the shortfall between
reserves and obligations. As we will show, asset prices also develop endogenously, leading
to rising market liquidity risk and prospective price spirals. After phase 2, all obligations
are settled. Depending on the outcomes of interbank trading and the magnitude of the
liquidity shocks, certain banks will come up insolvent (kti < 0), prompting their removal
from the system. We then introduce the central bank, who has perfect information on the
3.3. The Model 155
liquidity situation in the banking sector and intervenes by providing refinancing to banks
as needed. This concludes one period of the model (after which the system passes to the
next period of interbank trading).
Preliminaries
At the beginning of each period (phase 0), each bank’s balance sheet comprises only
variables carried over from the previous period (except at t = 0). All debt contracts are
assumed to have been settled (fully or partially) in the previous period i.e. lt,0i = b
t,0
i = 0.
As a result, the balance sheet in phase 0 of period t is given by:
at,0i = c
t−1,2
i + e
t−1,2
i
it,0i = d
t−1,1
i + k˜
t,0
i
Note that the first superscript in the two equations above indicates that the parameter
was carried over from the previous period while the second indicates the intra-period
phase in which the parameter was updated. Bank capital k˜t,0i is a residual value, set such
that at,0i = i
t,0
i . Consequently, it can be expressed as:
k˜t,0i = c
t−1,2
i + e
t−1,2
i − dt−1,1i (3.7)
Phase 1: Liquidity shock and move to interbank markets
Deposit shock: Phase one begins with an idiosyncratic liquidity shock to bank deposits.
The shock specification, based on Lux (2015), consists of both a random and a mean-
reverting component in order to ensure that deposits are stationary. Consequently, bank
deposit evolution over time is given by
δti = θ
(
d¯i − dt−1i
)
+ φti
t
i, where d¯i = βa
0
i (3.8)
where ti ∼ N (0, 1), and the parameters {θ, d¯i} denote the mean reversion speed and
long-run value of deposits, respectively. φti is assumed to be proportional to balance sheet
size in order to tailor the deposit shock magnitude to each bank. Finally, the mean across
all banks is subtracted from the ensemble of deposit shock realisations in order to render
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the system completely conservative in terms of aggregate deposits. The shock is then
incorporated in an additive manner into bank balance sheet dynamics
dt,1i = d
t−1,1
i + δ
t
i (3.9)
Investment decision - Lenders: In our model banks play the traditional role of ma-
turity transformers, using short-term deposits to finance long-term, illiquid investments.
To this end, interbank market activity is initially driven by the magnitude and sign of
the deposit shock, δti . If i experiences a positive liquidity shock (δ
t
i > 0), it uses that
amount first to finance an illiquid investment zti which lasts for one period and pays a
fixed interest rate rz, realised at the end of phase 3. The standard maturity mismatch is
incorporated by placing payments on deposits (remunerated at the calibrated rate rd) in
phase 1, prior to the realisation of returns from illiquid investments.
In each period, banks seek to maintain a constant level of investment relative to the
previous periods. Specifically, they use the average over all previous periods to fix current-
period desired investment levels, z˜ti = z¯
1:t−1
i , reflecting committed lines of credit between
banks and the private sector. As the size of the investment is driven by the magnitude of
the shock, we develop a balance sheet adjustment heuristic by which lender banks adjust
their balance sheet in response to a positive deposit shock. Beginning with the investment
entry, we identify three cases:
zti =

z˜ti if δ
t
i ≥ z˜ti
z˜ti if δ
t
i < z˜
t
i ∧ z˜ti − δti ≤ (1− ψ) ct−1,2i
z˜ti − (1− ψ) ct−1,2i + δti if δti < z˜ti ∧ z˜ti − δti > (1− ψ) ct−1,2i
(3.10)
In the first (and simplest) case, the deposit shock is sufficient to make the desired in-
vestment. Cases 2 and 3 arise when the deposit shock is smaller than the desired in-
vestment, implying that the bank must finance the investment using another source of
funds. Throughout the paper, we assume that cash reserves, cti are used primarily for
this purpose. The parameter ψ represents the minimum reserve requirement set by the
central bank which states that banks are obliged to maintain reserves greater than or
equal to ψ% of total reserves on their balance sheet in each period. The value ψct−1,2i is
thus the cash balance sheet entry such that this constraint becomes binding. Conversely,
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(1− ψ)ct−1,2i are the reserves available to the bank to fund the investment. In case 2, the
reserve requirement is still satisfied following the cash outflow and the bank is able to
make the desired investment. In case 3, the required funds would cause banks to violate
the minimum requirement. We thus assume that banks transfer the maximum amount
possible, leaving current cash holdings at the regulatory minimum (plus the positive but
insufficient amount of deposits).
In cases 1 and 2, current period cash reserves are both updated as: ct,1i = c
t−1,2
i +δ
t
i−zt−1i .
Note that in the first scenario, reserves increase (as δti ≥ z˜ti) while in the second, they
decrease by the same increment. The decrease in reserves is more pronounced in case three,
wherein ct,1i = ψc
t−1,2
i . The balance sheet dynamics in Equation 3.10 are summarised in
Figure 3.5, where panels (a), (b) and (c) correspond respectively to lines 1,2, and 3.
A L
(a)
et−1
ct−1
ψct−1
kt
dt−1
δt − zt
zt = zt−1
ct
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ψct−1
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zt−1
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∆ct
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et−1
ct−1
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kt
dt−1∆ct
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δt
Figure 3.5: Banks hit by a positive shock: Investment decision and balance sheet adjust-
ments
For ease of exposition, we simplify to one-period, resulting in a desired investment level
of zt−1. Starting with panel (a), we see that the magnitude of the shock δt is more than
sufficient to make the desired investment, allowing the bank to subsequently redirect the
additional liquidity δt − zt towards its cash reserves. In panel (b) δt < zt−1. However,
by allocating ∆ct from available reserves, the investment can be made. By contrast, the
desired investment in panel(c) is sufficiently large such that the bank is forced to reduce
its reserves by ∆ct to the regulatory minimum.
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Interbank market - Borrower requests: Banks hit by a negative deposit shock also
seek to smooth investment levels over time. However, in the absence of an influx of retail
funding from deposits, these banks turn to wholesale funding by requesting liquidity on
the interbank market equal to average of past investments:
b˜ti = z¯
1:t−1
i (3.11)
Recall that b˜ti indicates that these are provisional values. Since the actual interbank credit
is decided by lenders (as will be seen), the final balance sheet component for interbank
borrowing, bti will depend on the loan-provision activities of lenders.
After fixing their aggregate liquidity needs, each borrower i now redistributes this value
across their local neighbourhood of counterparties. The network structure comes into
play at this point as the number of local counterparties of i, Ni determines the number of
banks from whom they can request liquidity. Before proceeding with the model, we define
a set of variables conditional on the realised shock distribution. First, the set of banks
hit by a negative shock in t, N t− = {i ∈ N : δti < 0} and its complement corresponding
to banks hit by a positive shock, N t+ = N\N t−. This allows us to refine the set of each
bank’s local counterparties according to their status viz. N t− ⊇ N ti,− =
{
j ∈ Ni : δtj < 0
}
and N ti,+ = Ni\N ti,− correspond to i’s counterparties subject to a negative and positive
shock respectively.
In our framework, the realisation of the liquidity shock imposes directed edges on the
previously undirected network (hence the t superscripts on the aforementioned sets) as
a request from bank j to bank i for liquidity implies a directed edge from i to j. Since
interbank transactions are borrower-initiated in our model, the head of a directed edge
is placed ex-post at each node hit by a negative shock conditional on there being an
undirected edge there ex-ante (signifying a pre-existing relationship between two banks).
Taking these rules into account, we populate the adjacency matrix of the directed network
in period t7 as follows:
~a t,Aji =

1 if j ∈ N t− ∧ i ∈ N tj,+
0 if j ∈ N t− ∧ i ∈ N tj,−
0 otherwise
, ∀i, j ∈ N (3.12)
7Note that the structure of the directed network depends on the realisation of the liquidity shock and
thus, will vary from period-to-period.
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where ~atji denotes each element of the adjacency matrix associated to the directed graph
GIB
(
N t, ~E t
)
. Figure 3.6 below illustrates this using a simple six-node network.
1
+
2 −
3 +
4
−
5+
6−
1
2
3
4
5
6
GIB (N t, E t) GIB
(
N t, ~E t
)
Figure 3.6: Revealing the directed network conditional on shock sign distribution
Finally, in order to determine bilateral loan requests, we assume that each borrower
redistributes its aggregate loan requests, equally across their lending counterparties:
b˜tji =
(
1
N tj,+
)
· b˜tj, ∀i ∈ N tj,+ (3.13)
Interbank market - Lender offers: These requests are then transmitted to creditors
who (i) following the investment made prior, examine how much liquidity they have on
hand to lend out on the interbank market, (ii) decide on how much to allocate towards
interbank lending and (iii) fix the counterparty risk premium on extended interbank loans.
In step one, banks compare the sum of loan requests from their local neighbourhood of
borrowers with their available cash. Provisional loans are thus given by
l˜ti = min
cti (1− ψ) ; ∑
j∈N ti,−
b˜tji
 (3.14)
We now develop the funding liquidity risk heuristic that drives lenders’ final loan volumes.
Specifically, each lender looks through their history to the last period in which a negative
shock cast it as a borrower. They then compare the ratio of total received to total
requested loans in that period which is used as a proxy for funding tensions and drives a
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precautionary motive whereby lenders hoard a fraction of available liquidity in anticipation
of future difficulties in obtaining funding, based on realised past observations. Denoting
the last period where the current lender i borrowed on the interbank market by tˆBi , the
following scaling factor is applied to l˜ti:
lˆti =
b
tˆBi
i
b˜
tˆBi
i
l˜ti (3.15)
The numerator refers to the total loans received from lenders (defined later in Equa-
tion 3.16) while the denominator indicates total requests (Equation 3.11). Given that the
latter is constructed as an upper bound for the former, the scaling factor is constrained
in [0, 1]. A smaller scaling factor thus implies that lender i faced difficulties in obtain-
ing wholesale funding in the past. Consequently, it adjusts current lending behaviour
downward in response to a perceived higher funding liquidity risk.
Finally, bilateral loan supply is obtained in the same matter as loan demand: lˆtij =(
1
Nti,−
)
· lˆti. Borrowers then aggregate the loans received in period t:
bti =
∑
j∈Ni/N ti,+
lˆtji (3.16)
In the final step of phase 1, lenders now set the bilateral interbank rates associated to
each loan. Where loan volumes were assumed to be driven by lenders’ concerns over their
own funding, interbank risk premia are assumed to be driven by the counterparty risk
associated to each borrower. To achieve this, we use a similar type of backwards-looking
heuristic in which the lender i observes its history relative to each borrower in its local
neighbourhood j ∈ N ti,−, locating the last period in which they were also connected in a
lender-borrower relationship. We denote this period by tˆLij. Note that it is not limited to
being the same period for each borrower.
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We illustrate this with the following example whereby lender 2 is required to compute the
counterparty risk premium for borrowers 7,13,19 and 20 in period 5:
2
7
13
19
20
t=5 t=4 t=3 t=2 t=1
7 3
3
7 7 3
7 7 7 7
Figure 3.7: Lender backwards-looking heuristic for counterparty risk premium setting
As Figure 3.7 shows, when lender i and borrower j were connected in a lender-borrower
relationship in the past, the search is halted and bilateral loan provision and repayment
activities in that period recorded (indicated by the 3-sign). For all current borrowers
with whom a past lender-borrower relationship existed, lenders proceed to computing the
bilateral counterparty risk premium according to the following equation:
ρtij = 1 +
(
l
tˆLij
ij − x
tˆLij
ji
) l¯tˆLii
x¯
tˆLi
j
(3.17)
where ltij =
(
1 + rtij
)
lˆtij specifies the loan principal and interest i.e. the amount lender i
expects to receive from borrower j in phase 2 of the current period8 and xtji refers to the
final amount repaid by borrower j.
The risk premium is subsequently applied as a scaling factor to the interest rate set for
borrower j in period tˆLij to obtain the current interbank rate:
rb,tij = ρ
t
ijr
b,tˆLij
ij (3.18)
8To avoid confusion over the different specifications for lending, recall that l˜ti refers to lenders’ available
liquidity and is defined in the aggregate only. lˆti and lˆ
t
ij refer to loan volumes adjusted for funding liquidity
risk as well as the final amounts extended to borrowers.
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Equation 3.17 is derived from a simple graphical argument9 stating that lenders ‘punish’
past deviations from their expected return, equal to the principal plus interest. As shown
in the inverse demand graph below, full repayment of the loan to counterparty j in period
tˆLij (x
tˆL
ji = l
tˆL
ij ) maps to a risk premium of 1 which, when substituted into Equation 3.18,
implies no change in the interbank rate.
xtˆ
L
ji
ρtij
ρt,mij ↑ m
↓ m
xtˆ
L
ji = l
tˆL
ij
m =
l¯tˆ
L
i
x¯tˆ
L
j
1
Figure 3.8: Lender risk premium setting heuristic
By contrast, as the difference between xtˆ
L
ji and l
tˆL
ij increases (recall that x
tˆL
ji ∈ [0, ltˆLij ]),
the risk premium increases at a rate equal to the ratio of i’s average loan provision to
the average repayment in period tˆLij. This allows the lender to compare each individual
borrower’s behaviour to its loan-competitors. Consequently, in periods where average re-
payment was high relative to loans (↑ m: the rightmost grey dashed line in Figure 3.17),
small deviations from full repayment will be penalised. Similarly, keeping the slope con-
stant and shifting ltˆ
L
ij to the right results in a higher risk premium associated to partial
defaults. From a behavioural standpoint, this shows that lenders’ counterparty risk con-
cerns increase with the volume of loans.
9The relationship between Figure 3.8 and Equation 3.17 is provided in Appendix 3.A.
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Phase 2: Loan repayment and borrower deleveraging
Phase dynamics: Phase 2 begins with a subset of system-wide external assets sub-
jected to an external asset shock, updating asset prices from pt−1k → p˜tk. Following this,
borrower repayments on interbank loans become due, prompting potential firesales as
borrowers seek to satisfy interbank obligations. In the case of firesales, a downward shift
in external asset holdings occurs: st−1k → stk. Finally, we introduce a market impact func-
tion whereby total firesales engender further decreases in asset prices: p˜tk → ptk. Recall
that portfolio value of external asset k, ek is given by pk · sk. Figure 3.9 below tracks the
variation in ek during phase 2.
pt−1k
p˜tk
ptk
st−1k
stk
(i) et,2k = p
t−1
k · st−1k
(ii) e˜t,2k = p˜
t
k · st−1k
(iii) eˆt,2k = p˜
t
k · stk
(iv) et,2k = p
t
k · stk
1. Asset price shock
3. Market impact function
2. Firesales
Figure 3.9: Phase 2 portfolio dynamics
Prior to the shock, asset prices and holdings are carried over from the previous period,
yielding the following ex-ante portfolio value:
et,2i =
∑
k∈Mt
pt−1k · st−1ik
External asset shock: Where phase 1 of the model involved banks opening interbank
positions vis-a`-vis one another due to an exogenous (liability-side) liquidity shock, In the
current phase, banks are now required to close these positions (since we are examining
short-term lending).
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Recall that each bank initially holds an equally-weighted portfolio of M0i securities which
overlap according to a random bipartite network. In what follows, we develop a negative,
exogenous shock to a subset of the price vector that occurs in each period. The first step
of the external asset shock is thus to select the number of securities to shock as well as
the identity of the securities subject to the shock. Where the magnitude of the deposit
shock in phase 1 was expressed as a function of the bank’s size, we assume that external
asset shock size is driven by the financial state F of the economy, calibrated as ‘stable’
or ‘crisis’ F = {s, c}. In the normal state, the initial number of assets shocked is low.
Switching from the normal to the crisis state thus implies an increase in the number of
shocked assets.
Denoting the set of shocked assets in period t by Mt,S, the number of shocked assets in
period t is computed according to: |Mt,S| = M t,S ∼ bU(1, ν(F) ·M)c where b·c denotes
the floor function ensuring that the shock realisation is rounded down to the nearest
integer. ν(F) ∈ [0, 1] represents the fraction of total external assets held by the banking
sector that undergo an exogenous shock. As mentioned above, this is calibrated to the
current financial state such that ν(c) > ν(s).
Having identified the number of securities to shock, we now turn to the magnitude of
the shock i.e. the effect on the marked-to-market price of the selected securities. We
incorporate both first-round and second-round effects arising due to the aforementioned
exogenous shock. The first-round effects are simply the shift in market price from, pt−1k
to the ex post price p˜tk in period t given by:
p˜tk = fkp
t−1
k , ∀k ∈Mts (3.19)
where fk ∼ U (fmin, fmax) denotes the exogenous shift in the market price of shocked
asset k ∈ Mts. The lower and upper bounds of the price shock distribution are given
by fmin(F) and fmax (F), indicating that asset price fluctuations are determined by the
financial state. Note that this shock is idiosyncratic since its effect on individual banks
will depend on which of the shocked assets it holds in its external assets portfolio. Defining
this set asMt,Si ⊆Mt,S, we can express i’s ex-post balance sheet entry for external assets
as:
e˜t,2i =
∑
k∈Mt,Si
p˜tk · st−1ik +
∑
k∈Mt,S\Mt,Si
p˜tk · st−1ik
where the first term consists of the assets whose market price varies due to the shock.
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Firesales: Following the external asset shock, borrower banks are now contractually
obligated to repay their interbank loans plus interest from the previous phase. It is here
that we incorporate the securities firesale mechanism. Specifically, in order to reduce the
possibility of default, we allow borrowers to make up for the difference between avail-
able liquidity and repayment obligations by liquidating a portion of their external asset
portfolios. First, we define the required repayment, x˜tji of each borrower j to its lending
counterparties i ∈ N tj,+:
x˜tji = l
t
ij =
(
1 + rtij
)
lˆtij (3.20)
Observing their aggregate interbank obligations x˜j =
∑
i∈N tj,+ x˜
t
ji, borrowers proceed to
comparing this with available reserves for loan repayment. Equation 3.21 below provides
the mechanism by which borrowers compute the total value of external assets that need
to be sold to account for any shortfall in available reserves:
νtj = min
{
0; (1− ψ) ct,1j − x˜tj
}
(3.21)
As the above shows, when (1− ψ) ct,1j ≥ x˜tj, reserves are sufficient to cover all interbank
obligations resulting in a zero firesale requirement. By contrast, when (1− ψ) ct,1j < x˜tj,
nonzero firesale of assets occur to account for the shortfall.
Thus borrower j needs to sell off vtj worth of assets to meet its interbank obligations. We
assume that this deleveraging process is spread equally over its portfolio, resulting in a
per-asset value of νtjk =
vtj
Mtj
. In order to arrive at the amount of shares sold, we need to
take into account both the current market price p˜tk and the fact that potential firesales
are constrained by banks’ current asset holdings st−1jk . For each asset k ∈Mtj, the number
of shares sold at firesale is given by
ξtjk = min
{
st−1jk ;
νtjk
p˜tk
}
(3.22)
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Note that when j’s holding of asset k is insufficient to cover the required firesale amount,
the entire position st−1jk is sold off. From this, external asset holdings are updated according
to
stjk = s
t−1
jk − ξtjk (3.23)
Finally, the value of loans repaid by interbank borrowers following the firesale mechanism
described above is given by:
xtji = x˜
t
ji −
∑
k∈Mti
p˜tk · ξtjk (3.24)
Note that when Equation 3.24 evaluates to xtji = x˜
t
ji, borrower j’s loans are repaid in full,
even if it possesses insufficient reserves to do so. This is due to Equation 3.22 evaluating
to p˜tk · ξtji = νtjk for each k ∈ Mti, implying that j has sufficient holdings of each asset at
the current market price to make the required repayment.
Second round effects: Following Montagna and Kok (2016), we assume that the asset
firesales induce further reductions in asset prices via the following inverse demand curve,
which we refer to as the market impact function:
ptk = p˜
t
k · exp

−ωk ·
∑
j∈N t−
ξtjk∑
j∈N t−
st−1jk
 (3.25)
Where ωk is a positive constant representing the market depth of asset k. Consequently,
higher firesales across all borrowers holding asset k will result in a larger downward price
adjustment. Notice that Equation 3.22 incorporates the asset’s marked-to-market price
into j’s ability to meet its interbank obligations. Thus we introduce an additional source of
intertemporal feedback in which firesales in the current period result in future difficulties
in repaying interbank loans.
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Phase 3: Insolvency check and central bank intervention
Where phases 1 and 2 developed individual banks’ interbank market behaviour, phase 3
focusses on the banking system as a whole. Specifically, as interbank positions have closed
and banks’ liquidity deficits and surpluses are revealed, it is at this point that the central
bank intervenes, using information on imbalances between (i) Loan requests by borrowers
and loan provision by lenders (after hoarding) and (ii) expected loan repayment (i.e. the
principal plus interest) by lenders and the final loan repayment (after firesales, if required)
by borrowers. Using this information, the central bank calculates the aggregate amount of
liquidity that needs to be injected into the banking sector to correct the aforementioned
imbalances:
ΩB =
∑
j∈N t−
(
b˜tj − btj
)
ΩL =
∑
i∈N t+
(
l˜ti − xti
)
where ΩB and ΩL denote aggregate borrower and loan refinancing. For simplicity, we
assume that the aggregate amounts are redistributed such that each bank’s liquidity
shortfall is met. This is modelled as an increase in each bank’s cash reserves equivalent to
the relevant value. Note that this additional liquidity does not guarantee that each bank
will be solvent following the intervention. In order to ground our model in reality as best
as possible, we assume that refinancing operations occur at a set frequency tΩ which we
will calibrate to mirror the weekly main refinancing operations of the ECB. Consequently,
the above equations are only applied during a refinancing period.
As regards the last point above, we now introduce the policy of fixed rate full allotment,
which is activated in crisis times and has the aim of providing refinancing to counteract
rising bank insolvencies due to heavy pressure on the asset-side of their balance sheet.
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Thus, for a bank i entering phase 3 in an insolvent condition (kt,3i < 0), cash reserves are
updated according to:
ct,3i = c
t,2
i +
(|kt,3i |+ k0i ) (3.26)
This equation states that the central bank injects enough additional liquidity (indicated
by the term in parentheses) such that the bank returns to solvency and attains its initial
capital level.
Note that when the FRFA policy is activated, bank insolvencies do not occur by construc-
tion. As mentioned, this is not the case for the normal refinancing operations. In this
case, when a bank is declared insolvent, the following steps are taken: (i) It is removed
from the network as both an autonomous agent and as a counterparty to the remaining
active banks and (ii) Its remaining external assets are sold off at the prevailing market
price and distributed amongst its counterparties (as dictated by the direct exposure layer
of the network).
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3.3.4 Summarising feedback dynamics
The causal-loop diagram below illustrates the impact of past occurrences on banks’ present
behaviour. Using a minimum working example comprising two banks (a lender, 1 and
a borrower 2), we outline the feedback dynamics governing: loan repayment (LR21),
interbank rate setting (IBR12), interbank loan volumes (IBV1) and the market impact
function (MIF2).
LR21 IBR12
MIF2
IBV1
CPR
FLR
MLR1MLR2
−
−
− +
+
Figure 3.10: feedback loops
Counterparty risk: The CPR loop, expressed mathematically in Equations 3.17 and
3.18, is a negative loop in which lower loan repayment by borrower 2 in the past engenders
a higher bilateral risk premium in the premium, which in turn increases the likelihood of
future default.
Funding liquidity risk: Unlike the CPR loop, where current lenders observed past
periods where they were also lenders, the FLR loop in our model involves current lenders
observing their past as interbank borrowers in order to form a proxy over their future
ability to attract funding in times of need. That is, a higher success rate in obtaining
loans (IBV ) in the past, given by Equation 3.15, maps to higher loan provision in the
present.
Market liquidity risk: The MLR loop provides an additional channel between the
current interbank rate and borrowers’ future loan repayment. Specifically, a higher rate
can lead to a higher firesale requirement which results in a larger downward price adjust-
ment via Equation 3.25. In the case of future firesales, lower market prices imply that
banks have to sell off more shares to achieve the same value, increasing the probability of
default.
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3.4 Calibration and network generation
Our calibration methodology is split into two stages: First we set the parameters used to
generate the direct exposure and overlapping portfolio layers of the multilayer network.
We then provide the parameters used in the ABM simulation. Recall that our approach
entails embedding the latter in the former. Throughout this section, we provide justifica-
tion for our choice of parameter values, either based on known properties or derived from
the related literature
3.4.1 Network generation
Table 3.1 below provides the calibrations used to generate the bilayer network structure
on which the ABM runs.
Table 3.1: Network parameters
Parameter Value Definition Notes
Interbank network
amin 5 Minimum bank size Source: (Montagna and Lux, 2016)
amax 100 Maximum bank size –
γa 2 Power law exponent (size distribution) –
γ?p 1.2 Scaling exponent (probability function) Source: (Alves et al., 2013)
d? 3 Density adjustment factor –
N 50 Number of banks –
Overlapping portfolio network
M 50 Number of securities
p 0.2 Erdo˝s-Renyi index Source: (Montagna and Kok, 2016)
(Caccioli et al., 2014)
µb 20 Average bank diversification Source: (Caccioli et al., 2014)
Notes: Dashed line in notes column indicates that the parameter value is derived from the same source as above. Starred values are calibrated
in order to match the network topology of the European interbank market reported in Alves et al. (2013).
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Passing the N -element vector of bank sizes (sampled from the truncated power law dis-
tribution given in Equation 3.1 as arguments to the probability function (Equation 3.2)
populates the N2 element probability matrix denoting the probability that a given pair of
nodes i and j will form an edge10. Though the focus of this paper is bank behaviour rather
than the financial stability implications of interbank network topology, we nevertheless
seek to simulate as realistic a network as possible. Though this is achieved in part by
using an algorithm allowing for disassortative mixing, we calibrate certain parameters to
recreate as best as possible the structure of European Interbank market reported by Alves
et al. (2013). The highly granular dataset consists of the bilateral interbank exposures of
53 large EU banks (hence our use of 50 banks) at the end of 2011. The total exposure
value is EUR 1.7 trillion. In addition, the authors highlight a number of network proper-
ties derived from the data. Of interest to us are the network density, average path length,
assortativity and number of links. Through calibration of the starred parameters in Ta-
ble 3.1, we are able to generate a direct exposure network possessing similar topological
features as the EU interbank market. These are reported in Table 3.2 below:
Table 3.2: Replicating the structure of the EU interbank network
Our simulations Alves et al. (2013)
Density 0.2988 0.34
Number of links 732 988
Assortativity -0.3098 -0.27
Average path length 1.7959 1.73
Note that we do not replicate the specified topological figures exactly as we seek to preserve
the observed scale-free property scale-free property of interbank networks. As shown in
the right panel of Figure 3.11 below, this is the case. The node fitness distribution is
also clearly scale-free, though this is by construction (as the values are sampled from a
truncated power law distribution.
10Note that in order to prevent isolated nodes (which occurs for smaller nodes whose probability of forming
an edge is small) resulting in a disconnected network, we develop a contingency by which a disconnected
node will form a link to a randomly-selected node in the top quintile (according to bank size) of nodes.
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Figure 3.11: Initial bank size and degree distribution
Finally, the initial network structure of the direct exposure layer is provided in Figure 3.12.
From the left panel, the tiered/core-periphery topology is immediately apparent. We also
provide the network in circular format as this will simplify comparison between structures
after the network structure becomes dynamic due to the the ABM.
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Figure 3.12: Initial core-periphery network of interbank relationships
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The bipartite graph of overlapping portfolios is a random network with Poisson degree
distribution for both banks and assets. The probability, p of bank-asset pair forming a
link is given by µb/M . In order to reconcile the parametrisation given by Caccioli et al.
(2014) and Montagna and Kok (2016), we select the value of µb such that p = 0.2. Fixing
M = 50, this yields µb = 10. The initial overlapping portfolio (along with its evolution
over the course of the simulation is provided in Appendix 3.B.
3.4.2 Agent-based model
The Agent-Based Model combines calibrated parameters for the heterogenous initial bal-
ance sheets of the banks and the stochastic shock regimes with the output from the
network generation stage above. Specifically, the node fitness values ai define banks’ to-
tal assets which is then used to create the balance sheet parameters via the α and β
calibrations given in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: ABM parameters
ParameterValue Definition Notes
Initial balance sheet weights
α 0.9 Securities to assets ratio Source: (Lux, 2015)
β 0.92 Deposits to liabilities ratio –
Interest rates
rd 0.02 Deposit rate Source: (Georg, 2013)
re 0.03 Portfolio return Own calibration
rz 0.05 Investment return Own calibration
rb 0.04 Central bank refinancing rate Source: (Georg, 2013)
Shocks
θ 0.5 Mean reversion factor Source: (Lux, 2015)
φ 0.025 Shock proportionality factor –
fmin {0.9, 0.75} Asset price shock: lower bound {s, c} Own calibration
fmax {1.1, 1} Asset price shock: upper bound {s, c} Own calibration
ωk {0.2, 0.8} Market depth {s, c} Source: (Montagna and Kok, 2016)
MS {M/10,M/2} Number of shocked assets {s, c} Own calibration
Policy
ψ 0.02 Minimum reserve requirement Source: ECB
tΩ 5 Refinancing frequency –
Notes: {s, c} contains the calibrated value in the stable (first entry) and crisis states (second entry).
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3.5 Policy experiment results
Our results are presented in the form of a counterfactual policy experiment in which we
run the Agent-Based Model developed in Section 3.3 using the calibrations in Table 3.3.
We run the simulation for T = 250 periods. In order to simulate the onset of the crisis,
we switch from the stable to the crisis financial state in period T/2 = 125. Recall that
this entails sharp declines in asset prices, f ∈ [0.75, 1], as well as a reduction in the
market liquidity of external assets, wk = 0.2 (thereby mitigating borrowers’ ability to
meet interbank obligations through firesales). We allow the crisis state to persist for 50
periods, after which the external shock parameters revert to their stable values.
Coinciding with the crisis simulation, the policy experiment compares two alternative
scenarios. In the benchmark case, the crisis is allowed to develop unchecked with central
bank intervention limited to normal refinancing of lenders and borrowers in the face of
liquidity shortages on the interbank market. In the second experiment, the central bank
introduces a policy of fixed rate full allotment in which additional liquidity is injected into
the banking sector in order to counteract mounting insolvencies due to a combination of
asset price spirals putting downward pressure on external asset portfolio values and a
growing inability to obtain funding on the interbank market. A key feature of this policy
measure is its timing : In order to keep our simulations grounded in reality, we activate
the FRFA policy 25 periods after the onset of the crisis. In this way, we capture the
delay between the Lehman trigger on 15th September 2008 and the introduction of FRFA
one month later with the aim of showing that this allowed counterparty and funding
liquidity risks to develop and feed back on one another, thereby mitigating the ability
of the central bank to restore normal interbank market functioning. As discussed in the
general introduction of the thesis, this was largely the case
Lastly, we discuss some technical features of the computational model. First, given that
the system is driven by stochastic shocks, the model is run 100 times for each policy
experiment after which we average over the number of runs for each variable and each
point in simulation time. In order to report the results, we take another average, this
time over all banks at each point in simulation time11
11We also conducted a parallel analysis in which the maximum and minimum values are plotted as upper
and lower bounds of the average. However, this did not yield any further insights and complicated visual
analysis of the results.
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3.5.1 Balance sheet dynamics
We begin our analysis by studying how bank balance sheets have evolved from their initial
calibration due to the agent-based model. Starting with average total assets across all
50 banks over 250 time periods, Figure 3.13 shows that prior to the onset of the crisis
(whose duration, 50 periods starting at t = 125 is indicated by the shaded area), bank
balance sheets experience a steady increase. This trend is reversed once the crisis hits,
with bank assets dropping precipitously. The red line indicates the baseline scenario in
which the central bank continues with its pre-crisis policy of bank refinancing on the basis
of correcting liquidity imbalances on the interbank market. As is apparent, such policies
are unable to halt the downward trend in bank balance sheets (though a slight tapering
is observed once the economy emerges from the crisis).
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Figure 3.13: Average total assets
The blue line indicates the policy experiment in which the central bank activates its Fixed
Rate Full Allotment policy 25 periods after the onset of the crisis. For all figures, the
FRFA policy introduction is given by the vertical, dashed line. As expected, the two lines
largely overlap from period 0-125 (as the FRFA policy is inactive under both experiments
during this period). However, once the central bank activates FRFA, the decline in total
assets is halted and remains stable but subdued relative to its pre-crisis level.
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The same exercise is performed in Figure 3.14 for the individual components of bank
balance sheets: cash and external assets on the asset-side, and deposits and capital on
the liabilities-side.
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Figure 3.14: Evolution of balance sheet components
Again, the impact of the crisis as well as the mitigating effects played by the FRFA policy
are apparent.
Recall that our framework includes an un-modelled private sector dependant on banks for
credit. The provision of credit is the first priority for banks hit by a positive (interbank
lenders) and a negative (interbank borrowers) shock, both seeking to maintain a constant
level of investment: Lenders via reallocation of excess reserves and/or surplus funds from
positive deposit shocks and borrowers through interbank credit. As the left panel of
Figure 3.15 shows, credit provision to the private sector is severely affected by the crisis,
dropping to near-zero levels.
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Figure 3.15: Desired vs. final investment
Turning now the right panel, in which the central bank full allotment policy is activated
in period 150 (25 periods into the crisis), we observe that while investment does drop over
the first ten periods (similar to the baseline scenario), the aggressive intervention by the
central bank is successful in stabilising bank credit provision, albeit at a lower level than
prior to the crisis12.
3.5.2 Interbank market dynamics
Where the previous section on balance sheet dynamics served to outline how the model,
we now turn to the crux of our argument: to determine the link between bank behaviour
on the interbank market (loan and repayment volumes, hoarding and interbank rates)
and central bank policy during the crisis period. In the first step banks hit by a negative
liquidity shock go to the interbank market as borrowers and make loan requests to their
connected counterparties. Loan provision then occurs in two steps: First, lenders compare
total incoming requests to available reserves. This constitutes a form of hoarding as it
introduces a gap between requests and provisional loans. Hereafter, this is referred to as
12However, note the large gap between desired and final investment occurring around the introduction of
the FRFA policy. This occurs due to our modelling specification that banks seek to maintain a stable
long-term level of investment. As tensions hit the interbank market, banks are forced to adjust their
balance sheets to accomodate these shocks, resulting in an investment gap as borrower banks become
liquidity constrained.
178 Chapter 3: Central bank policy experiments
the liquidity motive of bank hoarding behaviour. Subsequently, precautionary hoarding
by lenders occurs after lenders have allocated the appropriate amount of funds towards
interbank lending. In this step, lenders assess their current funding liquidity risk through
backward-looking heuristics examining their ability to attract wholesale funding in the
past. Equation 3.15 maps past interbank market outcomes to current hoarding.
Phase 1
Figure 3.16 below summarises interbank market dynamics in phase 1. Again, we differen-
tiate between the policy experiment in which the crisis proceeds absent additional central
bank intervention (left panel) and one were the central bank injects additional liquidity
into the system through its FRFA policy (right panel). Given the complexity and hetero-
geneity of the system, a certain amount of hoarding is expected in normal times as large
banks make liquidity requests to smaller banks who have insufficient reserves to match
them in full. Moreover, as with the investment figure above, the system requires a few
periods to burn in, as indicated by the higher volumes at the beginning of the simulation
after which requests and loans appear to fluctuate around a long-run mean.
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Figure 3.16: Phase 1 dynamics
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Following the onset of the crisis, the gap between requests and loans widens as borrowers
request additional liquidity on the interbank market. However, lenders, faced with their
own liquidity concerns, find themselves unable to meet these requests. As a result, inter-
bank trading declines gradually, culminating in a complete freeze even after the crisis has
subsided. However as mentioned, this is a counterfactual exercise. In reality, the FRFA
policy of the central bank succeeded in preventing the dry-up of liquidity as mentioned in
the general introduction. However, liquidity hoarding becomes the status quo as the gap
in the right panel shows. Turning again to the data, this is corroborated by the increasing
recourse to the deposit facility. Figure 3.17 plots the difference between requests and
loans again, serving as further evidence of the divergence in outcomes under the baseline
and when allowing for central bank intervention.
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Figure 3.17: Lender hoarding
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We end our discussion on phase 1 volumes by recalling that hoarding behaviour is driven
by a liquidity as well as a precautionary motive. These are plotted in stacked form in
Figure 3.18 below. Firstly, note that the precautionary motive is prevalent throughout
the simulation. Again, this is due to the large degree of heterogeneity between banks
implying that not all requests are met implying a stable level of funding liquidity risk.
Regarding the liquidity motive of hoarding, the same burn-in phenomenon is observed
early in the simulation, after which lenders liquidity situation stabilises.
0 50 100 150 200 250
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 50 100 150 200 250
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Figure 3.18: Loan decomposition
Regarding the impact of the crisis on hoarding behaviour, we see that lenders’ liquidity
situation becomes steadily more precarious as the crisis evolves. The freezing of the
interbank market in the left panel follows the analysis of Figure 3.16. Note that when
the FRFA policy, hoarding due to liquidity concerns is nonexistent (due to the system
now being flush with liquidity). Moreover, the precautionary motive is significantly lower
than prior to the crisis.
As mentioned in the general introduction, the spike in banks’ concerns regarding the
creditworthiness of borrowers was one of the distinguishing features of the crisis’s mani-
festation on the interbank market. In our model, interbank risk premiums are assumed
to be driven directly by lenders’ concern over the creditworthiness of borrowers, the so-
called counterparty risk channel. Using a heuristic based on adaptive expectations (see
Equation 3.17), lenders map past loan defaults to set risk premiums in the current period.
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As shown in Figure 3.19 below, there was a small buildup of counterparty risk due to past
loan defaults prior to the crisis. In the benchmark case where the interbank market dries
up, no trades occur hence the interest rate is driven back to its initial value. By contrast,
despite the FRFA policy, counterparty risk has already manifested itself, resulting in
lenders’ continued reticence in providing easy funding.
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Figure 3.19: Average interbank rate
The results under FRFA support our claim that by the time the ECB intervened to sta-
bilise interbank markets and ensure continued credit provision to the real economy, the
buildup of liquidity and counterparty risk (and the associated feedback mechanisms be-
tween them) within the banking sector had resulted in banks withdrawing from interbank
market lending and borrowing. However, the policy also prevented a much more severe
outcome in which a full scale interbank market freeze occurs which spills over to the real
economy in the form of a credit crunch.
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Phase 2
The last step in banks’ interactions on the overnight interbank market involves borrowers
repaying the loans made in phase 1. This includes the principal loan amount as well as
the interbank rate set by lenders. Note that in our model, interbank loans are redirected
towards an illiquid investment. As a result, borrowers tap into their reserves to repay
interbank loans. It is in this stage that the interaction between the bilateral exposure and
the overlapping portfolio layers of the network are incorporated. Specifically, borrowers
with insufficient reserves to pay back loans in full sell off a portion of their external
asset portfolios at the prevailing market price. The impact of asset firesales is amplified
during the crisis period during which asset prices fall and market liquidity decreases. As
a result of falling asset prices, liquidity short banks have to sell off a larger fraction of
their portfolio to make the same requirement. This in turn engenders further endogenous
asset price spirals via the market impact function given by Equation 3.25.
Figure 3.20 below compares the average amount that borrowers are expected to repay in
each period with final repayment volumes. Again, interbank market tensions manifest
themselves quite clearly in a similar manner to loan requests and provision in phase 1.
Due to falling loans from cash-strapped lenders, required repayment decreases accordingly.
Note that the observed increase in interbank rates due to counterparty risk concerns is
not sufficient to impact borrowers’ loan repayment behaviour.
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Figure 3.20: Phase 2 dynamics
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Based on the above results reporting interbank market dynamics, we conclude that fund-
ing liquidity risk plays the dominant role in driving banks’ retrenchment from the inter-
bank market. Lenders continue to hoard liquidity which is reinforced given the dynamic
nature of the model (i.e. a borrower unable to obtain the requested funds due to hoard-
ing in one period will in turn hoard liquidity in the future). As shown, this would have
resulted in a complete freeze of the interbank market. The FRFA policy was shown
to alleviate liquidity concerns and ensure the continued but subdued functioning of the
interbank market.
Phase 3
After interbank positions are closed at the end of phase 2, the central bank, under its price
stability mandate, provides refinancing to banks in the form of cash injections. These are
calibrated to compensate for liquidity imbalances on the interbank market. Under normal
refinancing operations, this comprises both borrower and lender refinancing operations.
The former involves targeting the liquidity shortfall between borrowers’ total interbank
requests and loan provision by lenders (which, in addition to the precautionary hoarding
motive, is also drive by lenders’ available reserves). Similarly, lender refinancing is carried
out by calculating the difference between borrowers’ expected loan repayment (equal to
the principal + interest) and their final repayment.
0 50 100 150 200 250
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Figure 3.21: Central bank liquidity provision
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While normal refinancing continues throughout the entire simulation, the Fixed Rate
Full Allotment is introduced in period 125 and maintained for the remaining simulation
periods. In this setup, additional liquidity is provided to banks in danger of becoming
insolvent in the current period.
Observing the phase 1 and phase 2 dynamics allows us to conclude that funding liquidity
risk plays a more significant role in dampening interbank market activity than coun-
terparty risk. This is reflected in central bank activities wherein lender refinancing is
insignificant relative to borrower refinancing. As regards the latter, we observe a small
increase in liquidity provision to borrowers shortly after the onset of the crisis. However,
once the FRFA policy is introduced, this decreases to the pre-crisis level as borrowers’
liquidity needs are met under the new policy.
3.5.3 Securities market
In our model, asset prices are driven by exogenous shocks as well as by banks’ activities
on the interbank market via borrowers’ selling off assets to repay their loans. Moreover,
the extent of firesales is strongly dependant on interbank market dynamics. For example,
rising counterparty risk results in higher interbank rates which implies a larger loan repay-
ment requirement for borrowers. If reserves are insufficient, this increases the likelihood
that a bank will have to sell off assets to meet its interbank obligations and put further
downward pressure on asset prices. This further exemplifies the complex dynamics that
emerge from the simple heuristics of the model. Recall that asset prices are updated twice
over the course of phase 2 (see Figure 3.9): First exogenously via a shock to a subset of
total system assets13 then endogenously as market illiquidity and external asset firesales,
combined with an inelastic demand function for these assets increases market risk.
To shed light on asset price movements, Figure 3.22 disentangles the percent change in
average asset prices due to the exogenous shock and due to firesales. The former is
computed by taking the percentage difference between asset prices following the shock, p˜t
and the initial price pt equal to the post-MIF price from the previous period. Similarly,
the change in asset price due to the market impact function is computed using pt and the
post-APS price in the current period, p˜t.
13Although the shock calibration is the same for all banks, the bipartite graph imbues it with a certain
degree of idiosyncrasy as certain banks may hold more shocked assets than others.
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Figure 3.22: Asset price dynamics
Though a small endogenous decrease in asset prices due the market impact function is
observed, it is clear that endogenous price spirals do not occur. Again, this stems from
the decrease in interbank activity due to funding liquidity observed in phase 1 and 2.
Consequently, loan volumes are not high enough to require significant firesales on the
part of borrowers.
Despite this, we report banks’ firesale behaviour below. Though total firesales can be
considered in conjunction with Figure 3.20 given that they determine the extent to which
borrowers are successfully able to repay their loans, we include it here as the difference
between desired and final firesales is directly related to the liquidity of the securities
market. To be precise, a liquidity-short borrower will be unable to fulfil its interbank
obligations if it does not possess sufficient external assets in its portfolio to sell for cash.
While this could arise simply due to inadequate asset holdings, it is exacerbated by
rising market illiquidity as interbank markets become strained. In this scenario of falling
valuations, borrowers will need to sell off more assets for the same amount of cash thereby
increasing the likelihood that their holdings are insufficient.
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Following the same method of analysis as before, we consider asset firesales under normal
central bank refinancing and with the addition of FRFA. As Figure 3.23 shows, borrowers
with insufficient liquidity to meet their interbank obligations are mostly able to sell off
the required volume of assets at the current market price without having a noticeable
impact on future prices.
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Figure 3.23: External asset firesales
However, analysis of the left panel reveals a prolonged period during which borrowers
were unable to sell off enough assets to repay their loans. Moreover, this shortfall is not
observed when the FRFA policy is active.
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3.5.4 Failures
The final step in the analysis of our computational model takes a more structural per-
spective. Specifically, we begin by studying the evolution of bank failures during the
simulation as well as the resulting capital loss when a bank is driven into insolvency.
This is defined as the sum of the absolute value of failed banks’ capital at the moment of
insolvency. This is a negative value by construction and captures the of capital required
to bring the system back to full solvency.
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Figure 3.24: Cumulative insolvency dynamics
Given that a key feature of our model has been the interaction between banks as well as
between banks and their external assets, we compare the total number of active banks
and assets over the simulation period. Where active banks refers to banks that remain
solvent, a security is considered active if it is held by at least one bank. Consequently,
this variable is driven both by asset firesales and bank insolvencies. While the former is
intuitive (repeated firesales such that aggregate holdings of that asset are driven to zero),
recall that the latter effect is defined in Phase 3 wherein insolvent banks sell off their
remaining external assets which are then redistributed across their counterparties.
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Figure 3.25: Number of active banks and assets
Again, our model reproduces realistic dynamics. Absent any additional policy intervention
by the central bank, the banking sector is subject to a growing number of failures as the
crisis unfolds. Moreover, we observe a delay of approximately ten periods before the
first failures occur after which bank insolvencies compound, resulting in a diminished
banking sector relative to the start of the simulation. This delay can be interpreted as a
justification that model dynamics are not wholly driven by the exogenous shock. Indeed,
banks continue to interact on the interbank market several periods into the crisis, though
this eventually decreases at a steady rate, as the prior analysis on interbank market
dynamics has also shown.
Comparison of the left and right panels in Figure 3.25 leads to a stronger conclusion than
for the balance sheet and interbank market where central bank intervention was unable
to restore full functioning (though it did prevent a much worse outcome). Excessive
liquidity in the system due to FRFA (as shown in Figure 3.21 implies a high level of
solvency amongst banks combined with reduced interbank activity.
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3.5.5 Network structure dynamics
Where previous models of cascading defaults in financial networks use an ad hoc approach
replicate the spread of localised shocks across the baking sector, typically via a capital
buffer that absorbs or propagates incoming shocks, network dynamics in our model are
completely driven by bank behaviour within and across the multilayer structure. Thus,
we end the results section with a discussion on the evolving network structure of the
interbank exposure and the overlapping portfolio layers.
Starting with the interbank exposure layer, we represent the complex network structure
through three network measures : total number of edges, network density and average
degree. As is apparent from Figure 3.26, if the crisis would have been allowed to pro-
ceed without the introduction of additional liquidity measures, the number of interbank
linkages would have fallen dramatically as indicated by the leftmost and rightmost panels
which measure connectivity at the aggregate and average levels, respectively.
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Figure 3.26: Interbank exposure network evolution
As shown in section 3.2.2, the overlapping portfolio network takes the form of a bipartite
graph parametrised by µA and µB respectively denoting the average degree of assets (i.e.
the average number or banks holding each asset) and the average degree of banks which
can also be interpreted as banks’ average diversification. Lastly, the crowding parameter,
obtained by dividing the total number of banks by the total number of assets provides an
indication of the speed at which banks fail relative to assets becoming inactive.
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Figure 3.27: Overlapping portfolio network evolution
Comparison of µA to µB dynamics reveals much larger movements in the former than
the latter. Thus, banks fail faster than assets become inactive resulting in an increase in
diversification as a small number of banks hold the same number of assets.
As we have shown, the structure of the network is also strongly affected by the crisis and
interbank market behaviour. However, while the delay between the onset of the crisis
and the introduction of FRFA had a marked impact on interbank market dynamics, the
structure of the network is more resilient to changes in the economic situation. This is
shown in the elapsed time between the onset of the crisis and the first failures.
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3.6 Concluding remarks
This paper provides a first attempt at combining the literature on the network topology
of interbank markets with an Agent-Based Model tailored specifically to incorporate the
bank behavioural dynamics observed during the crisis. Specifically, this revolves around
our representation of funding liquidity and counterparty risk through a set of heuristics
in which banks use adaptive expectations to map past observations to current behaviour.
We argue that modelling bank behaviour in such a manner, set within the interactive
limits of a realistic interbank network structure represents a new paradigm for the study
of financial stability and systemic risk.
Prior to running the ABM, we apply two state-of-the art methodologies to simulate a
multilayer network comprising two layers: (i) an undirected, disassortative and scale-
free network and (ii) a random bipartite network. The parameters associated to each
layer respectively represent a different type of bank interdependency namely: (i) direct
exposures consisting of interbank lending and borrowing and (ii) indirect exposures arising
due to banks’ holding certain assets in common i.e. overlapping portfolios. It is now
widely accepted that considering multiple transmission channels is imperative to properly
understand financial contagion and systemic risk. Our paper is firmly grounded in and
further develops this narrative by developing the behavioural specification linking the
two layers in a dynamic model featuring heterogenous agents and an evolving network
structure.
Embedded within the simulated network, the ABM proceeds in a sequential manner.
The system is initiated by a liquidity shock that drives banks to the interbank market
as borrowers or lenders. This transforms the initial simulated undirected network into
a directed one whose structure changes in each period. Loan repayment by borrowers
provides the mechanism through which the two layers interact. Specifically, borrowers
with inadequate liquidity to fulfil their interbank obligations sell off external assets at the
prevailing market price. The price of each asset is updated endogenously as a function
of total sales volumes during the period. Since the bipartite graph formulation implies
that banks hold assets in common, firesales by one bank decreases the price of its assets
which in turn, forces other banks to revalue their portfolios downwards. Thus, despite our
use of relatively simple heuristics driving various aspects of bank behaviour, the model
features a number of complex feedback loops that occur within and between layers and
across time periods.
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Given that the model is run as a computer simulation in which agents interact au-
tonomously according to a predefined set of behavioural rules, a large amount of data
is generated covering bank balance sheet evolution, interbank market dynamics (volumes
and rates) and the changing structure of the bilayer network as banks fail and sell of
their asset positions. In order to construct a relevant narrative, we have restricted our
attention to the events occurring in the early days of the crisis during which the rapid
buildup and unwinding of systemic risks led to a freeze in the interbank market. Against
this background, we seek to understand the role played by the central bank in stabilising
interbank market tensions and the reason why interbank market activity remained sub-
dued despite aggressive central bank policy interventions. In the paper, we argue that
following the onset of the crisis (modelled as a sharp drop in asset prices coupled with a
decrease in market liquidity), banks’ concerns about their own ability to attract funding
results in precautionary hoarding behaviour while an increasing number of loan defaults
by stressed counterparties drives up risk premiums on interbank loans.
Our results thus take the form of two policy experiments, presented simultaneously for ease
of comparison. The first experiment i.e. our baseline is business as usual: The central
bank provides refinancing to the banking sector on a regular basis in order to correct
liquidity imbalances. In order to keep our model close to reality, these interventions
occur at regular intervals. This replicates the main refinancing operations instrument
used by all major central banks. In the second, we introduce a policy of Fixed Rate
Full Allotment in which additional liquidity is injected into the banking sector in order
to prevent cascading bank insolvencies. As was the case in September-October 2008,
this policy was introduced with a delay of one month by the ECB following the Lehman
Brothers insolvency on September 15th. The crux of our simulation study revolves around
the notion that while these emergency measures succeeded in preventing a widespread
collapse of the banking system, the buildup in funding liquidity and counterparty risk
that occurred after the onset of the crisis and prior to the introduction of the FRFA
policy resulted in a widespread withdrawal from the interbank market.
Though the results provide new insights into bank behavioural dynamics and the role of
central bank policy interventions, they represent a fraction of the possible research av-
enues that can be undertaken within the framework of our model. In our view, further
work derived from the methodology developed in the paper could revolve around two main
elements: (i) Use of real balance sheet and interbank network data to set up the model
prior to launching the ABM and (ii) Introducing different macro- and micro-prudential
measures in order to study the resilience of the financial system. Regarding the use of
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data, recall that we use a highly stylised balance sheet representation combined with a
probabilistic network generation model calibrated to replicate key topological features
of real interbank networks. Our framework is flexible enough to allow practitioners to
replace Section 3.2 entirely. By doing so, our model could be redirected towards use as a
stress-testing device. Lastly, given the growing importance of interconnectedness in the
development of financial regulation, a number of policy tools including capital require-
ments14, additional capital buffers for G-SIBS etc. could be incorporated. Lastly, we
have eschewed a comparative statics analysis of the parameters used to set up the model.
While this was done for the sake of brevity and to restrict our attention to understanding
bank behaviour and the impact of fixed-rate full allotment, further exploration of the
parameter space would yield additional insights on the inner workings of the model.
14In this context, heterogeneity in bank capital and the impact on systemic risk would constitute a relevant
addition to the literature. The increasing importance of bank capital in times of crisis and the impact
on bank performance has been recognised by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013).
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3.A Computations
Derivation of interbank risk-premium setting equations (Eqs. 3.17 and3.18):
Starting from Figure 3.8, we define the corresponding linear function:
ρtij = ρ
t,m
ij −
l¯
tˆLij
i
x¯
tˆLij
j
x
tˆLij
ji , ∀j ∈ N ti,− (C.27)
where the y-intercept ρt,mij corresponds to the maximum possible risk premium arising due
to total default in period tˆLij. This is computed from (i) the average interbank behaviour
in that period and (ii) the past expected return on loans from i to j.
Beginning with the assumption that full repayment yields a scaling factor of 1 provide
us with the coordinate (ltˆ
L
ij , 1) which, when substituted into Equation C.27, results in the
following value, after re-arranging, for ρt,mij :
ρt,mij = 1 +
l¯tˆ
L
i
x¯tˆ
L
j
ltˆ
L
ij (C.28)
Finally, substitution of Eq. C.28 into Eq. C.27 provides the final form of the risk premium
equation (Eq. 3.17).
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3.B Network visualisation
3.B.1 Interbank relationship dynamics
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Figure 3.B.1: Evolution of bank relationships during the crisis (undirected, unweighted
network)
3.B.2 Interbank loan dynamics
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Figure 3.B.2: Evolution of interbank loans during the crisis (weighted, directed network)
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3.B.3 Overlapping portfolio dynamics
Figure 3.B.3: Evolution of bank portfolios during the crisis (bipartite network)

Closing discussion
As I have demonstrated in the thesis, networks constitute a powerful tool for representing
the pattern of interlinkages between banks and understanding the systemic vulnerabilities
to the financial system as a whole. Moreover, their ability to represent the underlying dy-
namic structure of financial markets renders them highly useful as a backdrop to studying
the complex dynamics between banks during a financial crisis. The narrative developed
over the three chapters comprising the thesis can be broadly categorised along two dimen-
sions: (i) Understanding the impact of network topology on systemic risk and financial
contagion and (ii) Developing behavioural models in which agents/banks act within the
interactive limits given by the network structure and network externalities are transmitted
according to the pattern of interlinkages. Below, I briefly restate the current state-of-the-
art in order to later establish where each chapter is situated within the literature:
Network topology: Recent advances in using granular financial data to map real in-
terbank networks have gained traction amongst central banks and policymakers. As such
data increases in availability and quality, researchers are rapidly converging on a set of
common topological properties across a variety of national and international interbank
networks: small-world effects, a scale-free degree distribution, disassortative mixing and
a core-periphery structure. Against this background, increasingly sophisticated simula-
tion methods stemming from statistical mechanics are being perfected to simulate realistic
interbank networks for counterfactual simulations, stress-testing and macroprudential pol-
icy analysis. In my opinion, the newest frontier in financial network and systemic risk
analysis lies in the use of multilayer networks analysis to represent the various types of
interdependencies between financial institutions.
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Agent behaviour on networks: Extending from mechanical models of cascading de-
faults wherein bank behaviour is passive and shock propagation is a binary variable de-
termined by the ability of a banks’ capital buffer to absorb the incoming shock from
connected counterparties, the current state-of-the-art allows banks to actively respond to
their environment via a predefined behavioural specification using tools from Agent-Based
Modelling. Within this framework, state-of-the-art models introduce heterogeneity into
the network while incorporating heuristics lifted directly from bank behaviour during the
crisis. As I have argued, the network defines the interactive limits of the system in which
individual behaviour is driven the ABM. As a result, key ingredients such as information
asymmetry and myopic agents arise as intrinsic features of the model.
Each chapter, though different in the theoretical model and research question, is a vari-
ation of the above two themes. Chapter 1 introduces a stylised four-node network a`-la
Allen and Gale (2000) into a modified version of the DSGE specification developed by
De Walque et al. (2010) in order to study how interbank market tensions can spill over
into credit markets and impair the ability of the central bank to steer short-term inter-
est rates. Against this background, we take into account that real interbank networks
are best represented by the core-periphery topology while providing two extreme cases
(cyclical and complete networks) for comparison. Evidently, agent behaviour is provided
by the DSGE specification which includes such features as endogenous loan defaults (in
both the retail and wholesale markets), dynamic risk-weighted capital requirements and
liquidity injections by the central bank, all of which played a key role in the crisis.
With assessing the impact of network topology on financial stability being the main objec-
tive, we find that complete networks play a stabilising role by dissipating localised banking
shocks across the network. By contrast, when a core-periphery topology is applied, the
core bank exhibits large fluctuations while the network as a whole requires larger central
bank intervention. This lends support to the “too interconnected to fail paradigm wherein
certain banks, by virtue of their position in the network pose a higher threat to financial
stability.
Chapter 2 shares one common feature with chapter 1 namely, the primary aim is to as-
sess the role of network structure on system dynamics. However, where the first chapter
proposed a highly-stylised network structure in order to incorporate behavioural dynamics
via a DSGE model, chapter 2 shifts the focus to network topology while abstracting from
complex bank behaviour. Against this background, I simulate a wide array of realistic in-
terbank networks using a latin hypercube design after which a standard cascading defaults
model is run on each one. This creates a dataset in which each network constitutes an
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observation. I then develop an empirical model in which the independent variables com-
prise various topological features of the network (computed ex-ante) while the dependent
variables are based on the shock’s propagation through the network.
Recall that the main difference between chapters 1 and 2 was the lack of a behavioural
specification in the latter due to the higher complexity of the imposed network structure.
The model behind chapter 3 was developed with the aim of combining the state-of-
the-art in network modelling with a realistic framework for bank behaviour that takes
into account the specificities of the financial crisis. To this end, a thorough review of
the literature identified the rapid buildup of counterparty and funding liquidity risk as
financial market conditions deteriorated as one of the key features of the crisis and one of
the reasons why the large-scale liquidity interventions by central banks failed to restart
the interbank market. In order to include both dynamics in a tractable and intuitive
framework, I apply tools from the agent-based modelling literature by developing a set
of heuristics based on adaptive expectations in which banks condition current interbank
behaviour on past difficulties in obtaining funding or borrowers’ past inability to pay
back loans in full. The key strength of this approach is that it allows complex system-
wide dynamics (in this case, a retrenchment from wholesale funding) to emerge in a
‘bottom up’ fashion from simple agent behaviour. Moreover, it can be easily embedded
in a network by restricting banks’ interbank behaviour to their local counterparties (i.e.
their first neighbours in the network). Several studies on the relationship lending and the
efficiency repeated interactions between banks corroborate this approach. Though I use
the same network simulation approach to generate the initial interbank exposure network
as in chapter 2, there are two key differences: (i) The simulated network is undirected
and unweighted since the direction of lending and borrowing is dictated by idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks and the volume of loans is endogenous and driven by the heuristics and
(ii) I introduce a second set of interdependencies between banks namely, indirect links
via common exposures to external assets which, when combined with direct interbank
exposures, results in a multilayer network. Against this background, this chapter is firmly
situated in the state-of-the-art in interbank network and financial stability modelling
due to the combination of multilayer network analysis (allowing for various channels of
contagion) and complex bank behaviour.
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However, given the nascency of the field, there is no common framework for presenting re-
sults in a comprehensive way. Moreover, the model is largely computational in nature and
generates a large amount of data on banks’ balance sheet evolution, investment behaviour
as well as bilateral information on interbank rates, loan requests, loan provision and loan
repayment. In order to fit with the policy-oriented narrative of the thesis, I conducted a
counterfactual simulation comparing outcomes with and without the emergency liquidity
provision by the central bank. The results are largely in line with actual observations
on the manifestation of the crisis on the interbank market: while the central bank was
able to avert widespread insolvencies and maintain credit provision to the private sector,
it was unable to jumpstart the interbank market due to the buildup and feedback of
counterparty and liquidity risks.
To summarise, the present thesis not only provides new ways to understand systemic risk
through network analysis, but also outlines a foundation on which future work can be built.
This can be undertaken either through a sensitivity analysis using alternative calibrations
or via the use of real interbank exposure and balance sheet data as an alternative to
the simulated networks for the cascading defaults model and ABM in chapters 2 and 3
respectively, thereby introducing additional realism into the models.
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